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Abstract
My dissertation develops a set of tools for thinking about heterogeneity in economic mod-
els in an analytically tractable way. Many models use the representative agent framework,
which greatly simplifies macroeconomic aggregation but abstracts from the heterogeneity
we see in the real world. Models with heterogeneity in general equilibrium have too many
moving parts, so that it is hard to disentangle cause and effect. First, my work in interna-
tional macroeconomics incorporates heterogeneity via idiosyncratic shocks across countries
in a simple and analytical way. Second, my work on financial frictions helps to understand
the role of asymmetric information between lenders and borrowers in different contractual
environments. Crucially, these insights can be incorporated into the models currently used
by academics and central banks for policy analysis.
The first chapter of my dissertation, “Price Stability in Small Open Economies,” joint
work with Jonathan Hoddenbagh, studies the conduct of optimal monetary policy in a
continuum of small open economies. We obtain a novel closed-form solution that does not
restrict the elasticity of substitution between home and foreign goods to one. Using this
global closed-form solution, we give an exact characterization of optimal monetary policy
and welfare with and without international policy cooperation. We consider the cases of
internationally complete asset markets and financial autarky, producer currency pricing and
local currency pricing. Under producer currency pricing, it is always optimal to mimic the
flexible-price equilibrium through a policy of price stability. Under local currency pricing,
policy should fix the exchange rate. Even though countries have monopoly power, the
continuum of small open economies implies that policymakers cannot affect world income.
This inability to influence world income removes the incentive to deviate from price stability
under producer currency pricing or a fixed exchange rate under local currency pricing, and
prevents gains from international monetary cooperation in all cases examined. Our results
contrast with those for large open economies, where interactions between home policy and
world income drive optimal policy away from price stability or fixed exchange rates, and
gains from cooperation are present.
The second chapter of my dissertation, “The Optimal Design of a Fiscal Union”, joint
work with Jonathan Hoddenbagh, examines the role of fiscal policy cooperation and finan-
cial market integration in an open economy setting, motivated by the recent crisis in the
euro area. I show that the optimal design of a fiscal union is governed by the degree of
substitutability between the export goods of different countries. When countries produce
goods that are imperfect substitutes they should harmonize their income taxes to prevent
large terms of trade externalities. On the other hand, when countries produce goods that
are close substitutes, they should organize a contingent fiscal transfer scheme to insure
against idiosyncratic shocks. The welfare gains from the optimal fiscal union are as high
as 5% of permanent consumption when countries are able to trade safe government bonds,
and approach 20% of permanent consumption when countries lose access to international
financial markets. These gains are especially large for countries like Greece that produce
highly substitutable export goods and who cannot raise funds on international financial
markets to insure against downside risk. The results illustrate why federal currency unions
such as the U.S., Canada and Australia, with income tax harmonization and built-in fiscal
transfer arrangements, withstand asymmetric shocks across regions much better than the
euro area, which lacks these ingredients at the moment.
The third chapter of my dissertation, joint work with Jonathan Hoddenbagh, studies
macro-financial linkages and the impact of financial frictions on real economic activity in
some of my other work. Beginning with the Bernanke-Gertler-Gilchrist (1999) financial
accelerator model, a large literature has shown that financial frictions amplify business
cycles. Using this framework, Christiano, Motto and Rostagno (AER, 2013) show that
shocks to financial frictions can explain business cycle fluctuations quite well. However,
this literature relies on two ad hoc assumptions. When these assumptions are relaxed and
agents have access to a broader set of lending contracts, the financial accelerator disappears,
and shocks to financial frictions have little to no impact on the economy. In addition, under
the ad hoc lending contract inflation targeting eliminates the financial accelerator. These
results provide guidance for monetary policymakers and present a puzzle for macroeconomic
theory.
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Chapter 1
Price Stability in Small Open Economies
1.1 Introduction
Price stability is widely viewed as a benchmark monetary policy for central banks, and has
been found to be optimal in many closed economy studies.1 However, there is a longstanding
debate over the desirability of price stability in the open economy. Asymmetric shocks,
current account imbalances, cross-border pricing decisions, terms of trade movements, policy
cooperation and other elements unique to the open economy introduce complications that
are not present in the closed economy. These additional ingredients present a challenge for
understanding optimal policy in the open economy.
1In this paper, we refer to price stability as the policy which implements the flexible price allocation. A
non-exhaustive list of papers finding price stability to be optimal in closed economies includes Goodfriend
and King (1997, 2001), King and Wolman (1998), and Woodford (2000, 2002). See Schmitt-Grohe´ and
Uribe (2011) for a recent survey. A counterexample is provided by multi-sector models such as that in
Aoki (2001).
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In the classic case of producer currency pricing (PCP), exchange rate fluctuations pass-
through into imported goods prices one-for-one. Under PCP, the first generation of micro-
founded models proved that a central bank should mimic the flexible price allocation, em-
phasizing the isomorphism between optimal monetary policy in closed and open economies
(Clarida, Gali and Gertler (2002) and Obstfeld and Rogoff (2002)). But the optimality of
price stability hinged on two crucial assumptions: unitary elasticity of substitution between
home and foreign goods, and PCP. Unitary elasticity implies complete risk-sharing across
countries via terms-of-trade movements, so that households face no idiosyncratic consump-
tion risk in complete markets, incomplete markets or financial autarky (Cole and Obstfeld
(1991)). Counterfactually, under unitary elasticity export revenues are constant and im-
mune to exchange rate fluctuations and productivity shocks. No expenditure switching
occurs, so that household consumption does not shift to goods from “cheaper” countries
(countries with a depreciated currency for example).
Benigno and Benigno (2003) relaxed this assumption, and showed that price stability is no
longer optimal for PCP under non-unitary elasticity. Their work affirmed a central bank’s
incentive to manipulate its terms of trade, removing the isomorphism between optimal
monetary policy in closed and open economies.2 In addition, a number of studies have
2Benigno and Benigno (2003) hearkened back to the earlier predictions of non-microfounded models, which
established a deflationary bias in the open economy due to a central bank’s incentive to appreciate its
terms of trade (Rogoff (1985), Oudiz and Sachs (1984), and Canzoneri and Henderson (1990)). Benigno
and Benigno (2006) later showed that price stability is optimal for large open economies under non-
unitary elasticity when central banks cooperate and markets are complete. Corsetti, Dedola and Leduc
(2010) also examine optimal monetary policy under financial autarky, and show that price stability is
never optimal in financial autarky for large open economies. This contrasts with our results for small
open economies, where price stability is optimal under PCP in all cases, even in financial autarky.
2
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shown that under local currency pricing (LCP), when exchange rate fluctuations do not
pass-through into imported goods prices, price stability is not optimal (Devereux and Engel
(2003), Corsetti and Pesenti (2005), Corsetti, Dedola and Leduc (2010)).3
In this paper, we study the theoretical conditions under which price stability is optimal in
a continuum of small open economies. We solve the model globally in closed-form without
restricting the elasticity of substitution between home and foreign goods to one. To the best
of our knowledge, we derive the first closed-form solution for an open economy model that
allows substitutability to differ from one, enabling us to consider cases away from perfect
risk-sharing, including financial autarky. As in Benigno and Benigno (2003, 2006), Corsetti
and Pesenti (2001, 2005), Devereux and Engel (2003), Sutherland (2004) and others, we
assume one-period in advance price setting and no home bias.
While previous studies of optimal monetary policy in small open economies focus on PCP
with non-cooperative policymakers, we give an exact characterization of optimal monetary
policy and welfare with and without international policy cooperation for PCP and LCP, in
complete markets and financial autarky.4 The continuum framework allows us to examine
3Devereux and Engel (2003) study optimal monetary policy for two large open economies under PCP and
LCP in a complete markets model with unitary elasticity and find that a fixed exchange rate is the
optimal policy under LCP. Corsetti, Dedola and Leduc (2010) examine LCP under non-unitary elasticity
in complete markets and financial autarky for cooperative policymakers, and show that a fixed exchange
rate is not optimal. We do the same exercise for small open economies and find that a fixed exchange
rate is optimal for LCP in all cases examined, for any elasticity.
4A non-exhaustive list of studies of optimal monetary policy in small open economies includes Gali and
Monacelli (2005), Faia and Monacelli (2008), De Paoli (2009a) and De Paoli (2009b), Catao and Chang
(2012), Hevia and Nicolini (2012) and Monacelli (2012). Generally, these papers allow for a richer
specification and show various results depending on the emphasis and specific ingredients. All focus on
PCP and do not examine potential gains from cooperation. Modeling LCP in a continuum of small open
economies is quite difficult because the law of one price and purchasing power parity no longer hold.
With two economies, it is not hard to keep track of exchange rate policy, but in the continuum this
proves more challenging.
3
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the implications of international policy cooperation and solve for Nash equilibria, which is
not possible in the standard small open economy setup where there is only one measure
zero small open economy and one “rest of the world” block. Combined with our closed-form
solution, we obtain exact welfare gains resulting from cooperation amongst a continuum of
small, interdependent economies.5
Our results point to the importance of country size in the conduct of optimal monetary
policy. We prove that for small open economies implementing the flexible price allocation
through a policy of price stability is optimal under PCP, while a fixed exchange rate is
optimal under LCP. Both results hold for any elasticity of substitution between home and
foreign goods, in complete markets and financial autarky, with or without international
policy cooperation. We also show that international monetary cooperation does not im-
prove welfare for small open economies. Under central bank commitment, the cooperative
and non-cooperative solutions exactly coincide under any combination of PCP and LCP,
complete markets and financial autarky for any elasticity of substitution.6
Even though countries have monopoly power and can manipulate their terms of trade
5To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to examine cooperation within the continuum framework.
Our analysis does not face the problems encountered when conducting such an exercise in a log-linear
model. In a log-linear model, the steady state will be different in cooperative and non-cooperative
equilibria. As such, it is not clear how to make an accurate comparison of welfare between cooperative
and non-cooperative regimes. This is one reason why there was such an emphasis on closed-form solutions
in the early micro-founded literature on international policy cooperation. See Corsetti and Pesenti (2001,
2005) and Obstfeld and Rogoff (2001, 2002). In this paper we focus only on monetary policy cooperation,
but in a related paper we consider optimal fiscal policy and fiscal cooperation across countries (Dmitriev
and Hoddenbagh (2013)).
6This matches results for large economies under unitary elasticity (Obstfeld and Rogoff (2002)), where
gains from cooperation are absent, but contrasts with results for large open economies under non-unitary
elasticity (Benigno and Benigno (2006), Corsetti et al (2010) and Sutherland (2004)), where gains are
present.
4
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in our model, the continuum of small open economies implies that policymakers cannot
affect world income. This inability to influence world income removes the incentive to
deviate from price stability under producer currency pricing or a fixed exchange rate under
local currency pricing, and prevents gains from international monetary cooperation in all
cases examined.7 Small open economies are analogous to firms in a model of monopolistic
competition: policymakers have market power but cannot influence the behavior of other
countries in the model.
Policymakers’ inability to influence world income has very different implications under
PCP and LCP. Under PCP, the policy decisions of small open economies have no effect
on consumption baskets in foreign countries, which shuts down the expenditure switching
channel abroad. Unable to induce expenditure switching or influence foreign income, poli-
cymakers charge a constant terms of trade markup, utilizing monopoly power at the country
level. Monopolistic producers in our model also charge a constant markup utilizing their
monopoly power at the firm level within each country, but policymakers remove this do-
mestic markup via production subsidies. Since monetary policy can only affect the variance
and not the level of these constant markups, the optimal solution for the policymaker under
PCP is to mimic the flexible price allocation.
7In our model there is monopoly power at the firm and the country level. Both fiscal and monetary
policymakers can utilize country-level monopoly power to manipulate their terms of trade. But because
economies are small and cannot affect world income or induce expenditure switching abroad, central
banks will choose not to utilize this monopoly power as they find it optimal to replicate the flexible-
price equilibrium. On the other hand, optimizing fiscal authorities will choose to apply a constant terms
of trade markup on exports. We focus on the role of fiscal policy in another paper (Dmitriev and
Hoddenbagh (2013)). To be clear: in our model central banks are able to manipulate the terms of trade
but will choose not to, whereas fiscal authorities will charge a constant terms of trade markup equal to
γ−1
γ
.
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In contrast, when economies are large, policymakers must internalize the effect of their
decisions on the rest of the world. When domestic policymakers charge higher markups,
foreign households become poorer and shift consumption toward cheaper products. Under
PCP, expenditure switching abroad forces policymakers in large economies to behave more
cooperatively and charge lower markups. Since the relative size of an economy changes
stochastically with productivity shocks, the domestic policymaker in a large open economy
finds it optimal to deviate from flexible prices and charge a variable markup rather than a
constant one.
Under LCP, prices are fixed one period in advance in the currency of the importer, so the
proportion of income allocated to country-specific goods is insulated from monetary policy
and exogenous shocks. As a result, a constant proportion of world income is spent on each
country’s unique variety, and expenditure switching does not occur. In addition, small open
economies cannot affect world income, so domestic output and labor are unaffected by mon-
etary policy. The central bank thus maximizes welfare by stabilizing domestic consumption
via a fixed exchange rate. With a fixed exchange rate, labor fluctuates with productivity
shocks while consumption remains constant.
On the other hand, monetary policy in large open economies can influence domestic labor
under LCP. Expansionary monetary policy at home will increase wages, while goods prices
remain fixed. This induces home and foreign households to work more, since domestic and
foreign firms face higher demand for their goods. Higher real wages and an increase in hours
worked lead to higher domestic consumption. Policymakers in large open economies thus
6
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face a trade-off between labor and consumption volatility. In such cases, a fixed exchange
rate is no longer optimal.8
Is the Optimality of Price Stability Robust to Alternative Assumptions
on Price-Setting?
Up to this point we have assumed that prices are set one period in advance. If we change
this assumption and use quadratic costs of adjustment on prices or Calvo pricing, is price
stability still the optimal policy for central banks under PCP?
Optimal monetary policy should always set a fixed distance between the desired markup
and the actual markup, and this distance should be as small as possible. If the desired
markup is fixed, then there is no role for cyclical monetary policy, regardless of all other
conditions. If there are adjustment costs for prices, then the central bank will use them to
minimize the average distance between the actual and desired markup.
For small open economies without home bias, the desired markup is fixed over the business
cycle because all production is exported: with a CES demand structure, a constant terms
of trade markup is optimal. Under quadratic adjustment costs for prices, the central bank
will use steady-state deflation to tilt the terms of trade in its favor and impose a constant
terms of trade markup on its export goods. A policy of constant steady-state deflation will
thus be the optimal monetary policy. One can view this as optimal “deflation targeting”.
In this case, monetary policy cooperation will lead to gains in the steady-state, as the
8Unless labor enters the utility function as a linear term, as in Devereux and Engel (2003), in which case a
fixed exchange rate is optimal. In our model, labor enters the utility function as a non-linear term but
we still find that a fixed exchange rate is optimal under LCP.
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distortionary impact of the terms of trade markup imposed through steady-state deflation
will be removed when central banks internalize the impact of their monetary policy on other
countries. Note however that there is no incentive for the policymaker to deviate from the
policy of constant steady-state deflation over the business cycle, because the desired markup
is fixed. As a result, there are no gains from cooperation over the business cycle.
Under Calvo pricing on the other hand, steady-state inflation or deflation will have no
impact on the actual markup because agents in the economy anticipate the central bank’s
policy under commitment and prices are set in a forward looking manner. Unlike with
quadratic adjustment costs, central banks cannot affect the markup in the steady-state
because of the forward looking nature of the price setting assumption. As a result, under
Calvo pricing and one period in advance pricing central banks are unable to tilt the terms
of trade in their favor through monetary policy. Mimicking the flexible price equilibrium
through a policy of price stability is thus optimal under Calvo pricing as well as one period
in advance pricing, and there are no gains from cooperation in the steady-state or over the
business cycle.
8
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Economy Size and the Continuum
Table 1.1: Economy Size Measured By Contribution to World Trade
Country Exports* Imports*
EU† 11.99 13.02
China 10.68 9.69
US 8.50 12.86
Japan 4.50 4.42
South Korea 3.13 2.92
Russia 2.93 1.38
UK 2.79 3.64
Canada 2.53 2.61
*Exports and imports as a % of world exports
and imports (Source: WTO, 2011).
† Excludes internal trade.
Although the continuum enables very sharp predictions, is it a realistic assumption? The
data show that it is. For the purposes of this paper, we proxy for an economy’s size by
calculating its contribution to world trade – a measure of both size and openness. Table
1 shows the top eight trading nations measured by exports and imports to the rest of the
world as a percentage of total world exports and imports, respectively.9 Using this metric,
the continuum is a reasonable assumption. The largest economy in the world, the U.S.,
accounts for only about ten percent of world trade, which demonstrates the importance of
openness when evaluating relative country size in the world economy. A country with a
9EU trade data excludes intra-EU trade because we are trying to capture the influence of a central bank
(in this case the ECB) on the global economy. Thus, any trade within a currency union is excluded from
our calculation. This is why we look at the EU as a whole, rather than considering Germany, France,
Italy, etc. as separate countries. From the perspective of evaluating optimal monetary policy, these
countries share the same central bank. We recognize that the euro area is smaller than the EU, but we
could not find adequate data at the euro area level that disaggregated internal and external trade, so
we were forced to consider the EU as a whole. In this vein, we naturally exclude intra-U.S. trade in our
calculation.
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large GDP may make up a small percentage of world trade if it is relatively closed to the
rest of the world.
In line with this empirical evidence, Gali and Monacelli (2005, 2008) introduced a model
that considered a continuum of small open economies. They solved for optimal policy in the
aforementioned Cole-Obstfeld case of log utility and unitary elasticity. In their own words:
Domestic price stability (along with fully flexible exchange rates) stands out as
the welfare maximizing policy in the particular case of log utility and unitary
elasticity of substitution ... The derivation of the relevant welfare function for
the small open economy in the case of more general preferences as well as that of
uncorrected steady state distortions would allow a more thorough analysis and
quantitative evaluation of the optimal monetary policy and should certainly be
the object of future research.
Our paper answers this call. We evaluate optimal policy away from the Cole-Obstfeld
case, considering both incomplete risk-sharing and a general preference specification, with-
out having to approximate a welfare function around a steady state (whether distorted or
otherwise). This enables us to consider cases with uncorrected steady state distortions,
such as a constant terms of trade markup, as well as international monetary cooperation
and non-cooperative Nash equilibria. All of these possibilities demonstrate the power of the
global closed-form solution.
The paper proceeds as follows. We begin by laying out the model for PCP in Section
2. In Section 3, we examine optimal monetary policy in the closed economy to develop
10
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intuition, and then move to the open economy where we solve for optimal monetary policy
under PCP, first in complete markets and then in financial autarky. Finally, we lay out the
model for LCP in Section 4, and solve for optimal monetary policy in complete markets
and financial autarky. Section 5 concludes.
1.2 The Model
We consider a continuum of small open economies represented by the unit interval, as
popularized in the literature by Gali and Monacelli (2005, 2008).10 Each economy consists
of a representative household and a representative firm. All countries are identical ex-
ante: they have the same preferences, technology, and price-setting. Ex-post, economies
will differ depending on the realization of their technology shock. Households are immobile
across countries, however goods can move freely across borders. Each economy produces one
final good, over which it exercises a degree of monopoly power. This is crucially important:
countries are able to manipulate their terms of trade even though they are measure zero.
However, because countries are small they will be unable to influence world income and
induce expenditure switching to their goods. Policymakers will thus charge a constant
terms of trade markup on their exports.
We use one-period-in-advance price setting to introduce nominal rigidities.11 Monopo-
listic firms set next-period’s nominal prices, in terms of domestic currency, prior to next-
10A similar version of this model appears in Dmitriev and Hoddenbagh (2013) where we employ wage rigidity
instead of price rigidity and study the optimal design of a fiscal union within a currency union.
11Assuming rigid wages or prices has no impact on the results: they yield identical policy implications.
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period’s production and consumption decisions. These firms will charge a constant markup
in the flex-price equilibrium, utilizing their monopoly power at the firm level. Given this
preset price, firms supply as much output as demanded by households.
We lay out a general framework below, and then hone in on two specific cases: complete
markets and financial autarky. To avoid additional notation, we ignore time subindices
unless absolutely necessary. When time subindices are absent, we are implicitly referring
to period t.
Households In each economy i ∈ [0, 1], there is a representative household with lifetime
expected utility
Et−1
{ ∞∑
k=0
βk
(
C1−σit+k
1− σ − χ
N1+ϕit+k
1 + ϕ
)}
(1.1)
where β < 1 is the household discount factor, C is the consumption basket or index, and
N is household labor effort (think of this as hours worked). Households face a general
budget constraint that nests both complete markets and financial autarky; we will discuss
the differences between the two in subsequent sections. For now, it is sufficient to simply
write out the most general form of the budget constraint:
Cit = (1− τi)
(
Wit
Pit
)
Nit +Dit + Tit. (1.2)
The distortionary tax rate on household labor income in country i is denoted by τi, while
Tit is a lump-sum tax rebate to households. Net taxes equal zero in the model, as any
12
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amount of government revenue is rebated lump-sum to households. The consumer price
index corresponds to Pit, while the nominal wage is Wit. Dit denotes state-contingent
portfolio payments expressed in real consumption units, and can be written in more detail
as:
DitPit =
∫ 1
0
EijtBijtdj, (1.3)
where Bijt is a state-contingent payment in currency j.
12 Eijt is the exchange rate in units of
currency i per one unit of currency j; an increase in Eijt signals a depreciation of currency i
relative to currency j. When international asset markets are complete, households perform
all cross-border trades in contingent claims in period 0, insuring against all possible states in
all future periods. The transverality condition simply states that all period 0 transactions
must be balanced: payment for claims issued must equal payment for claims received.
Leaving the details in the appendix, we use the following relationship as the transversality
condition for complete markets:
E0
{ ∞∑
t=0
βtC−σit Dit
}
= 0, (1.4)
while in financial autarky
Dit = 0.
12Equation (2.6) holds in all possible states in all periods. Details are provided in Appendix A.1.
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Intuitively, the transversality condition (2.7) stipulates that the present discounted value
of future earnings should be equal to the present discounted value of future consumption
flows. Under complete markets, consumers choose a state contingent plan for consumption,
labor supply and portfolio holdings in period 0.
Consumption and Price Indices Households in each country consume a basket of
imported goods. This consumption basket is an aggregate of all of the varieties produced
by different countries. The consumption basket for a representative small open economy i,
which is common across countries, is defined as follows:
Ci =
(∫ 1
0
c
γ−1
γ
ij dj
) γ
γ−1
(1.5)
where cij is the consumption by country i of the final good produced by country j, and γ is
the elasticity of substitution between domestic and foreign goods (the Armington elasticity).
Because there is no home bias in consumption, countries will export all of the output of
their unique variety, and import varieties from other countries to assemble the consumption
basket.
Prices are defined as follows: upper case Pij denotes the price in country i (in currency i)
of the unique final good produced in country j, while CPIi is the aggregate consumer price
index in country i. Given the above consumption index, the consumer price index will be:
CPIi =
(∫ 1
0
P 1−γij dj
) 1
1−γ
. (1.6)
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Consumption by country i of the unique variety produced by country j is:
cij =
(
Pij
CPIi
)−γ
Ci. (1.7)
We assume that producer currency pricing (PCP) holds, and that the law of one price
(LOP) holds, so that the price of the same good is equal across countries when converted
into a common currency. We define the nominal bilateral exchange rate between countries
i and j, Eij , as units of currency i per one unit of currency j. LOP requires that:
Pij = EijPjj . (1.8)
Given LOP and identical preferences across countries, PPP will also hold for all i, j country
pairs:
CPIi = EijCPIj , (1.9)
The terms of trade for country j will be:
TOTj =
PExports from j
PImports to j
=
Pjj
CPIj
, (1.10)
where TOTj is defined as the home currency price of exports over the home currency price
of imports. Since the domestic consumption basket is entirely composed of foreign inputs,
the domestic CPI will be equal to the home currency price of imports. Now we can take
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(2.10), and using (2.11) and (2.12), solve for demand for country j’s unique variety:
Yj =
∫ 1
0
cijdi =
∫ 1
0
(
Pij
CPIi
)−γ
Cidi
(2.11)+(2.12)
=
(
Pjj
CPIj
)−γ ∫ 1
0
Cidi = TOT
−γ
j Cw.
(1.11)
where Cw is defined as the average world consumption across all i economies, Cw =
∫ 1
0 Cidi.
Production Each economy i consists of a group of intermediate goods producers, h ∈
[0, 1], who exercise monopoly power over their unique variety, and a perfectly competitive
final goods exporter who aggregates the intermediates in CES fashion into a final export
good. For simplicity, we assume that intermediates are non-tradable. Thus, each country
will bundle its intermediates into one final export good.13 Figure 1 below illustrates the
bundling of intermediates into a final export good, and the bundling of those exports into
the household consumption basket. We differentiate between the markup on intermediate
domestic goods (µ = εε−1) and the markup on the final export good (µγ =
γ
γ−1), which is
imposed only if policymakers decide to manipulate their terms of trade.
13We assume non-tradable intermediates with a final tradable consumption good that aggregates those
intermediates for simplicity. In Gali and Monacelli’s (2005, 2008) setup, intermediate goods are tradable,
such that every country’s import consumption basket is made up of an infinite number of varieties
imported from an infinite number of countries. This requires integrating over two continuums. While
it is straightforward for us to maintain their setup, we prefer the tractable alternative: a final goods
exporter bundles the domestically produced intermediates for export. In this way, each country produces
only one unique variety, and we only need integrate over one continuum. This assumption does not
change the results in any way. In both cases the household consumption basket in each country is made
up of imported goods from all i countries, which are themselves made up of intermediates produced
domestically.
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Figure 1
Production of intermediates requires technology Zi, which is common across firms within
a country, and labor Ni(h), which is unique to each firm. We do not need to assume
a specific distribution for technology, a luxury afforded by our closed-form solution. We
do assume that technology is independent across time and across countries, but is identical
across firms within the same country. Given this, the production function of a representative
intermediate goods firm h in country i will be:
yi(h) = Zini(h). (1.12)
Because intermediate goods firms produce differentiated varities, they have monopoly power
over their output, which leads to a markup in intermediate goods. Perfectly competitive
final goods exporters aggregate the intermediate input of each firm, so that production of
the representative final exporter in a specific country is:
Yi =
[∫ 1
0
yi(h)
ε−1
ε dh
] ε
ε−1
, (1.13)
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where ε is the elasticity of substitution between different intermediates, and µ = εε−1 is the
markup. The price of the final good in country i, Pii, will be a function of the nominal
price for intermediate goods, pi(h):
Pii =
[∫ 1
0
pi(h)
1−εdh
] 1
1−ε
.
Cost minimization by the perfectly competitive final goods exporter leads to the following
demand for intermediates:
yi(h) =
[
pi(h)
Pii
]−ε
Yi. (1.14)
In summary, monopoly power may be exercised at the firm and the country level: at the
firm level because of the production of differentiated domestic varieties, and at the country
level because each economy produces a unique variety for export. Households and final
goods exporters have no monopoly power and are perfectly competitive.14
Intermediate goods firms will price their unique good one-period-in-advance according to
the following condition, which results from profit maximization:
pit(h) = µ
Et−1
{
C−σit yit(h)
Wit
ZitCPIi
}
Et−1
{
C−σit yit(h)
CPIit
} . (1.15)
14It is entirely plausible to shift the country-level monopoly power from the policymaker to the final goods
exporter. All results will be exactly the same: terms of trade markups will be constant — just as in a
model of monopolistic competition. As such, price stability will remain optimal under PCP.
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Households maximize utility (2.4) subject to their budget constraint (2.5). The FOC with
respect to labor will give the following household labor supply condition:
Wit
CPIit
=
(
χ
1− τi
)
NϕitC
σ
it. (1.16)
Firms are identical, so that in equilibrium pi(h) = Pii and yi(h) = Zini(h) = ZiNi = Yi.
Using the labor demand condition (2.16) and the labor supply condition (2.15), and the
fact that prices are preset at time t− 1, the labor market clearing condition will be:
1 =
(
χµ
1− τi
) Et−1 {N1+ϕit }
Et−1
{
C−σit YitTOTi
} . (1.17)
This is the general labor market clearing condition; it holds in the closed economy and in
the open economy for PCP. Under PCP, the demand for the unique variety (2.14) will give
the following labor market clearing condition:
1 =
(
χµ
1− τi
) Et−1 {N1+ϕit }
Et−1
{
C−σit Y
γ−1
γ
it C
1
γ
wt
} . (1.18)
Taking the expectations operator out of (2.18) will give the flexible price equilibrium for
PCP.
We now turn our attention to the difference between complete markets and financial
autarky.
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1.2.1 Complete Markets
In this section, we assume that agents in each economy trade a full set of domestic and
foreign state-contingent assets. Households in all countries will maximize their utility (2.4),
choosing consumption, leisure, money holdings, and a complete set of state-contingent nom-
inal bonds, subject to (2.5).
Risk-Sharing Complete markets and PPP imply the following risk-sharing condition:
C−σit
C−σit+1
=
C−σjt
C−σjt+1
∀i, j (1.19)
which states that the ratio of the marginal utility of consumption at time t and t+ 1 must
be equal across all countries. Importantly, this condition does not imply that consumption
is equal across countries. Consumption in country i will depend on its initial asset position,
monetary policy, the distribution of country-specific shocks, the covariance of global and
local shocks, and other factors.
When the central bank in economy i changes its policy, the consumption allocation in
country i may change as well. For example, monetary policy can affect the covariance
between home production and world consumption, and this covariance will influence the
level of household consumption even under complete markets. The risk-sharing condition
(2.19) and the transversality condition (2.7) are both robust to changes in monetary policy.
If we combine the two, the resulting goods market clearing condition will also be robust to
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changes in monetary policy. When (2.7),(2.17), and (2.19) hold, consumption in country i
can be expressed as a function of world consumption:
Cit =
Et−1
{∑∞
t=1 β
t
[
YitC
−σ
wt TOTit
]}
Et−1
{∑∞
t=1 β
tC1−σwt
} Cwt. (1.20)
We solve for this expression explicitly in Appendix A.1.
Using the fact that Zit is independent across time and and across countries, and prices
are preset, (2.20) is equivalent to
Cit = Et−1 {YitTOTit} = C
1
γ
wtEt−1
{
Y
γ−1
γ
it
}
. (1.21)
1.2.2 Financial Autarky
The aggregate resource constraint under financial autarky specifies that the nominal value
of output in the home country (exports) must equal the nominal of consumption in the
home country (imports). That is, trade in goods must be balanced. In a model with cross-
border lending, bonds would also show up in this condition, but in financial autarky, they
are obviously absent. The primary departure from complete markets lies in the household
and economy-wide budget constraints.
Pii · Yi︸ ︷︷ ︸
Exports
= CPIi · Ci︸ ︷︷ ︸
Imports
(1.22)
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Using the fact that (2.14) holds under both complete markets and financial autarky, and
substituting this into (2.22), one can show that demand for country i’s good in financial
autarky will be
Cit = C
1
γ
wtY
γ−1
γ
it . (1.23)
Complete markets and autarky differ only by goods market clearing. In complete markets
consumption is equal to expected domestic output expressed in consumption baskets; in
autarky consumption is equal to realized domestic output expressed in consumption baskets.
1.3 Optimal Monetary Policy
Now that we’ve laid out the model in detail for both complete markets and financial autarky,
we consider optimal policy for a variety of scenarios. Without loss of generality, we assume a
cashless limiting economy. Central banks will optimize by choosing labor instead of money
supply or an interest rate rule, but all three are equivalent in this model: money supply
will determine the interest rate, which will in turn determine labor. We prove this in
Appendix F.15 One can easily write down a money supply rule or interest rate rule that
exactly implements the allocation resulting from optimization over labor. But for the sake
of simplicity, we assume the central bank optimizes over labor.
The timing of the model is described in Figure 2 below. Before any shocks are realized,
national central banks declare their policy for all states of the world. With this knowledge
15Benigno and Benigno (2003) also describe a cashless-limiting economy in detail in their appendix, pp.756-
758.
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in hand, households lay out a state-contingent plan for consumption, labor, money and
asset holdings. After that, shocks hit the economy. Note that under financial autarky, no
international asset trading will occur.
Figure 2
Central
bank
declares
monetary
policy
-1
Household
makes
state-contingent
plan
0
Period 1
shocks are
realized
1 2, 3, ..., t-1
Period t shocks
are realized
t
We begin with an analysis of optimal monetary policy in a closed economy version of
our model, and then proceed to the open economy. In all cases, we consider optimal policy
under commitment.
1.3.1 Closed Economy
The Flexible Price Allocation
To solve for the flexible price allocation in the closed economy, simply take expectations out
of (2.17), set TOTi = 1, and use goods market clearing (Yt = Ct = NtZt). This will give us
a system of two equations in two unknowns, Nt and Ct:
1 =
(
χµ
1− τ
)
N1+ϕt
C1−σt
,
Ct = NtZt.
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The solution to this two equation system is the flexible price allocation for the closed
economy: Ct =
(
1−τ
χµ
) 1
σ+ϕ
Z
1+ϕ
σ+ϕ
t .
Optimal Monetary Policy
The central bank will choose labor to maximize the expected utility of the representative
agent, given the closed economy labor market and goods market clearing constraints.
max
Nt
Et−1
{
C1−σt
1− σ − χ
N1+ϕt
(1 + ϕ)
}
(1.24)
s.t.
1 =
(
χµ
1− τ
) Et−1 {N1+ϕt }
Et−1
{
C1−σt
} (1.25)
Ct =ZtNt (1.26)
Although it is standard practice to use a welfare-loss function for optimal policy evalua-
tion, we can simply use the household utility function because of our global, closed-form
solution.16
Proposition 1 In the closed economy under ex ante commitment, the central bank will
maximize (1.24) subject to (1.25) and (1.26). The solution to this problem is: Ct =(
1−τ
χµ
) 1
σ+ϕ
Z
1+ϕ
σ+ϕ
t . The central bank replicates the flexible price allocation via a policy of
16The only reason to use a welfare-loss function is if the model in question must be approximated around a
steady state. Here, no such approximation is required, and thus a welfare-loss function is not needed.
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price stability.
Proof See Appendix B. 
Optimal Policy Under A Social Planner
Proposition 2 In the closed economy, the social planner will maximize (1.24) subject
to (1.26), ignoring the labor condition (1.25). The solution to this problem is: Ct =(
1
χ
) 1
σ+ϕ
Z
1+ϕ
σ+ϕ
t .
Proof See Appendix B. 
In comparing the solutions described in Proposition 1 and 2, notice that the social planner
mimics the flexible price allocation while eliminating the monopolistic markup µ (Proposi-
tion 2), while the markup and labor tax remain when we only consider optimal monetary
policy (Proposition 1). In the case of ex ante commitment in Proposition 1, a fiscal author-
ity may introduce subsidies to exactly offset the markup and replicate the social planner
equilibrium. It is straightforwad to show that τ = 1 − µ will get rid of the monopolistic
distortion on labor inputs and give the Pareto efficient allocation.
We’ve studied optimal policy in the closed economy, and proved the optimality of price
stability. The divine coincidence holds, a well known result in the closed economy. One
already sees the link between stable monopolistic markups and a desire to mimic the flexible
price allocation. We now turn our attention to the open economy, where we prove that
optimal monetary policy in closed and small open economies is isomorphic in both complete
markets and financial autarky.
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1.3.2 Global Social Planner
The global social planner is a benevolent “dictator” that distributes goods across countries in
order to maximize aggregate world utility. This scenario is analogous to perfect cooperation
among the social planner’s of all i countries. The global social planner solution defines the
Pareto efficient allocation. Since the economies in our model are identical ex-ante, the global
social planner will maximize a weighted utility function over all i countries,
∫ 1
0
[
C1−σi
1− σ − χ
N1+ϕi
(1 + ϕ)
]
di, (1.27)
subject to the consumption basket and the aggregate resource constraint:
Ci =
[∫ 1
0
c
γ−1
γ
ij dj
] γ
γ−1
, (1.28)
Yi =ZiNi =
∫ 1
0
cjidj. (1.29)
Proposition 3 The global social planner will maximize utility weighted over all i countries
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(2.24), subject to (2.25) and (2.26). The solution to this optimization problem is:
E{Ui} = C1−σi
(
1
1− σ −
1
1 + ϕ
)
,
Ci =
(
1
χ
) 1
σ+ϕ
Z
1+ϕ
σ+ϕ
w ,
Ni =
(
1
χ
) 1
σ+ϕ
Z
(1−γσ)(1+ϕ)
(1+γϕ)(σ+ϕ)
w Z
γ−1
1+γϕ
i ,
Yi =
(
1
χ
) 1
σ+ϕ
Z
(1−γσ)(1+ϕ)
(1+γϕ)(σ+ϕ)
w Z
γ(1+ϕ)
1+γϕ
i ,
Zw =
(∫ 1
0
Z
(γ−1)(1+ϕ)
1+γϕ
i di
) 1+γϕ
(γ−1)(1+ϕ)
.
Proof See Appendix C. 
The global social planner allocation above is a traditional benchmark for the evaluation of
different policy regimes. Because this is the Pareto efficient allocation, it provides a natural
marker with which to compare various policies under commitment. Notice that there are
no markups in the Pareto efficient allocation: the benevolent global social planner has
eliminated the markup on intermediate goods µ, and resisted the temptation to manipulate
the terms of trade. In the next sections we will look closely at optimal monetary policy for
central banks and see what conditions are necessary to replicate the global social planner
allocation.
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1.3.3 Complete Markets
In this section we examine the optimal monetary policy for cooperative and non-cooperative
central banks in complete markets. The objective functions for cooperative and non-
cooperative central banks are below.
max
Nit
Et−1
{
C1−σit
1− σ − χ
N1+ϕit
1 + ϕ
}
(1.30a)
max
∀Nit
∫ 1
0
Et−1
{
C1−σit
1− σ − χ
N1+ϕit
1 + ϕ
}
di (1.30b)
Non-cooperative central banks will choose the optimal amount of labor to maximize their
domestic welfare (1.30a), while cooperative central banks will choose the optimal amount of
labor in order to maximize the welfare of all i economies (1.30b). In both cases, policymakers
will maximize the appropriate objective function subject to labor market clearing (2.29a)
and goods market clearing (2.29b) constraints, and production (2.29c) and aggregate world
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consumption (2.29d):
1 =
(
χµ
1− τi
) Et−1 {N1+ϕit }
Et−1
{
C−σit Y
γ−1
γ
it C
1
γ
wt
} , (1.31)
Cit = C
1
γ
wtEt−1
{
Y
γ−1
γ
it
}
, (1.32)
Yit = ZitNit, (1.33)
Cwt =
(∫ 1
0
Y
γ−1
γ
it
) γ
γ−1
. (1.34)
Proposition 4 In complete markets, non-cooperative central banks will maximize (1.30a)
and cooperative central banks will maximize (1.30b), subject to (2.29a), (2.29b), (2.29c) and
(2.29d). The solution under commitment for both cooperative and non-cooperative central
banks in complete markets is:
E{Ui} = C1−σi
(
1
1− σ −
1− τi
µ(1 + ϕ)
)
Ci =
(
1− τi
χµ
) 1
σ+ϕ
Z
1+ϕ
σ+ϕ
w
Ni =
(
1− τi
χµ
) 1
σ+ϕ
Z
(1−γσ)(1+ϕ)
(1+γϕ)(σ+ϕ)
w Z
γ−1
1+γϕ
i
Yi =
(
1− τi
χµ
) 1
σ+ϕ
Z
(1−γσ)(1+ϕ)
(1+γϕ)(σ+ϕ)
w Z
γ(1+ϕ)
1+γϕ
i
Zw =
(∫ 1
0
Z
(γ−1)(1+ϕ)
1+γϕ
i di
) 1+γϕ
(γ−1)(1+ϕ)
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The resulting equilibrium allocation exactly coincides with the flexible price allocation. Mim-
icking the flexible price allocation is thus the dominant strategy for non-cooperative central
banks in complete markets, and is the optimal policy under cooperation. If the government
corrects the distortions due to market power with a non-contingent tax τi = 1− µ, then the
flexible price allocation in complete markets is identical to the global social planner solution.
Proof See Appendix D. 
There are a few important points to note from this exercise. First of all, note that
consumption in the optimal allocation is not subject to idiosyncratic technology shocks.
Because we are in complete markets, consumption is simply a function of average world
technology. Second, note that cooperative and non-cooperative equilibria are identical:
both yield the flexible price allocation.
In complete markets, we’ve shown that small open economy central banks will mimic
the flexible price allocation under both cooperative and non-cooperative regimes, for any
elasticity of substitution between home and foreign goods. In addition, we’ve demonstrated
that international monetary cooperation has no impact on welfare. This is because monetary
policy has no power against non-contingent distortions like markups, and can only address
the contingent price rigidity distortion. In the next section, we conduct the same exercise
for financial autarky.
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1.3.4 Financial Autarky
In financial autarky, the objective functions for cooperative and non-cooperative central
banks will be identical to those in complete markets. The only difference in the optimization
problem will be in the goods market constraint. In complete markets home consumption is
a function of expected output (2.29b), while in autarky home consumption is a function of
actual output (2.31).
1 =
(
χµ
1− τi
) Et−1 {N1+ηit }
Et−1
{
C−σit Y
γ−1
γ
it C
1
γ
w,t
} (1.35)
Cit = C
1
γ
w,tY
γ−1
γ
it (1.36)
Yit = ZitNit (1.37)
Cwt =
(∫ 1
0
Y
γ−1
γ
it
) γ
γ−1
. (1.38)
Proposition 5 In financial autarky, non-cooperative central banks will maximize (1.30a)
and cooperative central banks will maximize (1.30b), subject to (1.35), (2.31), (1.37) and
(1.38). The solution under commitment for both cooperative and non-cooperative central
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banks in financial autarky is:
E{Ui} = Ci
(
1
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)
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.
The resulting equilibrium allocation exactly coincides with the flexible price allocation. Mim-
icking the flexible price allocation is thus the dominant strategy for non-cooperative central
banks in financial autarky, and is the optimal policy under cooperation.
Proof See Appendix D. 
Note that in financial autarky, consumption is a function of idiosyncratic technology Zi,
reflecting the lack of international risk-sharing. As in complete markets, the optimal policy
for cooperative and non-cooperative central banks is to mimic the flexible price equilibrium.
We thus demonstrate the isomorphism between optimal monetary policy in closed and small
open economies for both complete markets and financial autarky.
As we’ve stated before, the key to this isomorphism stems from the inability of small open
economies to affect foreign consumption or income. The optimal terms of trade markup
on exports chosen by domestic policymakers is thus constant. Combined with monopolistic
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firms charging a constant markup, the optimal policy response is to remove price rigidities
and return to the flexible price allocation. Similarly, when elasticity is unitary and economies
are large, as in Clarida, Gali and Gertler (2002) and Obstfeld and Rogoff (2002), countries
are unable to influence world income because terms of trade movements no longer lead to
expenditure switching. As a result, price stability is optimal.
1.4 Local Currency Pricing
We now turn our attention to the case of LCP. Modeling LCP in a continuum of small open
economies is difficult because the law of one price and purchasing power parity no longer
hold. In two economy models, keeping track of exchange rate policy is trivial, but in the
continuum this becomes challenging. Although we will gloss over many of the methodologi-
cal nuances necessary to deal with LCP in the continuum, all modeling details can be found
in Appendix E. To simplify expressions, we assume log utility (σ = 1), but allow ϕ to vary
as before.
Under LCP, firms price their export good one-period-in-advance in the currency of the
importing country. As such, there is zero exchange rate pass-through into import prices.
Each country’s consumer price index will thus be fixed one-period-in-advance, as exchange
rate movements will have no impact on import prices. When firms price in this way, the
labor market and goods market clearing constraints will differ from those under PCP. In
complete markets and financial autarky, goods and labor market clearing conditions for
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LCP are:
1 =
(
χµ
1− τi
) Et−1 {N1+ϕit }
Et−1
{
C−1it YitTOTit
} , (1.39)
Cit =
P0it
CPIit
Ei0tYit. (1.40)
To keep track of exchange rate policy in the continuum, we introduce the concept of a
numeraire currency, which we assume is the currency of country 0. Thus, Ei0t is the exchange
rate between country i and the numeraire country, and P0it is the import price of the
numeraire country’s good in currency i.
Proposition 6 Under LCP, non-cooperative central banks will maximize (1.30a) subject
to (1.39) and (1.40). A fixed exchange rate will be the Nash equilibrium policy for a non-
cooperative central bank in both complete markets and financial autarky under LCP.
Proof See Appendix E. 
Et−1
{
C−σit YitEi0t
}
=
χµ
1− τi
Et−1
{
N1+ϕit
}
Et−1 {Cjt}
Et−1 {E0jtCjt} , (1.41)
Cit = Ei0t
∫ 1
0
CjtE0jtdj. (1.42)
Proposition 7 Under LCP, cooperative central banks will maximize (1.30b) subject to
(1.41) and (1.42). The optimal policy for cooperative central banks in both complete markets
and financial autarky will be a fixed exchange rate.
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Proof See Appendix E. 
Price stability is no longer optimal under LCP. Instead, central banks should fix the
exchange rate. Why is a fixed exchange rate optimal under LCP? As we discussed in the
introduction, LCP insulates household consumption baskets in each country from exchange
rate fluctuations, guaranteeing a constant proportion of world income spent on each unique
import good because exchange rate fluctuations do not pass-through into imported goods
prices. Policymakers in small open economies are also unable to influence world income.
Therefore domestic output and labor are unaffected by monetary policy. Stabilizing con-
sumption becomes the central bank’s goal, and the policy mechanism to achieve this goal is
a fixed exchange rate. With a fixed exchange rate, labor fluctuates with productivity shocks
but consumption remains constant. In contrast, when economies are large, monetary policy
can influence domestic labor under LCP. In such cases, a fixed exchange rate is no longer
optimal as shown by Corsetti, Dedola and Leduc (2010). The reasons for this are outlined
in the introduction.
1.5 Conclusion
We derive the first closed-form solution for an open economy model that does not restrict
substitutability between home and foreign goods to one. Different from the standard model-
ing framework in the literature, we assume a continuum of small open economies interacting
in general equilibrium, rather than two large open economies. The tractability of our frame-
work requires simplifying assumptions along other dimensions. Prices are set one period
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in advance, and each country exports all of its production and imports varieties from all
other countries to aggregate into a final consumption basket. Using this setup, we answer
the following question: What are the theoretical conditions under which it is optimal for a
central bank to mimic the flexible price allocation?
We prove that for PCP, small open economy central banks should mimic the flexible price
allocation for any elasticity of substitution between home and foreign goods, in cooperative
and non-cooperative equilibria, in both complete markets and financial autarky. Policymak-
ers should focus solely on eliminating domestic price rigidities and ignore external factors
such as exchange rate movements, even in the presence of monopolistic distortions in goods
markets and terms of trade distortions which are not internalized by domestic producers.
Under LCP, we show that small open economy central banks should fix their exchange rate.
Our results contrast with those in the literature for large open economies, where it is not
optimal to mimic the flexible price allocation under PCP or to fix the exchange rate under
LCP when substitutability differs from one.
We also calculate the welfare gains from cooperation among national monetary author-
ities. We show that for any elasticity in PCP and LCP, in both complete markets and
financial autarky, international monetary cooperation has no impact on welfare. Price
stability is the optimal policy for central banks under PCP in both non-cooperative and co-
operative scenarios, while a fixed exchange rate optimal under LCP in both non-cooperative
and cooperative scenarios. As a result, no benefits arise from cross-country monetary policy
cooperation.
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Our goal in this paper has been to provide a unifying framework for the analysis of optimal
monetary policy in small open economies. We focus on the classic benchmark cases, PCP
and LCP in both complete markets and financial autarky, to try and gain intuition and
understanding about what differentiates policymaking in small and large open economies,
particularly when risk sharing is not provided by terms of trade movements.
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The Optimal Design of a Fiscal Union
2.1 Introduction
The recent crisis in the euro area has prompted much debate about the need for greater fiscal
cooperation across member countries. Although not to the same extent, fiscal crises at the
state and municipal level have begun to raise similar questions in federal currency unions
like the United States.1 This debate has longstanding roots in the economics profession,
dating back to Kenen (1969), who emphasized the importance of fiscal integration in a
currency union.
While the concept of a fiscal union has received a great deal of attention in policy circles,
there is considerable uncertainty about how to design such a union. We study the optimal
design of a fiscal union in an open economy model where countries face three distortions:
1For example, the $14 billion-plus bankruptcy of the city of Detroit is on par with the roughly e10 billion
bank bailout of Cyprus by the euro area governments.
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nominal rigidities, incomplete financial markets, and terms of trade externalities. We show
that the negative welfare impact of these distortions is highly sensitive to the elasticity
of substitution between goods produced in different countries. As such, we find that the
magnitude of this elasticity — the Armington elasticity — governs the optimal design of a
fiscal union.
When the Armington elasticity is equal to one, a common assumption in the literature
known as the Cole-Obstfeld specification, terms of trade movements provide complete in-
ternational risk-sharing through offsetting income and substitution effects, even in financial
autarky.2 If a country produces less output and exports fewer goods under unitary elas-
ticity, its terms of trade will improve and exactly offset the decline in quantity produced
so that export revenues are constant. In this case, there is no need for a fiscal union to
improve international risk-sharing. At the same time, when goods are imperfect substitutes
countries are exposed to a relatively high degree of monopoly power at the export level.
Domestic fiscal policymakers use this monopoly power to impose a large markup on their
exports — what the literature refers to as a terms of trade externality. The optimal fis-
cal union will force domestic fiscal policymakers to internalize this externality and prevent
countries from exploiting their monopoly power and manipulating their terms of trade. We
find that when the elasticity is close to one countries should cooperate in setting steady
state domestic income tax rates to ameliorate large terms of trade externalities — what we
call a tax union.
2Cole and Obstfeld (1991) were the first to demonstrate the provision of complete international risk-sharing
via terms of trade movements under unitary elasticity.
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As the Armington elasticity increases and exports become closer substitutes, the degree
of international risk sharing provided by terms of trade movements declines, as does each
country’s monopoly power. Because country-level monopoly power falls, the welfare gains
from a tax union fall as well. On the other hand, there is now a role for a fiscal union to
improve international risk-sharing. We find that when the elasticity is high and goods are
close substitutes countries should organize a contingent cross-country transfer scheme to
provide international risk-sharing — what we call a transfer union.
The Armington elasticity thus governs the optimal design of a fiscal union: the welfare
gains from a tax union decrease in the Armington elasticity; the welfare gains from a transfer
union increase in the Armington elasticity. We prove that this is true for countries outside
of and within currency unions, in financial autarky and incomplete markets.
Empirical estimates of the Armington elasticity range from one to twelve or higher, de-
pending on the estimation method, country and time period being examined.3 In Section
2.8 we compute the welfare gains from a fiscal union for a wide range of elasticities, includ-
ing country-specific estimates for European countries from Corbo and Osbat (2013). For
standard calibrations, the welfare gains from a tax union are as high as 3% of permanent
consumption when the elasticity is close to one; the welfare gains from a transfer union
3Using highly disaggregated data, Eaton and Kortum (2002) estimate the elasticity to be 9.28, Broda and
Weinstein (2006) find an unweighted median of 3.1 and mean of 12.6, while Romalis finds a range of 4
to 13. Imbs and Majean (2011) find a mean of 6.7 with a standard deviaion of 4.9, and a median of
5.1. Lai and Trefler (2002) estimate a range between 5 and 8. More recently, Simonovska and Waugh
(2011) find a range between 3.38 and 5.42, while Feenstra, Obstfeld and Russ (2012) find a median
estimate of the elasticity between foreign countries of 3.1 for the U.S. In a survey of the literature on
elasticity estimates, Anderson and Van Wincoop (2004) conclude a range of five to ten is reasonable.
Ruhl (2008) explains why the international macro and trade literatures have quite different estimates of
the Armington elasticity.
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are as high as 5% of permanent consumption when the elasticity is five or higher, and can
approach 20% when countries lose access to international financial markets. These gains are
75 to 400 times larger than Lucas’ (2003) estimates of the welfare cost of business cycles.4
Although a tax union removes terms of trade externalities and a transfer union improves
international risk-sharing, the distortive effects of nominal rigidities remain unchecked by
international fiscal cooperation. If countries control their own monetary policy this is not
a problem, as the central bank can move the economy toward the efficient level of output.
However within a currency union, the union-wide central bank cannot eliminate nominal
rigidities in the presence of asymmetric shocks across countries, which prevents efficient
adjustment of the economy through changes in relative prices.5 National fiscal authorities
therefore have a role to play in implementing contingent policies that move the economy
toward the efficient level of output and eliminate nominal rigidities. Importantly, such
policies do not require international fiscal cooperation. We show that the negative welfare
impact of nominal rigidities and hence the necessity of contingent domestic fiscal policy is
increasing in the Armington elasticity.
In addition to studying optimal fiscal policies, we examine the implications of labor
mobility within a currency union. We show that labor mobility completely removes the
negative welfare impact of wage rigidity and also facilitates international risk-sharing. In
4Lucas (2003) estimated the welfare cost of business cycle fluctuations to be 0.05% of permanent consump-
tion.
5This role is fulfilled by national central banks under flexible exchange rates, but a common union-wide
central bank has only one instrument to fight many idiosyncratic shocks. Note that if shocks are sym-
metric across countries, the union wide central bank is able to eliminate nominal rigidities and mimic
the flexible price equilibrium.
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so doing, labor mobility eliminates the need for contingent domestic fiscal policy as well
as the need for a transfer union. For standard calibrations, the welfare gains from labor
mobility are as high as 5% of steady state consumption when elasticity is five or higher.
While the construction of a fiscal union is fraught with political and legal hurdles, labor
mobility is already guaranteed as one of the four pillars of the European Union. From a
policy perspective, efforts to improve labor mobility may be more effective than efforts to
agree on some type of fiscal union. At the very least, we show that the benefits of contingent
fiscal policy and a transfer union are redundant if labor is fully mobile across borders.
We also study the welfare implications of joining a currency union. One of the arguments
advanced by Mundell (1961, 1973) and others in favor of a currency union is that countries
who join such a union experience deeper financial integration. We thus compare the welfare
of a country outside of a currency union with no access to international financial markets
versus a country in a currency union with full access to international financial markets.
Even in this extreme scenario, the welfare benefits of entering a currency union are not
large enough to overcome the loss of independent monetary policy for standard calibra-
tions. Although these losses can be partially offset by contingent domestic fiscal policy or
labor mobility, it is telling that from the perspective of deeper financial integration, the
benefits of a currency union are relatively small compared with the costs of losing monetary
independence.
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How We Differ From the Literature: Non-Cooperative Fiscal Policy,
Imperfect Risk-Sharing and a Global Closed-Form Solution
This paper is related to the literature on the conduct of optimal monetary and fiscal pol-
icy among interdependent economies, particularly within a currency union.6 Beetsma and
Jensen (2005), Gali and Monacelli (2008) and Ferrero (2009) focus primarily on the case
of cooperative policy with internationally complete asset markets. These papers show that
monetary policy should stabilize inflation at the union level and that cooperative fiscal pol-
icy in the form of government spending has a country-specific stabilization role. Farhi and
Werning (2012) study cooperative fiscal policy in a transfer union in the aforementioned
Cole-Obstfeld specification with unitary elasticity and log utility.7 They demonstrate that
even when private asset markets are complete internationally, there is a role for contingent
cross country transfers to provide consumption insurance. We differ from all of these papers
in two important ways. First, we analyze non-cooperative equilibria between fiscal policy-
makers in a currency union. Second, we relax the assumption of perfect risk-sharing via
6Early non-microfounded contributions in this area include Canzoneri and Henderson (1990) and Eichen-
green and Ghironi (2002). Another strand of the literature focuses on the division of seignorage within a
currency union. Sims (1999) and Bottazzi and Manasse (2002) examine the interaction between monetary
and fiscal policy when seignorage is distributed by a common central bank. While this is an important
issue, we abstract from the role of seignorage and focus on the potential for fiscal policy cooperation
to improve welfare. Benigno and De Paoli (2010) emphasize the international dimension of fiscal policy
for the case of a small open economy in a flexible exchange rate regime, abstracting from the role of
strategic interactions between countries as well as from the role of a currency union, both focuses of our
analysis. Evers (2012) takes a more quantitative approach and estimates the welfare gains from a variety
of “transfer rules”, in essence running a horse race between different types of fiscal regimes within a cur-
rency union. Our exact analytical solution for optimal policy and our consideration of flexible exchange
rate allocations stand in contrast with this approach.
7We nest the Cole-Obstfeld calibration as a special case in the closed-form version of our model in Section
2.2, as well as in our extended model in Section 2.8. We show that the welfare gains from a transfer
union are extremely small in the Cole-Obstfeld specification due to the provision of complete cross-country
risk-sharing via terms of trade movements.
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complete markets or unitary elasticity. Our model thus introduces two additional distor-
tions that are empirically relevant: terms of trade externalities and incomplete international
risk sharing. We also analyze the welfare implications of a tax union and of labor mobility,
elements which are absent in the literature.
Our methodology provides us with a unique perspective on the role of currency unions,
fiscal unions and labor mobility. We obtain a novel global closed-form solution for an open
economy model that does not restrict the elasticity of substitution between the goods of
different countries to one. This provides a tractable framework to analyze optimal policy
and enables us to accurately compare welfare across a variety of risk-sharing regimes, which
is not possible under unitary elasticity. In the closed-form model, we consider two financial
market regimes: internationally complete asset markets with cross-border trade in bonds
and equities (perfect risk sharing) and financial autarky (no risk sharing).
Our closed-form model requires two simplifying assumptions: complete openness in con-
sumption for all economies in the model as well as one period in advance nominal rigidities.
We relax both of these assumptions in Section 2.8 and evaluate the welfare gains from a
fiscal union in a model with consumption home bias and Calvo wage rigidities. As in the
closed-form case, we solve the extended model away from the Cole-Obstfeld calibration so
that financial market structure matters. In the extended model, we consider incomplete
markets with cross-border trade in safe government bonds (incomplete risk sharing) as well
as financial autarky. In this setup, we find that home bias increases the welfare gains from
a transfer union, while home bias decreases the welfare gains from a tax union. We also
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find that Calvo rigidities do not impact the results, yielding similar welfare consequences as
one period in advance rigidities. As such, our closed-form results underestimate the welfare
benefits of a transfer union, contingent fiscal policy and labor mobility, but overestimate
the welfare benefits of a tax union. We focus on the closed-form model for the first half of
the paper as it generates analytically tractable and intuitive results, and then shift to the
extended model.
2.2 The Model in Closed-Form
We consider a continuum of small open economies represented by the unit interval, as
popularized in the literature by Gali and Monacelli (2005, 2008). Our model is based on
Dmitriev and Hoddenbagh (2013), although here we consider wage rigidity rather than
price rigidity and extend the closed-form solution for flexible exchange rates to the case of
a currency union.
Each economy consists of a representative household and a representative firm. All coun-
tries are identical ex-ante: they have the same preferences, technology, and wage-setting.
Ex-post, economies will differ depending on the realization of their technology shock. House-
holds are immobile across countries, however goods can move freely across borders. Each
economy produces one final good, over which it exercises a degree of monopoly power. This
is crucially important: countries are able to manipulate their terms of trade even though
they are measure zero. As in Corsetti and Pesenti (2001, 2005) and Obstfeld and Rogoff
(2000, 2002), we use one-period-in-advance wage setting to introduce nominal rigidities.
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Workers set next period’s nominal wages, in terms of domestic currency, prior to next-
period’s production and consumption decisions. Given this preset wage, workers supply
as much labor as demanded by firms. We lay out a general framework below, and then
hone in on the specific case of complete markets and financial autarky. To avoid additional
notation, we ignore time subindices unless absolutely necessary. When time subindices are
absent, we are implicitly referring to period t.
Production Each economy i produces a final good, which requires technology, Zi, and
aggregated labor, Ni. We assume that technology is independent across time and across
countries. We need not impose any particular distributional requirement on technology at
this point. The production function of each economy will be:
Yi = ZiNi. (2.1)
Households, indexed by h, each have monopoly power over their differentiated labor input,
which will lead to a markup on wages. A perfectly competitive, representative final goods
producer aggregates differentiated labor inputs from households in CES fashion into a final
good for export. Production of the representative final goods firm in a specific country is:
Ni =
(∫ 1
0
Ni(h)
ε−1
ε dh
) ε
ε−1
, (2.2)
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where ε is the elasticity of substitution between different types of labor, and µε =
ε
ε−1 is
the markup on labor.
The aggregate labor cost index, W , defined as the minimum cost to produce one unit of
output, will be a function of the nominal wage for household h, W (h):
Wi =
(∫ 1
0
Wi(h)
1−εdh
) 1
1−ε
.
Cost minimization by the firm leads to demand for labor from household h:
Ni(h) =
(
Wi(h)
Wi
)−ε
Ni. (2.3)
In the open economy, monopoly power is exercised at both the household and the coun-
try level: at the household level because of differentiated labor, and at the country level
because each economy produces a unique good. We show in Section 2.4 that optimizing
non-cooperative policymakers will remove the household markup on labor but will intro-
duce a terms of trade markup through the income tax rate. Just to be clear, firms have no
monopoly power and are perfectly competitive.
Households In each economy, there is a household, h, with lifetime expected utility
Et−1
{ ∞∑
k=0
βk
(
Cit+k(h)
1−σ
1− σ − χ
Nit+k(h)
1+ϕ
1 + ϕ
)}
(2.4)
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where β < 1 is the household discount factor, C(h) is the consumption basket or index,
N(h) is household labor effort (think of this as hours worked). Households face a general
budget constraint that nests both complete markets and financial autarky; we will discuss
the differences between the two in subsequent sections. For now, it is sufficient to simply
write out the most general form of the budget constraint:
Cit(h) = (1− τi)
(
Wit(h)
Pit(h)
)
Nit(h) +Dit(h) + Tit(h) + Γit(h). (2.5)
The distortionary tax rate on household labor income in country i is denoted by τi, while
Γit is a domestic lump-sum tax rebate to households. T refers to lump-sum cross-country
transfers. In the absence of a fiscal union, these cross-country transfers will equal zero
(T = 0). Net taxes equal zero in the model, as any amount of government revenue is
rebated lump-sum to households. The consumer price index corresponds to Pit, while the
nominal wage is Wit. Dit denotes state-contingent portfolio payments expressed in real
consumption units, and can be written in more detail as:
DitPit =
∫ 1
0
EijtBijtdj, (2.6)
where Bijt is a state-contingent payment in currency j.
8 Eijt is the exchange rate in units of
currency i per one unit of currency j; an increase in Eijt signals a depreciation of currency i
8Equation (2.6) holds in all possible states in all periods. Details are provided in Appendix A.1.
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relative to currency j. In a currency union, Eijt = 1 for all i, j, t. When international asset
markets are complete, households perform all cross-border trades in contingent claims in
period 0, insuring against all possible states in all future periods. The transverality condition
simply states that all period 0 transactions must be balanced: payment for claims issued
must equal payment for claims received. Leaving the details in the appendix, we use the
following relationship as the transversality condition for complete markets:
E0
{ ∞∑
t=0
βtC−σit Dit
}
= 0, (2.7)
while in financial autarky
Dit = 0.
Intuitively, the transversality condition (2.7) stipulates that the present discounted value
of future earnings should be equal to the present discounted value of future consumption
flows. Under complete markets, consumers choose a state contingent plan for consumption,
labor supply and portfolio holdings in period 0.
Consumption and Price Indices Households in each country consume a basket of
imported goods. This consumption basket is an aggregate of all of the varieties produced
by different countries. The consumption basket for a representative small open economy i,
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which is common across countries, is defined as follows:
Ci =
(∫ 1
0
c
γ−1
γ
ij dj
) γ
γ−1
(2.8)
where lower case cij is the consumption by country i of the final good produced by country
j, and γ is the elasticity of substitution between domestic and foreign goods (the Armington
elasticity). Because there is no home bias in consumption, countries will export all of the
output of their unique variety, and import varieties from other countries to assemble the
consumption basket.
Prices are defined as follows: lower case pij denotes the price in country i (in currency
i) of the unique final good produced in country j, while upper case Pi is the aggregate
consumer price index in country i. Given the above consumption index, the consumer price
index will be:
Pi =
(∫ 1
0
p1−γij dj
) 1
1−γ
. (2.9)
Consumption by country i of the unique variety produced by country j is:
cij =
(
pij
Pi
)−γ
Ci. (2.10)
We assume that producer currency pricing (PCP) holds, and that the law of one price
(LOP) holds, so that the price of the same good is equal across countries when converted
into a common currency. We define the nominal bilateral exchange rate between countries
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i and j, Eij , as units of currency i per one unit of currency j. LOP requires that:
pij = Eijpjj . (2.11)
Given LOP and identical preferences across countries, PPP will also hold for all i, j country
pairs:
Pi = EijPj , (2.12)
The terms of trade for country j will be:
TOTj =
pjj
Pj
, (2.13)
where TOTj is defined as the home currency price of exports over the home currency price
of imports. Now we can take (2.10), and using (2.11) and (2.12), solve for demand for
country j’s unique variety:
Yj =
∫ 1
0
cijdi =
∫ 1
0
(
pij
Pi
)−γ
Cidi
(2.11)+(2.12)
=
(
pjj
Pj
)−γ ∫ 1
0
Cidi = TOT
−γ
j Cw. (2.14)
where Cw is defined as the average world consumption across all i economies, Cw =
∫ 1
0 Cidi.
51
Chapter 2 The Optimal Design of a Fiscal Union
Labor Market Clearing Households maximize (2.4) subject to (2.5). The first order
condition for labor will give the optimal preset wage (that is, the labor supply condition):
Wit =
(
χµε
1− τi
) Et−1 {N1+ϕit }
Et−1
{
C−σit Nit
Pit
} . (2.15)
The optimization problem of the representative firm in country i is standard. It maximizes
profit choosing the appropriate amount of aggregate labor.
max
Ni
Yipi −WiNi ⇒ Wi
pi
=
Yi
Ni
= Zi (2.16)
This labor demand condition equates the real wage at time t with the marginal product of
labor, Zit. Using the labor demand condition (Nit = Yitpit/Wit) from (2.16), and the fact
that the wage is preset at time t− 1, the labor market clearing condition will be:
1 =
(
χµε
1− τ
) Et−1 {N1+ϕit }
Et−1
{
C−σit Yit
pit
Pit
} . (2.17)
This is the general labor market clearing condition; it holds for the closed economy and in
the open economy for producer currency pricing and local currency pricing. Under producer
currency pricing, our focus in this paper, the demand for the unique variety (2.14) will give
the following labor market clearing condition:
1 =
(
χµε
1− τ
) Et−1 {N1+ϕit }
Et−1
{
C−σit Y
γ−1
γ
it C
1
γ
wt
} . (2.18)
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Taking the expectations operator out of (2.18) will give the flexible wage equilibrium.
We now turn our attention to the difference between complete markets and financial
autarky.
2.2.1 Complete Markets
In complete markets, agents in each economy have access to a full set of domestic and
foreign state-contingent assets. Households in all countries will maximize (2.4), choosing
consumption, leisure, money holdings, and a complete set of state-contingent nominal bonds,
subject to (2.5). Complete markets and PPP imply the following risk-sharing condition:
C−σit
C−σit+1
=
C−σjt
C−σjt+1
∀i, j (2.19)
which states that the ratio of the marginal utility of consumption at time t and t+1 must be
equal across all countries. Importantly, this condition does not imply that consumption is
equal across countries. Consumption in country i will depend on the initial asset position,
fiscal and monetary policy, the distribution of country-specific shocks, the covariance of
global and local shocks, and other factors.9
When (2.7),(2.17), and (2.19) hold, consumption in country i can be expressed as a
9A policy change in economy i may lead to a change in consumption. For example, monetary policy
affects the covariance between home production and world consumption, which in turn influences home
consumption, even in complete markets. Fiscal policy can tax consumption and cause a lower level of
consumption in the long-run relative to the rest of the world. In spite of this, it is still possible to
characterize an optimal consumption plan that is robust to changes in monetary and fiscal policy.
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function of world consumption:
Cit =
Et−1
{∑
βs
[
Yit+sC
−σ
wt+sTOTit+s
]}
Et−1
{∑
βsC1−σwt+s
} Cwt. (2.20)
This defines the optimal consumption allocation for country i in complete markets.10 Using
the fact that Zit is independent across time and across countries, and wages are preset,
(2.20) is equivalent to
Cit = Et−1 {YitTOTit}+ Tit = C
1
γ
wEt−1
{
Y
γ−1
γ
it
}
+ Tit (2.21)
where transfers will equal zero in all states of the world because risk-sharing is provided by
trade in contingent claims.
2.2.2 Financial Autarky
The aggregate resource constraint under financial autarky specifies that the nominal value
of output in the home country (exports) must equal the nominal of consumption in the
home country (imports). That is, trade in goods must be balanced. In a model with cross-
border lending, bonds would also show up in this condition, but in financial autarky they
are obviously absent. The primary departure from complete markets lies in the household
10Details are found in the appendix of Dmitriev and Hoddenbagh (2013).
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and economy-wide budget constraints,
Pi · Ci︸ ︷︷ ︸
Imports
= pii · Yi︸ ︷︷ ︸
Exports
+ Tit︸︷︷︸
Transfers
(2.22)
where transfers will be zero unless countries form a transfer union, in which case transfers
will provide risk-sharing. Using the fact that (2.14) holds under both complete markets and
financial autarky, and substituting this into (2.22), one can show that demand for country
i’s good in financial autarky will be
Cit = C
1
γ
wY
γ−1
γ
it + Tit. (2.23)
Complete markets and autarky differ only by goods market clearing. In complete markets
consumption is equal to expected domestic output expressed in consumption baskets; in
autarky consumption is equal to realized domestic output expressed in consumption baskets.
2.3 Global Social Planner
We begin by describing the maximization problem faced by a benevolent global social plan-
ner who has complete control over the monetary and fiscal policies of each country. Since
the economies in our model are identical ex-ante, the global social planner will maximize a
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weighted utility function over all i countries,
∫ 1
0
[
C1−σi
1− σ − χ
N1+ϕi
(1 + ϕ)
]
di, (2.24)
subject to the consumption basket and the aggregate resource constraint:
Ci =
(∫ 1
0
c
γ−1
γ
ij dj
) γ
γ−1
, (2.25)
Yi =NiZi =
∫ 1
0
cjidj. (2.26)
Proposition 8 The global social planner will maximize (2.24), subject to (2.25) and (2.26).
The solution to the global social planner problem is:
Ci =
(
1
χ
) 1
σ+ϕ
Z
1+ϕ
σ+ϕ
w , (2.27a)
Ni =
(
1
χ
) 1
σ+ϕ
Z
(1−γσ)(1+ϕ)
(1+γϕ)(σ+ϕ)
w Z
γ−1
1+γϕ
i , (2.27b)
Zw =
(∫ 1
0
Z
(γ−1)(1+ϕ)
1+γϕ
i di
) 1+γϕ
(γ−1)(1+ϕ)
. (2.27c)
Proof See Appendix C in Dmitriev and Hoddenbagh (2013). 
The global social planner solution characterizes the Pareto efficient allocation. From
(A.11a), we see that domestic consumption depends on average world technology Zw, which
is a constant because technology shocks are identically and independently distributed. Con-
sumption is thus stabilized at the country level, insuring risk averse households from con-
56
Chapter 2 The Optimal Design of a Fiscal Union
sumption risk. On the other hand, (A.11b) shows that labor will fluctuate with technology
shocks, increasing in booms and decreasing in recessions. There are no distortions in the ef-
ficient allocation: wage ridigity, incomplete risk-sharing, and the terms of trade externality
are absent.
The efficient allocation provides a natural benchmark to evaluate different policy regimes.
In Sections 2.4 and 2.5 we look closely at optimal monetary and fiscal policy in non-
cooperative and cooperative settings and see what conditions are necessary to replicate
the Pareto efficient allocation outside of and within a currency union. In Section 2.6 we
study the effect of labor mobility and see if it can replicate the Pareto efficient allocation.
2.4 Non-Cooperative Policy
In order to study the benefits of international policy cooperation, we must first understand
the non-cooperative Nash equilibrium. What outcomes naturally arise when policymakers
do not cooperate? Our goal in this section is to illuminate the various distortions that are
present in the non-cooperative Nash equilibrium, and to compare and contrast with the
global social planner equilibrium defined in Proposition 8. We can then pinpoint specific
areas of policy cooperation that ameliorate welfare decreasing distortions, leading us to
the optimal design of a fiscal union. We begin with the Nash equilibrium under flexible
exchange rates and then move to the case of a currency union.
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2.4.1 Flexible Exchange Rates
When exchange rates are flexible, each country has its own central bank and its own fiscal
authority. Before any shocks are realized, national fiscal authorities declare non state-
contingent taxes, and then national central banks declare monetary policy for all states
of the world. With this knowledge in hand, households lay out a state-contingent plan
for consumption and labor as well asset holdings when markets are complete. After that,
shocks hit the economy. A detailed timeline is provided in Figure 2.1.
Without loss of generality, we assume a cashless limiting economy.11 Central banks set
monetary policy in each period by optimally choosing the amount of labor. Although
central banks optimize by choosing labor instead of money or an interest rate, the three
are equivalent in this model.12 We can write down an interest rate rule that gives the
exact same allocation. Domestic fiscal authorities choose the optimal labor tax rate τi. The
objective function for non-cooperative domestic policymakers will be
max
Nit
max
τi
Et−1
{
C1−σit
1− σ − χ
N1+ϕit
1 + ϕ
}
, (2.28)
where the fiscal authority acts first and chooses τi and the central bank then chooses Nit.
We first examine the Nash equilibrium for non-cooperative policymakers when interna-
tional asset markets are complete. Policymakers in complete markets will maximize their
objective function subject to the labor market clearing (2.29a) and goods market clearing
11Benigno and Benigno (2003) describe a cashless-limiting economy in detail in their appendix, pp.756-758.
12We demonstrate the equivalence Appendix F of Dmitriev and Hoddenbagh (2013).
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(2.29b) constraints, and production (2.29c) and aggregate world consumption (2.29d):
1 =
(
χµε
1− τi
) Et−1 {N1+ϕit }
Et−1
{
C−σit Y
γ−1
γ
it C
1
γ
wt
} , (2.29a)
Cit = C
1
γ
wtEt−1
{
Y
γ−1
γ
it
}
(2.29b)
Yit = ZitNit, (2.29c)
Cwt =
(∫ 1
0
Y
γ−1
γ
it
) γ
γ−1
. (2.29d)
Proposition 9 Flexible Exchange Rates + Complete Markets When international
asset markets are complete and exchange rates are flexible, non-cooperative policymakers
will maximize (2.28) subject to (2.29a), (2.29b), (2.29c) and (2.29d). The solution under
commitment for non-cooperative policymakers in complete markets is:
Ci =
(
1
χµγ
) 1
σ+ϕ
(∫ 1
0
Z
(γ−1)(1+ϕ)
1+γϕ
i di
) 1+γϕ
(γ−1)(σ+ϕ)
, (2.30a)
Ni =
(
1
χµγ
) 1
σ+ϕ
(∫ 1
0
Z
(γ−1)(1+ϕ)
1+γϕ
i di
) 1−γσ
(γ−1)(σ+ϕ)
Z
γ−1
1+γϕ
i . (2.30b)
It is optimal for non-cooperative central banks under commitment to mimic the flexible wage
allocation. The optimal tax rate for non-cooperative fiscal authorities is τi = 1− µεµγ .
Proof See Appendix B.1. 
The above allocation replicates the global social planner allocation with the addition of
a terms of trade markup, µγ =
γ
γ−1 , that lowers consumption and output. It is optimal
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for central banks to mimic the flexible wage allocation through a policy of price stability.13
Optimizing fiscal authorities internalize the negative welfare impact of the domestic markup
on differentiated labor inputs (µε), and thus choose an income tax rate that cancels out the
labor markup. However, fiscal authorities also want to use their country-level monopoly
power. Because each country in the continuum is measure zero, policymakers do not in-
ternalize the impact of charging a higher markup for their export good on the welfare of
other countries. This leads fiscal authorities to set an income tax rate which reduces hours
worked and restricts production, τi = 1− µεµγ , so that exports from each country are subject
to a terms of trade markup (µγ). The terms of trade externality leads to lower welfare
outcomes because households in each country must pay a higher price on each import good
in the consumption basket. Even though asset markets are complete, the non-cooperative
allocation under flexible exchange rates yields lower welfare than the global social planner
allocation due to the imposition of the terms of trade markup. The need for some sort of
international fiscal cooperation that would force domestic fiscal authorities to internalize
this externality is clear.
Now that we’ve examined the complete markets equilibrium when exchange rates are
flexible, we turn our attention to the case of financial autarky. The objective function in
financial autarky will be identical to the complete markets case. Domestic fiscal authorities
will first choose the optimal tax rate, and then central banks will set the optimal monetary
13In a related paper (Dmitriev and Hoddenbagh 2013), we prove that mimicking the flexible price allocation
is a dominant strategy for small open economy central banks. This result is robust to changes in
elasticity between domestic and foreign goods, the degree of cooperation between policymakers in different
countries, and the degree of financial integration across countries.
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policy by choosing labor. However, there is a slight difference in the constraints faced
by policymakers in complete markets and financial autarky. In complete markets, home
consumption is a function of expected output (2.29b), while in autarky home consumption
is a function of actual output
Cit = C
1
γ
wtY
γ−1
γ
it . (2.31)
Aside from (2.31), all other constraints are identical in complete markets and financial
autarky.
Proposition 10 Flexible Exchange Rates + Financial Autarky Non-cooperative pol-
icymakers in financial autarky will maximize (2.28) subject to (2.29a), (2.29c), (2.29d) and
(2.31). The solution under commitment for non-cooperative policymakers in financial au-
tarky is:
Ci =
(
1
χµγ
) 1
σ+ϕ
(∫ 1
0
Z
(γ−1)(1+ϕ)
1−σ+γ(σ+ϕ)
i di
) (1+ϕ)
(γ−1)(σ+ϕ)
Z
(γ−1)(1+ϕ)
1−σ+γ(σ+ϕ)
i , (2.32a)
Ni =
(
1
χµγ
) 1
σ+ϕ
(∫ 1
0
Z
(γ−1)(1+ϕ)
1−σ+γ(σ+ϕ)
i di
) (1−σ)
(γ−1)(σ+ϕ)
Z
(γ−1)(1−σ)
1−σ+γ(ϕ+σ)
i . (2.32b)
It is optimal for non-cooperative central banks to mimic the flexible wage allocation. The
optimal tax rate for non-cooperative fiscal authorities is τi = 1− µεµγ .
Proof See Appendix B.1. 
As in complete markets, central banks find it optimal to mimic the flexible wage equi-
librium through a policy of price stability in financial autarky. On the fiscal side, poli-
61
Chapter 2 The Optimal Design of a Fiscal Union
cymakers again eliminate the domestic markup µε, but impose a terms of trade markup
on their unique export good µγ via the steady state income tax rate. Financial autarky
removes cross-country consumption insurance, as households no longer have the ability to
trade in international contingent claims. This can be seen most clearly in (2.32a), where
equilibrium consumption is a function of idiosyncratic productivity, Zi, and will fluctuate
with country-specific shocks to technology.
2.4.2 Currency Union
Within a currency union, a single central bank sets monetary policy for the union as a whole.
Countries no longer control their domestic monetary policy as they do when exchange rates
are flexible. In the presence of aggregate shocks, the union-wide central bank will stabilize
inflation at the union level, a result shown in Gali and Monacelli (2008). However, for
tractability we assume no aggregate shocks, only asymmetric country-specific shocks. With
only one policy instrument, the union-wide central bank cannot eliminate wage rigidity at
the country level in the presence of asymmetric shocks. As a result, the union-wide central
bank does nothing in our model. None of our results change if we add aggregate shocks:
these shocks would simply be counteracted by the union-wide central bank.
In a currency union each country retains control over it’s own fiscal policy. The objective
function for non-cooperative fiscal policymakers in a currency union is:
max
τi
Et−1
{
C1−σit
1− σ − χ
N1+ϕit
1 + ϕ
}
(2.33)
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The constraints faced by policymakers within a currency union are identical to those faced by
policymakers under flexible exchange rates, with the addition of a fifth constraint unique to
currency unions. Thus, relative to the optimization problem under flexible exchange rates,
we add one constraint and subtract one FOC. We know that demand for country i’s good is
Yi = TOT
−γ
i Cw =
(
pii
Pi
)−γ
Cw from (2.14) and that pii =
Wi
Zi
from (2.16). Plugging (2.16)
into (2.14) gives:
Yit =
(
Wit
Pit
)−γ
Cw︸ ︷︷ ︸
A
Zγit = AZ
γ
it (2.34)
where A is a constant. (2.34) is the additional constraint faced by the policymaker in a
currency union.
Proposition 11 Currency Union + Complete Markets Non-cooperative policymakers
in a currency union will maximize (2.33) subject to (2.29a), (2.29b), (2.29c), (2.29d) and
(2.34). The solution under commitment for non-cooperative policymakers within a currency
union in complete markets is:
Ci = Cw =
(
1
χµγ
) 1
σ+ϕ

(∫ 1
0 Z
γ−1
i di
) γ(1+ϕ)
γ−1∫ 1
0 Z
(γ−1)(1+ϕ)
i di

1
σ+ϕ
, (2.35a)
Ni =
(
1
χµγ
) 1
σ+ϕ

(∫ 1
0 Z
γ−1
i di
) γ(1−σ)
γ−1∫ 1
0 Z
(γ−1)(1+ϕ)
i di

1
σ+ϕ
Zγ−1i . (2.35b)
The resulting equilibrium allocation does not replicate the flexible wage equilibrium. The
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optimal tax rate for non-cooperative fiscal authorities is τi = 1− µεµγ .
Proof See Appendix B.2. 
Within a currency union, the inability of the union-wide central bank to alleviate asym-
metric shocks across countries leads to the presence of wage rigidity in the optimal allo-
cation. In addition, non-cooperative fiscal authorities exploit their country-level monopoly
power and impose a terms of trade markup via income tax policy. We thus see the pres-
ence of two distortions in the equilibrium allocation: wage rigidity and a terms of trade
markup. As in the flexible exchange rate allocation, there is no idiosyncratic technology
risk in consumption under complete markets, so consumption will be equalized across coun-
tries in equilibrium. However, welfare will be lower when wages are rigid than when they
are flexible, as one can notice by comparing the above allocation with the Pareto efficient
allocation.14
Proposition 12 Currency Union + Financial Autarky In financial autarky, non-
cooperative policymakers in a currency union will maximize (2.33) subject to (2.29a), (2.29c),
(2.29d), (2.31) and (2.34). The optimal allocation in financial autarky given by a non-
14We calculate explicit welfare differences between allocations in Section 6.
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contingent policymaker in a currency union is:
Ci =
(
1
χµγ
) 1
σ+ϕ

(∫ 1
0 Z
(γ−1)(1−σ)
i di
)(∫ 1
0 Z
γ−1
i di
) 1+ϕ
γ−1∫ 1
0 Z
(γ−1)(1+ϕ)
i di

1
σ+ϕ
Zγ−1i , (2.36a)
Ni =
(
1
χµγ
) 1
σ+ϕ

(∫ 1
0 Z
(γ−1)(1−σ)
i di
)(∫ 1
0 Z
γ−1
i di
) 1−σ
γ−1∫ 1
0 Z
(γ−1)(1+ϕ)
i di

1
σ+ϕ
Zγ−1i . (2.36b)
The resulting equilibrium allocation does not replicate the flexible wage allocation. The
optimal tax rate for non-cooperative fiscal authorities is τi = 1− µεµγ .
Proof See Appendix B.2. 
In the autarky Nash equilibrium described in Proposition 12, members of a currency
union face three welfare decreasing distortions: wage rigidity resulting from the absence of
country-specific monetary policy; idiosyncratic consumption risk, caused by lack of access to
international financial markets; and a terms of trade markup, imposed by non-cooperative
fiscal authorities in other countries. The potential for cooperative measures to ameliorate
these distortions is evident, and will be the focus of Section 2.5. Before we broach the
topic of a fiscal union however, we study the implications of contingent fiscal policy in the
non-cooperative setup.
2.4.3 Contingent Fiscal Policy
Up to this point we have assumed that fiscal policy is non-contingent, so that fiscal au-
thorities can only set a constant income tax rate. If we relax this assumption so that fiscal
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policymakers can adjust tax rates over the business cycle, the objective function under
flexible exchange rates is
max
Nit
max
τit
Et−1
{
C1−σit
1− σ − χ
N1+ϕit
1 + ϕ
}
, (2.37)
and within a currency union is
max
τit
Et−1
{
C1−σit
1− σ − χ
N1+ϕit
1 + ϕ
}
. (2.38)
As we showed in Proposition 9 and 10, when exchange rates are flexible national central
banks will mimic the flexible wage allocation and a constant labor tax rate will be opti-
mal for both contingent and non-contingent fiscal policymakers. The role of fiscal policy
under flexible exchange rates is simply to ameliorate the monopolistic markup on differen-
tiated labor inputs and impose a terms of trade markup in the non-cooperative case. In
other words, contingent fiscal policy is redundant when exchange rates are flexible because
national central banks adjust monetary policy over the business cycle to counteract wage
rigidity.
In contrast, the role of fiscal policy in a currency union is twofold: to impose a terms
of trade markup, but also to eliminate wage rigidity at the national level resulting from
asymmetric shocks. Optimal contingent fiscal policy within a currency union will not set
a constant tax rate. Within a currency union the union-wide central bank has only one
policy instrument at its disposal and cannot offset the effect of asymmetric shocks across
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countries. Contingent national fiscal policy can fill the void, setting domestic tax rates in
each period to remove domestic wage rigidity and mimic the flexible wage equilibrium. One
already begins to see that fiscal policy is more important within a currency union than
outside of one. Given that contingent fiscal policy is only necessary in a currency union, we
ignore flexible exchange rate allocations in Proposition 13.
Proposition 13 Contingent Fiscal Policy Contingent non-cooperative policymakers within
a currency union will maximize (2.38), subject to (2.29a), (2.29b), (2.29c), (2.29d), and
(2.34) in complete markets and subject to (2.29a), (2.29c), (2.29d), (2.31) and (2.34) in
autarky. The optimal allocation will exactly coincide with (2.30a) in complete markets and
(2.32a) in autarky, replicating the flexible wage allocation with a terms of trade markup.
Proof See Appendix B.3. 
The optimal contingent labor tax within a currency union will be equal to τit = 1− µit.
The realized markup µit is defined by
MPLit = µit ·MRSit,
where MPLit = Zit is the marginal product of labor and MRSit is the marginal rate of
substitution. A positive productivity shock increases MPLit, but since wages remain fixed,
there will be a rise in demand for labor. The rise in demand for labor will induce households
to work more hours and cause an even larger increase in MRSit. As a result, the markup
will be countercylical and the optimal contingent labor tax will be procyclical: taxes will
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increase when productivity shocks are positive and decline when productivity shocks are
negative.
Note that international policy cooperation is not necessary to eliminate the wage rigidity
distortion: non-cooperative contingent fiscal policy is all that is required. For the remainder
of the paper, we will assume that fiscal policy is non-contingent. However, keep in mind that
contingent fiscal policy within a currency union can play the same role as monetary policy
outside of a currency union, eliminating nominal rigidities and mimicking the flexible-wage
allocation. While the ability of contingent fiscal policy to eliminate nominal rigidities has
been shown in other closed and open economy studies, we are the first to emphasize that the
distortionary impact of wage rigidity and hence the importance of contingent fiscal policy
is increasing in the Armington elasticity γ.15
2.4.4 Summary of Non-Cooperative Policy
In sections 2.4.1 and 2.4.2 we solved for Nash equilibria under flexible exchange rates and
within a currency union, for complete markets and financial autarky. Policymakers max-
imized the welfare of their domestic households without internalizing the impact of their
policy decisions on other countries. The non-cooperative allocations featured three distor-
tions: wage rigidity, lack of access to international financial markets, and terms of trade
externalities. Proposition 9 and 10 proved that domestic monetary policy is sufficient to
eliminate wage rigidity outside of a currency union, while Proposition 13 proved that con-
15A non-exhaustive list of papers demonstrating the importance of contingent fiscal policy includes Chugh
(2006), Correia et al (2013), Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2004) and Siu (2004).
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tingent fiscal policy is sufficient to eliminate wage rigidity within a currency union. In both
cases, policy cooperation was unnecessary. In Section 2.5, we will show that the remaining
two distortions — incomplete risk-sharing and terms of trade externalities — can be reme-
died with appropriate international policy cooperation via the construction of a tax union
and a transfer union.
2.5 Cooperative Policy in a Fiscal Union
In this section we analyze fiscal policy cooperation. Although the concept of fiscal cooper-
ation may be quite broad, we focus here on two specific types — a tax union and a transfer
union. In a tax union, fiscal policymakers in each country cooperatively set steady state
income tax rates to maximize the welfare of the union as a whole. A tax union may be
viewed as a cross-country agreement on income tax harmonization between domestic fiscal
authorities, or as a tax rate chosen by a supranational (or federal) fiscal authority. In a
transfer union, fiscal policymakers in each country arrange contingent cross-country trans-
fers to maximize the welfare of the union as a whole. The transfer scheme may derive from
an agreement between national fiscal authorities or from a supranational (or federal) fiscal
authority.
Each arrow in Figure 2.2 denotes cooperation between countries in a fiscal union. Com-
plete cooperation (all arrows), no cooperation (no arrows), or cooperation along only one
axis are all possible.16
16Because our focus is on the optimal design of a fiscal union, we ignore the implications of monetary
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The objective functions for the various types of fiscal union described in Figure 2.2 are
below.
max
∀τi
∫ 1
0
[
max
Nit
Et−1
{
C1−σit
1− σ − χ
N1+ϕit
1 + ϕ
}]
di (2.39a)
max
∀τi
∫ 1
0
[
Et−1
{
C1−σit
1− σ − χ
N1+ϕit
1 + ϕ
}]
di (2.39b)
Objective functions (2.39a) and (2.39b) refer to a tax union outside of and within a currency
union, respectively. Here, the fiscal authorities in each country jointly maximize the welfare
of all countries in the union by choosing the same steady state income tax rate.
max
∀Tit
∫ 1
0
[
max
Nit
max
τi
Et−1
{
C1−σit
1− σ − χ
N1+ϕit
1 + ϕ
}]
di (2.39c)
max
∀Tit
∫ 1
0
[
max
τi
Et−1
{
C1−σit
1− σ − χ
N1+ϕit
1 + ϕ
}]
di (2.39d)
Objective functions (2.39c) and (2.39d) refer to a transfer union outside of and within
a currency union, respectively. Here, a supranational (or federal) fiscal body optimally
policy cooperation. With one common central bank, monetary cooperation within a currency union is
not possible. In another paper (Dmitriev and Hoddenbagh (2013)), we show that in a continuum of
small open economies monetary cooperation yields no welfare gains, as non-cooperative and cooperative
equilibria exactly coincide.
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chooses cross-country transfers in order to maximize union-wide welfare.
max
∀τi,Tit
∫ 1
0
[
max
Nit
Et−1
{
C1−σit
1− σ − χ
N1+ϕit
1 + ϕ
}]
di (2.39e)
max
∀τi,Tit
∫ 1
0
[
Et−1
{
C1−σit
1− σ − χ
N1+ϕit
1 + ϕ
}]
di (2.39f)
Finally, (2.39e) and (2.39f) refer to a tax and transfer union outside of and within a currency
union, respectively. Here, countries not only agree on income tax rates, but also agree to
send contingent cash transfers across countries.
Proposition 14 Tax Unions Policymakers in a tax union will internalize the impact of
their income tax rate on all union members. As a result, a tax union will remove the
incentive for policymakers to manipulate their terms of trade. The optimal tax rate in a tax
union is τi = 1−µε, which will remove the markup on domestic production in each country,
µε, while preventing the imposition of a terms of trade markup on exports, µγ, from all
equilibrium allocations.
Proof See Appendix B.4. 
A tax union forces domestic fiscal authorities to internalize the impact of their terms of
trade externality on union wide welfare. As a result, policymakers will not impose a terms
of trade markup on the export of their country’s unique good in a tax union. This improves
welfare for the entire union as well as for each individual country, particularly for low values
of elasticity when countries have a high degree of monopoly power. The distortive impact
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of the terms of trade externality increases as the degree of substitutability decreases, which
will become clear in Section 2.7 when we calculate the welfare gains from a tax union.
In other words, the benefits of a tax union are increasing in the degree of country-level
monopoly power.
Members of a transfer union agree to send contingent cash transfers across countries in
order to insure against idiosyncratic consumption risk. In complete markets the presence
of cross-country transfers will alter the goods market clearing constraint, so that (2.29b) is
replaced by the following two conditions:
Cit = C
1
γ
wtEt−1
{
Y
γ−1
γ
it
}
+ Tit, (2.40)
where
∫ 1
0
Titdi = 0. (2.41)
In financial autarky the presence of cross-country transfers will alter the goods market
clearing constraint, so that (2.31) is replaced by the following two conditions:
Cit = C
1
γ
wtY
γ−1
γ
it + Tit, (2.42)
where
∫ 1
0
Titdi = 0. (2.43)
Proposition 15 Transfer Unions Policymakers in a transfer union agree to send con-
tingent cash transfers across countries in order to insure against idiosyncratic consumption
risk. The equilibrium allocation within a transfer union will be identical with the equilibrium
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allocation under complete markets. As a result, transfer unions are redundant when inter-
national asset markets are complete or when substitutability is one, but yield large welfare
gains when markets are incomplete.
Proof See Appendix B.5. 
As Proposition 15 states, a transfer union guarantees complete cross-country consumption
insurance and thus replicates the effect of complete markets. The welfare benefits of a
transfer union are increasing in the Armington elasticity: as goods become closer substitutes,
the natural risk-sharing role played by the terms of trade begins to disappear. This will be
seen more clearly in Section 2.7 when we calculate the welfare gains from a transfer union.
As shown in Figure 2.2, it is also possible to have a tax and a transfer union. If countries
agree to both, they will enjoy complete risk-sharing and eliminate the distortive impact
of the terms of trade externality. Proposition 14 and 15 show that a tax union, a transfer
union or a combination of the two will move countries toward the Pareto efficient allocation.
Proposition 16 Pareto Optimum The Pareto efficient allocation is achieved through a
combination of: (1) independent monetary policy outside of a currency union or contingent
fiscal policy within a currency union; (2) internationally complete asset markets or a transfer
union; and (3) a tax union.
Proof (1) eliminates wage rigidity, (2) provides cross-country risk-sharing, and (3) pre-
vents terms of trade manipulation. Any combination of (1), (2) and (3), for example a tax
and transfer union whose members control their own monetary policy outside of a currency
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union, will yield the Pareto efficient allocation. 
Although each of these ingredients is necessary to achieve the Pareto efficient allocation,
the relative importance of these ingredients is highly sensitive to the elasticity of substitution
between products from different countries. In Section 2.7, we show that the optimal design
of a fiscal union, and the emphasis given to a tax versus a transfer union, will depend on
the value of the elasticity parameter.
2.6 Labor Mobility
While a fiscal union provides large economic benefits, it may be politically difficult to achieve
in practice. This is especially true within the euro area, where the construction of a fiscal
union would require sovereign governments to cede at least partial control over national
fiscal policy. If deeper fiscal integration is not possible, what should governments do? Our
answer, heralding back to James Meade (1957), is to pursue policies that increase labor
mobility. Discussing the creation of a common currency area in Western Europe, Meade
argued that without the free movement of goods, capital and labor, the idea was doomed
to failure. Meade didn’t prove the necessity of labor mobility rigorously, but we do so here
using our analytical closed-form model.
Although we’ve assumed that labor is immobile up to this point, it is quite plausible that
labor will be mobile across borders within a currency union. When labor is mobile, non-
cooperative policymakers in a currency union in financial autarky maximize the familiar
objective function, but face a new set of constraints (found in Appendix B.6). As each
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economy in the currency union is hit with idiosyncratic shocks, labor will shift from low
demand bust countries to high demand boom countries, equalizing wages across countries
and acting as a natural shock absorber that enables efficient adjustment of the economy
without any policy actions taken by the monetary or fiscal authority.
Proposition 17 Labor Mobility Labor mobility will eliminate two distortions: wage rigid-
ity and the lack of risk-sharing in financial autarky. The resulting equilibrium allocations
yield higher welfare than the flexible wage allocations in complete markets and financial
autarky. When labor can move freely across borders, the solution under commitment for
non-cooperative policymakers outside of or within a currency union, in complete markets or
financial autarky, is:
Ci =
(
1
χµγ
) 1
σ+ϕ
(∫ 1
0
Zγ−1i di
) 1+ϕ
(σ+ϕ)(γ−1)
(2.44a)
Ni =
(
1
χµγ
) 1
σ+ϕ
(∫ 1
0
Zγ−1j dj
) 1+ϕ−γ(σ+ϕ)
(γ−1)(σ+ϕ)
Zγ−1j . (2.44b)
The optimal tax rate for non-cooperative fiscal authorities is τi = 1− µεµγ .
Proof See Appendix B.6. 
Labor mobility thus plays the role of a transfer union by generating perfect international
risk sharing, as well as the role of monetary policy under flexible exchange rates or contingent
fiscal policy within a currency union by removing wage rigidity. In addition to facilitating
consumption risk sharing, labor mobility has the added advantage of facilitating labor
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risk sharing — so that both consumption and hours worked are stabilized. Although the
distortive effect of the terms of trade externality remains so there is still a need for a tax
union, the benefits of labor mobility are potentially massive and ease the burden on fiscal
policy greatly. We quantify these gains in Sections 2.7 and 2.8.
How mobile is labor in the data? Legally, labor mobility is guaranteed as one of the
four pillars of economic integration within the European Union. EU citizens are free to
migrate to any other EU country to seek employment (Kahanec 2012, Zimmermann 2005).
Workers are also free to move across state borders in the U.S., as well as provincial borders
in Canada and state borders in Australia. Despite similar legal environments, actual labor
mobility is much higher within the U.S., Canada and Australia than within the EU.
Figure 2.3 plots the extent of labor mobility across countries in the EU as well as across
U.S. states, Canadian provinces, and Australian states and territories. Over and above
regulatory and legal barriers to mobility, language seems to rule: linguistic and cultural
differences across countries make emigration much more difficult. For example, notice the
high degree of labor mobility within unilingual currency unions (Australia and the U.S.),
the slightly lower degree of labor mobility in a bilingual currency union (Canada), and the
much lower degree of labor mobility in a multilingual currency union (euro area). One
can see the importance of language most clearly by focusing on the much higher degree of
mobility within EU countries (0.95%) where languages are uniform than across EU countries
(0.29%) where they differ, as well as the the high mobility across Canada as a whole (0.98%)
versus the low degree of mobility between French-speaking Quebec and the English-speaking
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provinces (0.39%). These data reinforce the notion that labor mobility is vital to the sound
functioning of a currency union: high mobility in the US, Australia and Canada dampens
internal wage rigidity, lowers unemployment and improves risk sharing. On the other hand,
low mobility in the EU leads to high unemployment and overvalued wages in areas that are
hit by large negative shocks.
2.7 Welfare Analysis in the Closed-Form Model
In this section we analyze the welfare gains resulting from a tax union, a transfer union,
labor mobility, and from eliminating wage rigidity via flexible exchange rates or contingent
fiscal policy within a currency union. The advantage of the closed-form solution is most
apparent here. Rather than approximating a quadratic welfare function around a particular
steady state, we can calculate welfare explicitly at any steady state, whether distorted or
otherwise. This is particularly important when we focus on the welfare gains from a tax
union, which eliminates the terms of trade markup from the steady state allocation. In
a log-linear model, comparing welfare between the tax union and no tax union cases is
infeasible because of the different steady states.
To begin, we take consumption and labor from the five allocations: flexible exchange
rates with complete risk-sharing (Proposition 9); flexible exchange rates in financial au-
tarky (Proposition 10); currency union in complete markets (Proposition 11); currency
union in financial autarky (Proposition 12); and labor mobility (Proposition 17). Using
consumption and labor from each allocation, we then derive the expected utility. Alloca-
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tions that eliminate wage rigidity (via flexible exchange rates or contingent fiscal policy)
are denoted by flex, while those that do not are denoted by fixed. We assume that there
is no contingent fiscal policy in the currency union allocations, so that wages are rigid.
Similarly, allocations with complete international risk-sharing (via complete markets or a
transfer union) are denoted by complete, while autarky allocations with no risk-sharing are
denoted by autarky.
Below we calculate the log of expected utility for the five allocations. We ignore the
constant terms and focus only on the exponents of Z. Details on how we compute welfare
analytically for each allocation are found in Appendix B.7. We assume technology is log-
normally distributed in all countries, log(Zi) ∼ N(0, σ2Z), and is independent across time
and across countries.
logE {Uflex,complete} = (γ − 1)(1− σ)(1 + ϕ)
2
(1 + γϕ)(σ + ϕ)
σ2Z (2.45a)
logE {Ufixed,complete} = (γ − 1)(1− σ)(1 + ϕ)(1 + ϕ− γϕ)
(σ + ϕ)
σ2Z (2.45b)
logE {Uflex,autarky} = (γ − 1)(1− σ)(1 + ϕ)
2 [1 + ϕ+ (γ − 1)(1− σ)(σ + ϕ)]
(σ + ϕ)[1− σ + γ(σ + ϕ)]2 σ
2
Z (2.45c)
logE {Ufixed,autarky} = (γ − 1)(1− σ)(1 + ϕ) [1− (γ − 1)(σ + ϕ)]
σ + ϕ
σ2Z (2.45d)
logE {Ulabor mobility} = (γ − 1)(1 + ϕ)
σ + ϕ
σ2Z (2.45e)
Using these expected utilities, and the fact that any constant terms will cancel out when
subtracted from each other, we calculate the welfare differences for four scenarios: (1)
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complete markets vs. autarky for flexible wages; (2) complete markets vs. autarky for fixed
wages; (3) flexible vs. fixed wages for complete markets; and (4) flexible vs. fixed wages
for autarky. When comparing welfare across different allocations, it is important to keep
in mind that as risk-aversion decreases, (i.e. as σ → 1), the welfare differences expressed in
logarithms also decrease but the absolute values of utility increase. In other words, when
risk aversion is low, the welfare differences shown in (2.46a) – (2.46d) will shrink, but this
does not mean that the welfare differences are decreasing in absolute value.
logE {Uflex,complete} − logE {Uflex,autarky} = σ(γ − 1)
2(1− σ)(1 + ϕ)2
(σ + ϕ)(1 + γϕ)[1− σ + γ(σ + ϕ)]σ
2
Z
(2.46a)
logE {Ufixed,complete} − logE {Ufixed,autarky} = σ(γ − 1)
2(1− σ)(1 + ϕ)
σ + ϕ
σ2Z (2.46b)
logE {Uflex,complete} − logE {Ufixed,complete} = γϕ
2(γ − 1)2(1− σ)(1 + ϕ)
(1 + γϕ)(σ + ϕ)
σ2Z (2.46c)
logE {Uflex,autarky} − logE {Ufixed,autarky} = (γ − 1)
2(1− σ)(1 + ϕ)[γ(σ + ϕ)− σ]
1 + γ(σ + ϕ)− σ σ
2
Z
(2.46d)
Not surprisingly, equations (2.46a) – (2.46d) prove that for non-unitary Armington elas-
ticity: (1) improved risk-sharing always has positive welfare consequences; and (2) moving
from fixed to flexible exchange rates always has positive welfare consequences. We also see
that in the special case of unitary elasticity the expected utility for all policy coalitions
is identical. Under this special assumption, there is no difference in welfare between a
fixed and flexible exchange rate, nor is there any benefit from improved risk-sharing across
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countries. Equations (2.46a) – (2.46d) thus demonstrate the restrictive nature of assuming
unitary elasticity. In particular, as we’ve mentioned above, unitary elasticity of substitu-
tion between home and foreign goods: (i) leads to complete risk-sharing, eliminating any
difference between allocations in complete markets and financial autarky and (ii) eliminates
wage rigidities, removing the difference between allocations under flexible exchange rates
and within a currency union as well as between non-contingent and contingent domestic
fiscal policy in a currency union. In both cases, risk-sharing and the elimination of nominal
rigidities occur via movements in the terms of trade. This explains why Obstfeld and Rogoff
(2002) and others found such small gains from cooperation: when the elasticity is unitary,
there are simply no gains from cooperation available as movements in the terms of trade
fill the role of cross-country risk-sharing and negate the influence of nominal rigidities.
One can see this explicitly by comparing consumption in all allocations when γ = 1:
Cflex,complete|γ=1 = Cfixed,complete|γ=1 = Cflex,autarky|γ=1 = Cfixed,autarky|γ=1 = Clabor mobility|γ=1.
Under unitary elasticity, consumption is equalized across all risk-sharing regimes, and across
all exchange rate regimes. This demonstrates the importance of considering welfare away
from the unitary elasticity case. The closed-form solution allows us to evaluate the optimal
design of a fiscal union under non-unitary elasticity and isolate the impact of risk sharing,
wage rigidity and labor mobility from a welfare perspective.
Another interesting welfare comparison concerns the gains from improved risk-sharing
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outside of and within currency unions. Using (2.46a) – (2.46d), one can easily show that
the gains from improved risk sharing are higher within a currency union than outside of
one (which matches the results of Farhi and Werning (2012)),
logE {Ufixed,complete} − logE {Ufixed,autarky} ≥ logE {Uflex,complete} − logE {Uflex,autarky} ,
and that the gains from a flexible exchange rate are higher in autarky than under complete
risk-sharing
logE {Uflex,autarky} − logE {Ufixed,autarky} ≥ logE {Uflex,complete} − logE {Ufixed,complete} .
In other words, the benefits of a transfer union are higher in a currency union, and the
benefits of independent monetary policy are higher in financial autarky.
2.7.1 Calibration in the Closed-Form Model
After deriving analytical expressions for welfare, we examine the benefits of a tax union,
a transfer union, a flexible exchange rate, contingent fiscal policy and labor mobility. Our
calibration for the closed-form model is reported in Table 2.1. We calibrate our parameters
at quarterly frequency according to standard benchmarks given in Gali and Monacelli (2005,
2008), Rotemberg and Woodford (1997) and others.
In our welfare analysis, we allow the Armington elasticity to vary while fixing the other
parameters of the model. Our aim is to calculate welfare exactly for a wide range of
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Armington elasticity values. Each plot below shows the loss in consumption as a percentage
of the Pareto optimal allocation for a range of γ.
2.7.2 Tax Union
We begin by comparing the welfare of a country in a tax union (denoted by tax) with the
welfare of a country outside of a tax union (denoted by notax), assuming that the two
countries are identical in all other respects. Aside from the terms of trade externality, both
countries are subject to the same distortions, whether that be incomplete risk-sharing or
wage rigidity. They differ only in the fact that one country faces a terms of trade markup
in it’s steady state allocation (the country outside of a tax union) and the other does not
(the country within a tax union). The log difference in expected utility between a country
inside a tax union and a country outside of a tax union is:
logE {Utax} − E {Unotax} =
(
1− σ
σ + ϕ
)
logµγ =
(
1− σ
σ + ϕ
)
log
(
γ
γ − 1
)
. (2.47)
Equation (2.47) shows that the welfare gains from a tax union are decreasing in γ, the
degree of substitutability between products across countries. As goods become closer sub-
stitutes, country level monopoly power falls and the distortionary impact of the terms of
trade externality decreases due to the declining markup on exports. In the limit, as γ →∞
and goods become perfect substitutes, the terms of trade markup will go to zero, and a tax
union will be unnecessary. On the other hand, as the Armington elasticity decreases, coun-
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tries gain a higher degree of monopoly power over their export good and thus increase their
terms of trade markup µγ . In the limit, as γ → 1, the terms of trade markup approaches
infinity and the benefits of a tax union dwarf the gains from other policy measures.
Figure 2.4 illustrates the importance of a tax union for low values of the Armington
elasticity and plots the loss in consumption from the terms of trade distortion relative to
the Armington elasticity. The figure makes it clear that as γ → 1, a tax union becomes
imperative. In the absence of a tax union, optimizing non-cooperative fiscal authorities
charge extremely large markups on their export good, leading to a dismal equilibrium for all
countries. This is one of the most important insights we glean from the closed-form model:
non-cooperative fiscal policy inflicts extremely large welfare losses on other countries under
low Armington elasticity. Because there are very few papers that consider non-cooperative
fiscal policy, this dynamic is generally absent in the literature. As we’ve mentioned before,
it is important to point out that the benefits of a tax union occur in the steady state because
the terms of trade markup is present in the steady state. Business cycle fluctuations and
shocks have no bearing on the welfare gains from a tax union. The gains from a tax union
are a steady state phenomenon, and as such, cannot be analyzed in a log-linear model.
2.7.3 Transfer Union, Flexible Wages and Labor Mobility
Having established the relative importance of a tax union with respect to the Armington
elasticity, we now turn to the welfare gains achieved through improved risk-sharing (via a
transfer union or deeper financial integration), the elimination of wage rigidity (via optimal
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monetary policy outside of a currency union or contingent fiscal policy within a currency
union) and labor mobility. In what follows, we assume the presence of a tax union, which
removes the constant terms of trade markup.
Figure 2.5 plots the consumption in each allocation as a percentage of the Pareto opti-
mum. The negative impact of the wage rigidity distortion dominates the negative impact
of financial autarky, as both fixed wage allocations perform quite poorly relative to the
flexible wage allocations, particularly as the degree of substitutability increases. The rel-
ative similarity of all flexible wage allocations (Flex Complete, Flex Autarky, and Labor
Mobility) is quite striking. Even in financial autarky, when wages are flexible households
are able to stabilize consumption with small movements in their labor hours. As a result,
the benefit of consumption risk-sharing is very small when wages are flexible. The gains
from flexible wages approach 2% of permanent consumption under complete risk-sharing
and 4% of permanent consumption under financial autarky for γ = 10. On the other hand,
the welfare gains from perfect risk-sharing via a transfer union or complete markets equal
2% of permanent consumption within a currency union when γ = 10.
2.7.4 Are countries better off in a currency union?
One of the arguments in support of a currency union, advanced by Mundell (1961, 1973)
among others, is that the formation of such a union will lead to deeper financial integration
and improve cross-country risk sharing. Using this logic, we conduct a thought experiment
on the potential benefits of a currency union. We compare the welfare of a country outside
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a currency union in financial autarky with a member of a currency union in complete
markets. Is a country better off with a flexible exchange rate and no risk sharing, or in a
currency union with perfect risk sharing? The answer depends on the degree of risk aversion
as defined by σ, the inverse Frisch elasticity of labor supply ϕ, as well as the Armington
elasticity γ. Details are found in Appendix B.8. Here we focus on the intuition.
When households are completely risk neutral (σ = 0), they prefer a country with inde-
pendent monetary policy in financial autarky if γ > 1. As households become more risk
averse, they prefer a country that is a member of a currency union with full risk-sharing for
a wider range of values of γ. In the limit, as σ →∞, households prefer a currency union if
γ ∈
(
1, 1+2ϕϕ
)
. For standard calibrations of ϕ, this means households will prefer a currency
union when γ is between 1 and 2. So there is a very small range of γ for which households
are better off in a currency union in complete markets than outside of one in financial au-
tarky. Even under extreme risk aversion, deeper financial integration is not worth the loss
of independent monetary policy.
As export goods become closer substitutes, the welfare losses from financial autarky fall
relative to the gains from independent monetary policy. What causes this? Assume country
i is hit with a negative productivity shock. If country i is a member of a currency union,
wage rigidity will force its producers to charge a higher price. With a flexible exchange rate,
the higher domestic price would be offset by a depreciated currency, but in a currency union
this effect is absent. Given the higher price, consumers in country i and in other countries
will switch to cheaper substitutes. If the elasticity of substitution is very high, demand for
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country i′s good will collapse, and country i will produce almost nothing. If markets within
the currency union are complete or a transfer union is in place, consumption must be equal
across countries. However only a few countries will produce any output, and households in
those few countries will have to work long hours to supply goods for the whole currency
union. As a result, average consumption and welfare will fall. This effect is exacerbated as
goods become closer substitutes. In the limit, when goods are perfect substitutes (γ =∞)
and shocks are asymmetric, only one country in the currency union will produce any output,
and consumption and welfare will equal zero for all countries in the union. This illustrates
the challenges that arise within a currency union when countries produce similar goods and
face wage rigidity.
On the other hand, when substitutability is close to one, the welfare losses from wage
rigidity and the gains from risk-sharing go to zero. Terms of trade movements will provide
risk-sharing and insulate economies from the negative impact of asymmetric productivity
shocks and nominal rigidities. In this case, a country will be indifferent between remaining
outside a currency union in financial autarky and joining a currency union with full risk-
sharing.
In reality of course, membership in a currency union does not guarantee perfect risk shar-
ing through access to complete markets, nor does lack of membership in a currency union
prevent countries from accessing international financial markets. Whether countries enjoy
some degree of cross-border risk sharing seems to be largely unrelated to their membership
in a currency union, although it is true that the introduction of the euro led to an increase
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in cross-border lending within the euro area, as well as an initial convergence of borrowing
rates within the union. However, from a theoretical standpoint it is hard to argue that
the potential risk sharing benefits of a currency union outweigh the loss of independent
monetary policy.
2.8 Extended Model: Home Bias, Calvo Rigidities and
Incomplete Markets
In this section we relax the assumption of complete openness and conduct welfare analyses
in a model with home bias. We also employ Calvo wage rigidities in place of one period
in advance wage setting and consider incomplete markets where cross-border trading in
safe government bonds is permitted. The model presented here, which we refer to as the
extended model, is identical in all other respects to the closed-form model described in
Section 2.2. The extended model is laid out in full detail in Appendix B.9.
In each country i, the consumption basket consists of home (CHit ) and foreign (C
F
it ) goods,
Cit =
[
(1− α) 1η (CHit) η−1η + α 1η (CFit )
η−1
η
] η
η−1
(2.48)
where CFit and C
H
it are defined as
CFit =
(∫
(CFijt)
γ−1
γ dj
) γ
γ−1
and CHit =
(∫
(CHit (h))
ε−1
ε dh
) ε
ε−1
. (2.49)
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CFijt denotes consumption by households in country i of the variety produced by country
j, while CHit (h) denotes consumption by households in country i of the domestic variety
produced by intermediate firm h. The elasticity of substitution between home and foreign
products is defined by η, while the elasticity of substitution between the goods of different
countries remains γ. The relative weight of these goods in the consumption basket is defined
by the degree of home bias, 1−α. When α = 0, home bias is complete and households only
consume domestic goods. In the opposite extreme, when α = 1, the economy is fully open
and households will consume a basket made up entirely of imports from all other countries
in the world.
imilarly the price index will consist of goods prices of both home and foreign products:
Pit =
[
(1− α)P 1−ηH,it + αP 1−ηF,it
] 1
1−η
. (2.50)
Relative demand for home and foreign products is given by
CH,it = (1− α)
(
PH,it
Pit
)−η
Cit, (2.51)
CF,it = α
(
PF,it
Pit
)−η
Cit, (2.52)
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where CF,it and CH,it are defined as
CF,it =
(∫
C
γ−1
γ
F,ijtdj
) γ
γ−1
, (2.53)
CH,it =
(∫
CH,it(h)
−1
 dh
) 
−1
. (2.54)
CF,ijt denotes consumption by households in country i of the variety produced by country j.
CH,it(h) denotes consumption by households in country i of the domestic variety produced
by intermediate firm h.
Calvo wage setting can be expressed as
W 1−εt = (1− θW )W˜ 1−εt + θWW 1−εt−1 (2.55)
where Wt is the actual wage, W˜ is the optimal reset wage and θW is the fraction of house-
holds who are able to reset wages in each period.
There is a nominal government bond that pays in units of the import basket CF . House-
holds will maximize utility from (2.4) subject to the following budget constraint:
Cit(h) +
Bit(h)
Pit
= (1− τi)
(
Wit(h)
Pit(h)
)
Nit(h) +Dit(h) + Tit(h) + Γit(h) + (1 + it−1)
(
Bit−1(h)
Pit
)
.
(2.56)
The domestic interest rate it equals the world interest rate plus a country specific interest
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rate premium p() that is strictly increasing in the amount of debt Bt:
it = i
∗ + p(Bt). (2.57)
Financial autarky is the case for which p goes to infinity. The interest rate premium is
necessary to ensure stationarity, a feature demonstrated in Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2003).
2.8.1 Calibration in the Extended Model
As in the closed-form case, we calibrate the extended model at a quarterly frequency.
All parameter values are found in Table 2.2. We conduct a number of experiments to
measure the robustness of our closed-form results for varying degrees of openness (α) and
substitutability (γ). We calibrate η = 1, the elasticity between home and foreign goods, to
match Gali and Monacelli (2005, 2008) and Farhi and Werning (2012), although later we
consider cases where η > 1. The assumption of η = 1 leads to a Cobb-Douglas consumption
basket: Cit = C
1−α
H,itC
α
F,it. We still allow for non-unitary elasticity between the products
of different countries defined by γ. In our baseline calibration, we set θW = 0.93, which
implies that wages are reset every three years. This is a conservative parameterization
relative to recent estimates by Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2011 and 2012), who estimate the
degree of downward wage rigidity for a number of economies in Europe from 2008-2011.
They find complete downward wage rigidity in a number of countries, including Greece,
Portugal and Spain. Although wages are more flexible in the upward direction, our focus
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here is on the negative effect of downward wage rigidity and the large welfare losses that
accrue in a currency union under this scenario. We consider a wider range of wage rigidity
parameterizations in Figure 2.9.
2.8.2 Welfare Analysis in the Extended Model
We first analyze the welfare gains from a tax union. We compare the difference in steady
state consumption between a set of countries outside of a tax union with those inside
a tax union. Figure 2.6 plots the loss in permanent consumption from the terms of trade
externality as a function of openness and the Armington elasticity. The distortionary impact
of the terms of trade markup is increasing in both openness and the Armington elasticity.
One can see this by examining the optimal non-cooperative income tax rate in the extended
model, τi = 1 − µε
(
γ−1+(1−α)η
γ−(1−α)(1−η)
)
, which we derive in Appendix B.10. This tax rate is
increasing in openness and both elasticities, η and γ.
The intuition is as follows. As the degree of home bias increases, optimizing non-
cooperative fiscal policymakers find it less desirable to impose a large terms of trade markup
on their export good because home consumers pay the markup when they consume home
products. This is a result of the law of one price: if the fiscal authority taxes workers in
order to reduce supply and increase the price of its unique final good, households in all
countries will suffer but home households will suffer more because the home good makes up
(1-α) fraction of the consumption basket. In contrast, when economies are completely open,
home households consume measure zero of their domestic good, and the non-cooperative
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fiscal authority is no longer concerned about reducing home welfare through the terms of
trade markup. As we saw earlier in the closed-form version of the model, the optimal in-
come tax rate converges to τi = 1 − γγ−1 when economies are completely open. Within a
tax union, the optimal tax rate remains τi = 1− µε.
Why does the welfare loss from the terms of trade externality increase in the degree of
openness? When an economy is more open the household consumption basket consists of
a larger percentage of imports. These imports are subject to a terms of trade markup.
As a result, the more a country needs to import, the greater the negative welfare impact
of the terms of trade externality. In addition, as goods become less substitutable (as the
Armington elasticity decreases), fiscal authorities have an incentive to impose larger terms
of trade markups on their exports through income tax setting. Country-level monopoly
power is thus increasing in both openness and the Armington elasticity.
Next, we calculate the welfare losses from business cycle fluctuations in financial autarky
and incomplete markets. We follow Lucas (2003) and estimate the utility from a deter-
ministic consumption path and a risky consumption path with the same mean. We then
calculate the amount of consumption necessary to make a risk averse household indifferent
between the deterministic and risky consumption streams.
Figure 2.7 plots the loss in permanent consumption from business cycle fluctuations in
financial autarky when wage rigidity θW = 0.93. We ignore the impact of the terms of trade
externality and assume that there is no steady state terms of trade markup here. Figure 2.7
shows that home bias lowers welfare for every value of the Armington elasticity. In other
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words, home bias exacerbates the negative welfare impact of wage rigidity in the absence
of risk-sharing, demonstrating that our closed-form results actually provide a lower bound
estimate of the welfare benefits of a transfer union under financial autarky. The losses in
permanent consumption in financial autarky in a currency union are as high as 25% when
economies are completely open (α = 1) and 26% under full home bias (α→ 0). Home bias
thus adds about 1% to the loss in permanent consumption from rigid wages. In contrast,
depending on the value of the Armington elasticity, the losses in permanent consumption
can be as low as 0% (γ = 1) and as high as 26% (γ = 20). The Armington elasticity is far
more important than the degree of openness in determining welfare losses.
Why does home bias increase the welfare losses from business cycle fluctuations in finan-
cial autarky? To better understand the intuition, consider the following thought experiment.
Assume that wages are completely rigid, that α = 0.01 so the economy is almost closed,
and that home and foreign consumption baskets are perfect complements. In this case,
one percent of consumption always goes to imports. Under financial autarky in a currency
union, the cash value of imports must equal the cash value of exports. Therefore, total con-
sumption is equal to the value of exports multiplied by 100. Fluctuations in total household
consumption are thus equal to fluctuations in export revenues when the home and foreign
consumption baskets are perfect complements. This effect is only strengthened when home
and foreign goods are imperfect complements or substitutes. A negative shock raises the
price of the home good, which will lead domestic households to substitute home goods for
foreign goods in their consumption basket. The share of imports in total consumption will
93
Chapter 2 The Optimal Design of a Fiscal Union
thus increase. But the value of imports must equal the value of exports in financial autarky,
and exports are now uncompetitive on the world market due to the rise in price caused by
the negative shock. As a result, total home consumption must fall.
Figure 2.8 plots the loss in permanent consumption from business cycle fluctuations in
incomplete markets. The ability to trade bonds greatly improves welfare for countries in
a currency union who are exposed to asymmetric shocks. Different from financial autarky,
an increase in home bias improves the ability of countries to stabilize business cycles when
markets are incomplete. If a country is completely open, bonds allow households to stabi-
lize consumption but not labor, because exports are not competitive following a negative
technology shock and wages are rigid. When home bias increases, stabilization of both con-
sumption and labor is possible, because firms supply goods mainly to the home market. On
the other hand, under financial autarky consumption is never stabilized, so that an increase
in home bias has the opposite effect.
As a robustness check, we plot the loss in permanent consumption from business cycle
fluctuations for varying levels of Calvo wage rigidity in Figure 2.9. We set openness equal
to the euro area average (α = 0.35). As in Figure 2.7, we ignore the effects of the terms
of trade externality. Again, it is not simply wage rigidity that leads to large welfare losses,
but rather the combination of wage rigidity and a high Armington elasticity. Simply put,
when a country in a currency union produces exports that are easily substitutable, the
welfare consequences are dramatic. When wages are completely rigid, as the evidence
in Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2011) suggests for some European countries, the losses in
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permanent consumption are small for low values of elasticity, but approach 80% for high
values of elasticity. Even for conservative estimates of wage rigidity, the losses in permanent
consumption are quite large when the Armington elasticity is high.
Overall our findings in this section confirm our closed-form results. The Armington
elasticity remains an essential parameter that governs the optimal design of a fiscal union.
A tax union is more important when exports are imperfect substitutes, while a transfer
union is more important when exports are close substitutes. We also find that home bias
increases the distortionary impact of imperfect risk sharing, but decreases the impact of
the terms of trade externality because monopoly power at the export level declines when
domestic consumption baskets consist of a significant portion of domestically produced
goods. In the limit, when countries only consume domestic goods, there are no terms of
trade externalities. Home bias thus strengthens the need for a transfer union but decreases
the need for a tax union. In addition, home bias strengthens the distortionary impact of
wage rigidity, raising the importance of contingent fiscal policy or labor mobility within a
currency union. Our welfare analysis also demonstrates that under the commonly assumed
Cole-Obstfeld calibration, which sets σ = η = γ = 1, the welfare losses from business cycle
fluctuations are extremely small. We nest the Cole-Obstfeld calibration as a special case,
and show that the the distortionary impact of imperfect risk-sharing and wage rigidity is
much larger as the Armington elasticity moves away from unity and goods become more
substitutable.
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2.8.3 Country-Specific Elasticity Estimates and Welfare Losses
In this section we move from general welfare analysis to country-specific analysis. In Table
2.3 and 2.4 we compute the welfare losses under financial autarky and incomplete markets
for a number of European countries using the elasticity estimates calculated by Corbo and
Osbat (2013). Their paper is one of the few to actually estimate the aggregate elastic-
ity of substitution between home and foreign products (η) and the aggregate elasticity of
substitution between the products of different countries (γ). Most trade papers focus only
on sector-specific estimates. We set the Calvo wage rigidity parameter θW = 0.93 for all
countries in this section.
Table 2.3 plots the loss in permanent consumption for the mean elasticity estimates. The
results are striking: the losses in permanent consumption from financial autarky are as high
as 33% for Greece. Large losses in financial autarky also occur in Austria (24.78%), France
(23.25%), Germany (23.90%) and Sweden (31.86%). The benefits of incomplete markets
become clear here, as the losses drop to a range of 3.71% (Italy) to 17.98% (Greece) when
countries are able to trade a safe government bond. The importance of maintaining access
to international financial markets is quite apparent in the last column of the table, where
we calculate the welfare gain when a country moves from financial autarky to incomplete
markets. The values in the last column can also be viewed as a lower bound estimate of
the welfare gain from the optimal transfer union, which enables perfect risk-sharing.
Table 2.4 plots the loss in permanent consumption for the median elasticity estimates.
The median elasticity estimates are lower than the mean estimates. As a result, the welfare
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losses here are not as large, ranging from 2.8% (UK) to 5.49% (Sweden). But the losses
in permanent consumption are still incredibly large relative to Lucas’ (2003) estimates of
the welfare cost of business cycles. These results suggest that the potential gains from
international fiscal cooperation are economically significant for a number of countries in the
euro area, but particularly for countries that lose access to international financial markets.
2.9 Conclusion
In this paper we provide a unique perspective on the welfare gains from international fiscal
policy cooperation. We first derive a global closed-form solution for an open economy
model in which countries are subject to three distortions: nominal rigidities, imperfect risk
sharing and terms of trade externalities. Using this global closed-form solution, we study
the benefits of a fiscal union in complete markets and financial autarky, for varying degrees
of substitutability between traded goods produced in different countries, both within and
outside of currency unions. This setup allows us to examine the optimal structure of a fiscal
union and analytically calculate the exact welfare gains from cooperation among national
policymakers for a broad set of scenarios. We then compute the welfare gains from the
optimal fiscal union in a larger model that incorporates home bias and Calvo wage rigidities.
We show that the optimal design of a fiscal union depends crucially on the Armington
elasticity, which defines the degree of substitutability between the products of different
countries. When substitutability is low (around one), risk-sharing occurs naturally via terms
of trade movements so that a transfer union is unnecessary. Terms of trade externalities
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are large however, and optimal policy will implement a tax union to prevent terms of trade
manipulation. The welfare gains from a tax union can be as high as 3% of permanent
consumption for standard calibrations. When substitutability is high (above one), risk-
sharing no longer occurs naturally via terms of trade movements. If financial markets do
not provide complete risk-sharing across countries, there is a role for a transfer union to
insure against idiosyncratic shocks. The relative importance of a transfer union increases
as goods become more substitutable. The welfare gains from a transfer union are as high as
5% of permanent consumption when countries are able to trade safe government bonds, and
approach 20% of consumption when countries lose access to international financial markets.
We also show that contingent domestic fiscal policy can make up for the lack of national
monetary policy within a currency union and eliminate nominal rigidities. Finally, we prove
that labor mobility eliminates nominal rigidities and enhances international risk-sharing.
Our results illustrate why federal currency unions such as the U.S., Canada and Australia,
with relatively high labor mobility, income tax harmonization and built-in fiscal transfer
arrangements, can withstand asymmetric shocks across regions much better than the euro
area, which lacks many of these ingredients at the moment. The potential welfare gain
from implementing such policies in the euro area is quite large, particularly for countries
that produce highly substitutable export goods and that cannot raise funds on international
financial markets to insure against downside risk.
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Table 2.1: Calibration of the Closed-Form Model
Parameter Value Description
σ 2 Risk aversion parameter
ϕ 3 Inverse labor supply elasticity (Gali and Monacelli (2005, 2008))
χ 1 Following Gali and Monacelli (2005, 2008)
ε 6 Elasticity between different types of labor
σZ 0.01 Standard deviation of technology
β 0.99 Household discount factor
γ Varies Armington elasticity
Table 2.2: Calibration of the Extended Model with Home Bias and Calvo Wage Rigidity
Parameter Value Description
σ 2 Risk aversion parameter
ϕ 3 Inverse labor supply elasticity (Gali and Monacelli (2005, 2008))
χ 1 Following Gali and Monacelli (2005, 2008)
ε 6 Elasticity between different types of labor
θW Varies Calvo parameter for wage rigidity
α 0.25 Openness (Gali and Monacelli (2005, 2008))
η 1 Elasticity between home and foreign goods
ρZ 0.95 Persistence of technology shock
σZ 0.01 Standard deviation of technology
β 0.99 Household discount factor
γ Varies Armington elasticity
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Table 2.3: Losses in Permanent Consumption from Business Cycle Fluctuations for Mean Country-Specific Elasticity Estimates
Welfare Loss Welfare Loss Welfare Gain from Access Welfare Loss Welfare Loss Welfare Gain from Access
α η γ Autarky Incomp. Mkts to Financial Markets Autarky Incomp. Mkts to Financial Markets
Austria 0.55 24.5 5.3 24.78 12.27 12.51 4.88 3.04 1.84
Czech 0.7 13.3 9.5 23.29 10.82 12.47 4.53 3.09 1.44
Denmark 0.4 8.6 4.2 15.03 6.58 8.45 3.72 1.71 2.01
Finland 0.32 10.9 4.6 18.16 7.03 11.13 4.09 1.91 2.18
France 0.31 13.2 8.9 23.25 9.85 13.4 4.72 2.54 2.18
Germany 0.34 8.2 13.3 23.9 10.54 13.36 4.79 2.69 2.1
Greece 0.35 28.5 22 33.67 17.98 15.69 5.6 3.99 1.61
Hungary 0.49 9.6 7.7 19.55 9.28 10.27 4.28 2.44 1.84
Italy 0.22 4.6 4.7 13.57 3.71 9.86 3.38 1.06 2.32
Netherlands 0.62 9.5 5.3 16.48 8.04 8.44 3.85 2.17 1.68
Portugal 0.41 6.8 5.4 15.67 6.32 9.35 3.72 1.75 1.97
Slovakia 0.3 8.5 7.8 19.87 7.67 12.2 4.32 2.02 2.3
Spain 0.3 5.5 6.7 16.67 5.88 10.79 3.88 1.64 2.24
Sweden 0.42 15.8 25.5 31.86 17.74 14.12 5.48 3.96 1.52
UK 0.37 4.4 6 14.64 5.51 9.13 3.56 1.55 2.01
European Avg 0.35 11.46 9.126666667 22.39 9.73 12.66 4.62 2.52 2.1
All losses are in percent. Openness (α) is taken from Balta and Delgado (2009). The elasticity of substitution between home and foreign products (η) and the elasticity of substitution
between the products of different countries (γ) for European countries is taken from Table 4 and 5 of Corbo and Osbat (2013).
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Table 2.4: Losses in Permanent Consumption from Business Cycle Fluctuations for Median
Country-Specific Elasticity Estimates
Welfare Loss Welfare Loss Welfare Gain from Access
α η γ Autarky Incomplete Mkts to Financial Markets
Austria 0.55 5.7 4.0 12.23 4.77 7.46
Czech Rep. 0.70 3.8 4.3 11.46 4.12 7.34
Denmark 0.40 3.9 3.6 9.83 4.05 5.78
Finland 0.32 4.0 3.5 10.59 3.23 7.36
France 0.31 4.3 4.4 12.47 3.97 8.50
Germany 0.34 4.2 5.3 13.61 4.73 8.88
Greece 0.35 3.1 4.6 11.38 3.75 7.63
Hungary 0.49 3.8 4.5 11.46 4.72 6.74
Italy 0.22 3.4 3.4 10.03 2.36 7.67
Netherlands 0.62 4.1 3.7 9.87 4.47 5.4
Portugal 0.41 3.6 4.1 10.87 3.90 6.97
Slovakia 0.30 4.1 4.3 12.13 3.75 8.38
Spain 0.30 3.8 3.5 10.43 3.04 7.39
Sweden 0.42 5.0 5.2 13.89 5.49 8.40
UK 0.37 3.1 3.3 8.95 2.80 6.15
European Avg 0.35 3.9 4.1 11.35 3.74 7.61
All losses are in percent. Openness (α) is taken from Balta and Delgado (2009). The elasticity of substitution
between home and foreign products (η) and the elasticity of substitution between the products of different
countries (γ) for European countries is taken from Table 4 and 5 of Corbo and Osbat (2013).
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Figure 2.1: Model Timeline
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Figure 2.3: Annual Cross-Border Mobility, % of Population (2010)
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Figure 2.4: Welfare Losses From Terms of Trade Externalities in the Closed-Form Model
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Figure 2.5: Welfare Losses from Business Cycle Fluctuations in the Closed-Form Model
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Figure 2.6: Welfare Losses from Terms of Trade Externalities
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Figure 2.7: Welfare Losses from Business Cycle Fluctuations in Financial Autarky
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Figure 2.8: Welfare Losses from Business Cycle Fluctuations in Incomplete Markets
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Figure 2.9: Welfare Losses from Business Cycle Fluctuations in Financial Autarky for Dif-
ferent Levels of Wage Rigidity
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Chapter 3
The Financial Accelerator and the
Optimal Lending Contract
3.1 Introduction
In one of the foundational papers in the literature on financial frictions in macroeconomic
models, Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (1999) derive a contract between risk averse lenders
and risk neutral borrowers in the costly state verification (CSV) framework of Townsend
(1979).1 Although this loan contract has become the standard contract for CSV models of
financial frictions, it is not optimal because it assumes returns for lenders are predetermined
and borrowers are myopic.
In this paper we relax these two assumptions and derive the optimal history-independent
1A non-exhaustive list of some important early contributions in this literature include Bernanke and Gertler
(1989) and Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997).
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loan contract in the CSV model.2 We allow returns to the lender to be contingent on the
aggregate state of the economy following early criticism of Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist
(1999) by Chari (2003). Chari’s concerns were later formalized by Carlstrom, Fuerst and
Paustian (2012). We also introduce forward looking entrepreneurs who maximize the present
discounted value of all future consumption instead of next period expected consumption.3
Our analysis provides three main results. First, under the optimal contract we find that
financial frictions do not amplify business cycles. Relative to a model with financial frictions,
monetary and technology shocks generate much larger output responses when frictions
are absent. Second, shocks to the cross-sectional variance of entrepreneurs’ idiosyncratic
productivity — so-called “risk” shocks — have little to no impact on the real economy,
in contrast with the standard Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist contract (hereafter BGG).
This is particularly important as recent work by Christiano, Motto and Rostagno (2013)
emphasizes the importance of risk shocks in driving business cycles. We show here that
risk shocks provide amplification only when the lending contract is suboptimal. Third, we
show that the financial accelerator in the original BGG framework is dependent on three
key characteristics: a suboptimal contract, loose monetary policy and extremely persistent
technology shocks. We conduct a number of robustness checks in Section 3.5 and find
2To be precise, we derive the optimal one-period contract with deterministic monitoring. An excellent
list of references for partial equilibrium multi-period contracts includes Monnett and Quintin (2005)
for stochastic monitoring, Wang (2005) for deterministic monitoring, and Cole (2013) for self-enforcing
stochastic monitoring.
3In an October 2013 version of their paper, Carlstrom, Fuerst and Paustian independently derive the
dynamically optimal contract for forward looking households without risk shocks. Different from their
paper, we introduce a frictionless benchmark to evaluate amplification and also consider the effect of risk
shocks.
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that the removal of any one of these characteristics significantly weakens or eliminates the
financial accelerator. Overall, our results cast doubt on the qualitative and quantitative
importance of the financial accelerator in the costly state verification framework.
Our model is standard and consists of a risk averse representative household and risk
neutral entrepreneurs. Entrepreneurs borrow money from the representative household
and purchase capital to use in production. Entrepreneurs are identical ex ante but differ
depending on the ex post realization of an idiosyncratic productivity shock. Both agents
have full information about the distribution of idiosyncratic shocks ex ante, so there is no
adverse selection problem. Borrowers observe the realization of their idiosyncratic shock,
but lenders do not: they need to pay monitoring costs to observe it.
In the BGG contract borrowers guarantee a constant safe rate of return to lenders in order
to maximize returns on their equity. As a result, borrowers absorb all risk in the economy.
It should be noted that this is an assumption and not an equilibrium condition. Because
of this assumption, negative shocks cause a decline in entrepreneurs’ net worth which leads
to a tightening of financial constraints. The subsequent fall in investment and output is
stronger than the effect from the initial shock. This results in the financial accelerator:
the BGG contract amplifies macroeconomic fluctuations in a dynamic stochastic general
equilibrium (DSGE) model.
Recent work by Carlstrom, Fuerst and Paustian (2012), hereafter CFP, shows that the
BGG contract is suboptimal because the predetermined deposit rate does not provide appro-
priate consumption insurance for risk averse households. In CFP, risk neutral entrepreneurs
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find it optimal to offer lenders a contract with a negative covariance between the rate of
return and the lenders’ consumption. During a recession when consumption is low, en-
trepreneurs pay a higher borrowing rate in order to provide household consumption insur-
ance. Entrepreneurs thus have to pay a higher interest rate on their loans exactly when
their net worth is already low. Because the quantity of capital in the economy is a func-
tion of net worth, the dynamics of net worth directly affect investment, leading to a sharp
decline in investment during recessions. The stabilizing effect of the insurance channel on
household consumption is outweighed by a much stronger decline in investment, leading to
higher volatility in the economy at large.
In BGG, CFP and the entire CSV literature entrepreneurs are myopic: they maximize
their expected next period consumption, but expected utility depends on the expected
discounted stream of all future consumption. We depart from the literature and embed
forward looking entrepreneurs into an otherwise standard CSV framework. Our analysis
provides a number of results that call the robustness of the financial accelerator into question
under optimal and suboptimal contracts, for myopic and non-myopic entrepreneurs.
The intuition is as follows. When lenders’ returns are predetermined, we find that to a first
order approximation the lending contract is identical regardless of whether entrepreneurs are
forward looking or myopic. In period t, the predetermined lending rate is chosen to satisfy
the lender’s Euler equation in that specific period without the possibility of revisions in
period t+1. As a result, it does not matter whether entrepreneurs are forward looking or not,
as the lender’s stochastic discount factor determines the rate of return. In order to generate
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amplification however, this suboptimal contract must be combined with other ingredients.
In our robustness exercise in Section 3.5, we show that contracts with a predetermined
deposit rate only generate a financial accelerator when monetary policy deviates from price
stability and when technology shocks are stationary.
On the other hand, when lender’s returns are chosen optimally and vary with the ag-
gregate state of the economy, the presence of forward looking entrepreneurs or myopic
entrepreneurs matters greatly. In CFP, entrepreneurs sell as much insurance to the house-
hold as they can because insurance does not effect their next period expected consumption.
During a recession, the provision of insurance leads to very tight financial constraints for
entrepreneurs, as they face a higher lending rate due to the fall in household consumption.
During a boom the opposite occurs: myopic entrepreneurs have too much capital and earn
small returns on their capital. In other words myopic entrepreneurs miss good investment
opportunities on a consistent basis because they do not take the future flow of capital re-
turns into account when making investment decisions. Under the optimal contract however,
forward looking entrepreneurs sell less insurance because they are concerned not only about
next period expected consumption but also expected consumption in all future periods,
which is impacted by insurance claims. In particular, forward looking entrepreneurs desire
high net worth in states of the world where the financial premium is also high.
To provide more intuition on the role of forward looking entrepreneurs, consider the
following example. Assume that ex-post there is a shock which suddenly decreases the
entrepreneur’s net worth. Lower net worth today means that the financial premium today
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and in the future will be higher. The entrepreneur desires more net worth in states with a
higher financial premium because capital returns are higher and borrowing is more costly.
Forward looking entrepreneurs thus find it profitable to enter into an ex-ante agreement that
stipulates a lower lending rate in these states. Correspondingly, entrepreneurs prefer to pay
a higher lending rate when a shock increases net worth, because the financial premium will
be lower in these states. This interplay between movements in net worth and the financial
premium leads risk-neutral entrepreneurs to behave in a “risk averse” manner because they
want to avoid borrowing in states with a high financial premium. In contrast, if there is no
costly state verification so that financial frictions are absent, non-myopic entrepreneurs will
ignore concerns about the financial premium and provide as much insurance as possible,
generating large amplification.
We also find that risk shocks have little effect on the real economy and give the wrong
comovement between macroeconomic aggregates when contracts are optimal. This contrasts
with Christiano, Motto and Rostagno (2013), who employ the BGG contract and emphasize
the importance of risk shocks in generating business cycle fluctuations. Under the BGG
contract, increased idiosyncratic variance causes an increase in defaults leading to a decline
in the price of capital and consequently net worth. However, if returns to lenders are not
predetermined and entrepreneurs are forward looking, they realize that lower net worth
implies higher financial premiums and more costly borrowing in the future. Therefore,
forward looking entrepreneurs desire more net worth in these states and thus negotiate
lower returns to lenders, which stabilizes the response of net worth to the shock. As a
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result, under the optimal contract the financial accelerator is severely dampened for risk
shocks.
3.2 The Optimal Lending Contract in Partial Equilibrium
Our main theoretical contribution in this paper is to introduce forward looking entrepreneurs
into an otherwise standard CSV model of financial frictions. In this section we outline the
key differences between the dynamically optimal loan contract chosen by utility maximizing
entrepreneurs and the alternative loan contracts in BGG and CFP in a partial equilibrium
setting. Here we assume that entrepreneurs take the price of capital and the expected return
to capital as given. In Section 3.3 we endogenize these variables in general equilibrium.
At time t, entrepreneur j purchases capital Kt(j) at a unit price of Qt. At time t + 1,
the entrepreneur rents this capital to perfectly competitive wholesale goods producers. The
entrepreneur uses his net worth Nt(j) and a loan Bt(j) from the representative lender to
purchase capital:
QtKt(j) = Nt(j) +Bt(j). (3.1)
After buying capital, the entrepreneur is hit with an idiosyncratic shock ωt+1(j) and an
aggregate shock Rkt+1, so that entrepreneur j is able to deliver QtKt(j)R
k
t+1ωt+1(j) units
of assets. The idiosyncratic shock ω(j) is a log-normal random variable with distribution
log(ω(j)) ∼ N (−12σ2ω, σ2ω) and mean of one.
Following BGG, we assume entrepreneurs are risk neutral and die with constant proba-
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bility 1−γ. Upon dying, entrepreneurs consume all operational equities, which are equal to
net worth minus wages. If entrepreneurs survive they do not consume anything, and they
supply labor and earn wages which they later reinvest. Entrepreneur j’s value function is
V et (j) = (1− γ)
∞∑
s=1
γsCet+s (3.2)
where Cet+s is the entrepreneur’s consumption,
Cet (j) = Nt(j)−W et (3.3)
defined as wealth accumulated from operating firms, equal to net worth without entrepreneurial
real wages W et . The timeline for entrepreneurs is plotted in Figure 3.1.
Figure 3.1: Timeline for Entrepreneurs
t
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3.2.1 Borrower and Lender Payoffs
The contract between the lender and borrower follows the familiar CSV framework. We as-
sume that the lender cannot observe the realization of idiosyncratic shocks to entrepreneurs
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unless he pays monitoring costs µ which are a fixed percentage of total assets. Given this
friction, the risk neutral borrower offers the risk averse lender a contract with an state-
contingent interest rate Zt+1 subject to macroeconomic conditions.
The entrepreneur repays the loan only when it is profitable to do so. In particular, the
entrepreneur will repay the loan only if, after repayment, he has more assets than liabilities.
We define the cutoff productivity level ω¯t+1, also known as the bankruptcy threshold, as
the minimum level of productivity necessary for an entrepreneur to repay the loan:
Bt(j)Zt+1(j)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Cost of loan repayment
= ω¯t+1R
k
t+1QtKt(j).︸ ︷︷ ︸
Minimum revenue for loan repayment
(3.4)
If ωt+1(j) < ω¯t+1 the entrepreneur defaults and enters bankruptcy; if ωt+1(j) ≥ ω¯t+1 he
repays the loan. The cutoff productivity level allows us to express the dynamics of net
worth for a particular entrepreneur j:
Nt+1(j) = QtKt(j)R
k
t+1 max
{
ωt+1(j)− ω¯t+1, 0
}
+W et+1. (3.5)
The gross rate of return for the lender, Rt+1, also depends on the productivity cutoff.
For idiosyncratic realizations above the cutoff, the lender will be repaid the full amount of
the loan Bt(j)Zt+1(j). For idiosyncratic realizations below the cutoff, the entrepreneur will
enter bankruptcy and the lender will pay monitoring costs µ and take over the entrepreneur’s
assets, ending up with (1 − µ)Kt(j)Rkt+1h(ωt+1(j)). More formally, the lender’s ex post
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return is
Bt(j)Rt+1(j) =

Bt(j)Zt+1 if ωt+1(j) ≥ ω¯t+1
(1− µ)Kt(j)Rkt+1ωt+1(j) if ωt+1(j) < ω¯t+1
(3.6)
Taking into account that loans to entrepreneurs are perfectly diversifiable, the lenders return
on a loan Rt+1 to entrepreneur j is defined as
Bt(j)Rt+1 ≡ QtKt(j)Rkt+1h(ω¯t+1, σω,t), (3.7)
where h(ω¯t+1, σω,t) is the share of total returns to capital that go to the lender. We define
this share as
h(ω¯t+1, σω,t) =
{
ω¯t+1
[
1− F (ω¯t+1, σω,t)
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Share to lender if loan pays
+ (1− µ)
∫ ω¯t+1
0
ωf(ω, σω,t)dω︸ ︷︷ ︸
Share to lender if loan defaults
}
(3.8)
where f is the probability density function and F is the cumulative distribution function of
the log-normal distribution of idiosyncratic productivity.
In order to simplify the entrepreneur’s optimization problem, we introduce the concept
of leverage, κt, defined as the value of the entrepreneur’s capital divided by net worth:
κt(j) ≡ QtKt(j)/Nt(j). (3.9)
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3.2.2 Loan Contracts: BGG, CFP and the Optimal Contract
The differences between the BGG contract, the CFP contract and the optimal contract
arise from two sources: the lender’s participation constraint and the borrower’s objective
function.
First, the lender’s participation constraint in BGG differs from CFP and the optimal con-
tract. The participation constraint arises from the household Euler equation and stipulates
the minimum rate of return that entrepreneurs must offer to lenders to receive a loan. In
BGG, the participation constraint has the following form:
Et
{
Λt,t+1
}
Rt+1 = 1, (3.10)
where
Λt,s ≡ βsUC,t+s
UC,t
(3.11)
is the household (i.e. shareholder) intertemporal marginal rate of substitution, also known
as the household stochastic discount factor. Under this participation constraint, entrepreneurs
pay a constant safe rate of return to the lenders, Rt+1, which ignores the risk averse rep-
resentative household’s desire for consumption insurance. In contrast, the participation
constraint in CFP and the optimal contract is:
Et
{
Λt,t+1Rt+1
}
= 1. (3.12)
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As CFP show, the above expression implies that households prefer a state contingent rate of
return that is negatively correlated with household consumption. Quite simply, households
like consumption insurance. In recessions, households desire a higher rate of return because
their marginal utility of consumption is high, and vice versa in booms.
Second, the borrower’s objective function in BGG and CFP differs from the optimal
contract. Entrepreneurs in BGG and CFP maximize next period net worth, defined in
equation (3.5). If we substitute the expression for leverage from (3.9) into (3.5), we have
the entrepreneur’s objective function in BGG and CFP:
κt(j)Nt(j)Et
{
Rkt+1 max
[
ωt+1(j)− ω¯t+1, 0
]}
. (3.13)
In contrast, under the dynamically optimal contract entrepreneurs maximize utility, given
by (3.2). As we have mentioned before, utility maximizing entrepreneurs are concerned
not only about current capital returns but also future capital returns and future financial
premiums.
We now have all of the ingredients necessary to set up the entrepreneur’s optimization
problem and solve for the three different loan contracts: (1) the BGG contract; (2) the CFP
contract; and, (3) the optimal contract.
Proposition 18 To solve for the BGG contract, entrepreneurs choose their state contingent
cutoff ω¯t+1 and leverage κt(j) to maximize next period net worth (3.13) subject to (3.5),
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(3.7) and (3.10). The solution to this problem is given by
κtEt
{
Rkt+1g(ω¯t+1, σω,t)
}
= −Et
{
gω(ω¯t+1, σω,t)
hω(ω¯t+1, σω,t)
}
1
EtΛt,t+1
. (3.14)
where g(ω¯t+1, σω,t) =
∫∞
ω¯t+1
ωf(ω, σω,t)dω − ω¯t+1
[
1− F (ω¯t+1, σω,t)
]
.
Proof See Appendix C.2. 
Corollary 1 Log-linearization of the BGG optimality condition (3.14) and the BGG par-
ticipation constraint (3.10) gives
EtRˆkt+1 − EtRˆt+1 = νκκˆt + νσσˆω,t (3.15)
Rˆt+1 − EtRˆt+1 = 0 (3.16)
where the constant νκ =
hωω
hω
− gωω
gω
− gω
g
+hω
h
+ gωω
gω
−hωω
hω
1
κ−1 and νσ =
−hσω
h
(
gωω
gω
−hωω
hω
− gω
g
)
+hω
h
(
gωσ
gω
−hωσ
hω
− gσω
g
)
gωω
gω
−hωω
hω
− gω
g
+hω
h
σω.
Proof See Appendix C.7. 
Equation (3.15) shows that in the BGG contract the entrepreneur’s leverage depends on
next period’s expected financial premium while (3.16) shows that lenders returns (deposit
rate) are predetermined. We prove in Appendix C.5 that when lenders’ returns are pre-
determined, to a first order approximation the lending contract is identical regardless of
whether entrepreneurs are forward looking or myopic.4
4This is also true when the lending rate Z is predetermined, rather than lenders returns R. The general
122
Chapter 3 The Financial Accelerator and the Optimal Lending Contract
Proposition 19 To solve for the CFP contract, entrepreneurs choose their state contingent
cutoff ω¯t+1 and leverage κt(j) to maximize (3.13) subject to (3.5), (3.7) and (3.12). The
solution to this problem is given by
κtEt
{
Rkt+1g(ω¯t+1, σω,t)
}
= − gω(ω¯t+1, σω,t)
hω(ω¯t+1, σω,t)
1
Λt,t+1
. (3.17)
Proof See Appendix C.3. 
Corollary 2 Log-linearization of the CFP optimality condition (3.17) and the CFP partic-
ipation constraint (3.12) gives
EtRˆkt+1 − EtRˆt+1 = νκκˆt + νσσˆω,t (3.18)
Rˆt+1 − EtRˆt+1 = Rˆkt+1 − EtRkt+1 − α˜σ(Cˆt+1 − EtCˆt+1) (3.19)
where α˜ = −
hω
h
hωω
hω
− gωω
gω
.
Proof See Appendix C.7. 
Corollary 2 clearly illustrates the differences between the BGG contract and the CFP
contract. In equation (3.19), lender’s returns depend on capital returns and household con-
sumption, both elements which are missing in the BGG contract. For standard calibrations,
α˜ takes a value between five and six and the risk aversion parameter σ is equal to one, so
that lender’s returns are very sensitive to the consumption level and the consumption in-
equilibrium behavior of the model under predetermined R and predetermined Z is similar, so we only
report results for predetermined R.
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surance channel dominates the response to capital returns. When consumption is high, the
lending rate declines; when consumption is low the lending rate increases. The negative
covariance between the lender’s consumption and returns reflects the nature of insurance,
which amplifies the impact of shocks to the economy. Note that as entrepreneurs become
more risk averse (as σ decreases), the impact of the consumption insurance channel declines.
Now that we have described the BGG and CFP contracts in detail, we turn our attention
to the optimal contract. As we discussed above, the optimal contract takes the consumption
insurance channel from CFP and adds forward looking entrepreneurs.
Proposition 20 To solve for the optimal contract, entrepreneurs choose their state con-
tingent cutoff ω¯t+1 and leverage κt(j) to maximize (3.2) subject to (3.3), (3.5), (3.7) and
(3.12). The solution to this problem is given by
κtEt
{
Ψt+1R
k
t+1g(ω¯t+1, σω,t)
}
= − gω(ω¯t+1, σω,t)
hω(ω¯t+1, σω,t)
Ψt+1
Λt,t+1
(3.20)
where
Ψt = 1 + γκtEt
{
g(ω¯t+1, σω,t)R
k
t+1Ψt+1
}
(3.21)
Proof See Appendix C.4. 
Corollary 3 Log-linearization of the optimal contract, (3.20) and (3.21), and the partici-
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pation constraint (3.12) gives
EtRˆkt+1 − EtRˆt+1 = νκκˆt + νσσˆω,t (3.22)
Rˆt+1 − EtRˆt+1 = Rˆkt+1 − EtRkt+1 − α˜
[
σ(Cˆt+1 − EtCˆt+1) + Ψˆt+1 − EtΨˆt+1
]
(3.23)
Ψˆt+1 = NEt+1
{
(κ− 1)(Rˆkt+2 − Rˆt+2) + Rˆkt+2 + νΨσˆω,t+1 + Ψˆt+2
}
(3.24)
where νΨ =
gσ−hσ gωhω
g σω.
Proof See Appendix C.7. 
We see from (3.23) that under the optimal contract, the surprise to lender’s returns
depends not only on surprises to capital returns and consumption, as in the CFP contract,
but future capital returns and future financial premiums as well. If entrepreneurs are more
optimistic about expected future financial premiums or future returns to capital, they prefer
to pay the lender a lower interest rate because one unit of net worth becomes more valuable.
Corollary 3 thus illustrates the strong stabilizing mechanism of the optimal contract. When
a crisis hits and decreases entrepreneur’s net worth, expected future financial premiums will
rise. But entrepreneurs will also pay lenders a smaller deposit rate, which stabilizes their
net worth. As a result, the main channel for the financial accelerator, the volatility in net
worth, is diminished when entrepreneurs are forward looking.
Although we have taken a partial equilibrium view here, Corollaries 1-3 are identical in
the general equilibrium setting. In both partial and general equilibrium, leverage and the
deposit rate are determined by the paths of capital returns and consumption. Therefore,
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the intuition provided by Corollaries 1-3 holds in general equilibrium.
3.3 The Model in General Equilibrium
We now embed the three loan contracts in a standard dynamic New Keynesian model. There
are six agents in our model: households, entrepreneurs, financial intermediaries, capital
producers, wholesalers and retailers. Entrepreneurs buy capital from capital producers and
then rent it out to perfectly competitive wholesalers, who sell their goods to monopolistically
competitive retailers. Retailers costlessly differentiate the wholesale goods and sell them
to households at a markup over marginal cost. Retailers have price-setting power and are
subject to Calvo price rigidities. Households bundle the retail goods in CES fashion into a
final consumption good. A graphical overview of the model is provided in Figure 3.2. The
dotted lines denote financial flows, while the solid lines denote real flows (goods, labor, and
capital).
3.3.1 Households
The representative household maximizes its utility by choosing the optimal path of con-
sumption, labor and money
maxEt
{ ∞∑
s=0
βs
[
C1−σt+s
1− σ + ζ log
(
Mt+s
Pt+s
)
− χH
1+η
t+s
1 + η
]}
, (3.25)
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where Ct is household consumption, Mt/Pt denotes real money balances, and Ht is house-
hold labor effort. The budget constraint of the representative household is
Ct = WtHt − Tt + Πt +RtDt
Pt
− Dt+1
Pt
+
Mt−1 −Mt
Pt
+
Bt−1Rnt −Bt
Pt
(3.26)
where Wt is the real wage, Tt is lump-sum taxes, Πt is profit received from household
ownership of final goods firms distributed in lump-sum fashion, and Dt are deposits in
financial intermediaries (banks) that pay a contingent nominal gross interest rate Rt, and
Bt are nominal bonds that pay a gross nominal non-contingent interest rate R
n
t .
Households maximize their utility (3.25) subject to the budget constraint (3.26) with
respect to deposits, labor, nominal bonds and money, yielding four first order conditions:
UC,t = βEt
{
Rt+1UC,t+1
}
, (3.27)
UC,t = βR
n
t Et
{
UC,t+1
pit+1
}
(3.28)
WtUC,t = χH
η
t , (3.29)
UC,t = ζ
1
mt
+ βEt
{
UC,t+1
pit+1
}
. (3.30)
We define the gross rate of inflation as pit+1 = Pt+1/Pt, and real money balances as mt =
Mt/Pt.
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3.3.2 Retailers
The final consumption good is made up of a basket of intermediate retail goods which are
aggregated together in CES fashion by the representative household:
Ct =
(∫ 1
0
c
ε−1
ε
it di
) ε
ε−1
. (3.31)
Demand for retailer i’s unique variety is
cit =
(
pit
Pt
)−ε
Ct, (3.32)
where pit is the price charged by retail firm i. The aggregate price index is defined as
Pt =
(∫ 1
0
p1−εit
) 1
1−ε
. (3.33)
Each retail firm chooses its price according to Calvo (1979) in order to maximize net dis-
counted profit. With probability 1−θ each retailer is able to change its price in a particular
period t. Retailer i’s objective function is
max
p∗it
∞∑
s=0
θsEt
{
Λt+s
p∗it − Pwt+s
Pt+s
(
p∗it
Pt+s
)−ε
Yt+s
}
, (3.34)
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where Pwt is the wholesale goods price. The first order condition with respect to the retailer’s
price p∗it is
∞∑
s=0
θsEt
{
Λt,s(p
∗
it/Pt+s)
−εYt+s
[
p∗it −
ε
ε− 1P
w
t+s
]}
= 0. (3.35)
From this condition it is clear that all retailers which are able to reset their prices in period
t will choose the same price p∗it = P
∗
t ∀i. The price level will evolve according to
Pt =
[
θP 1−εt−1 + (1− θ)(P ∗t )1−ε
] 1
1−ε . (3.36)
Dividing the left and right hand side of (3.36) by the price level gives
1 =
[
θpiε−1t−1 + (1− θ)(p∗t )1−ε
] 1
1−ε , (3.37)
where p∗t = P ∗t /Pt. Using the same logic, we can normalize (3.35) and obtain:
p∗t =
ε
ε− 1
∑∞
s=0 θ
sEt−1
{
Λt,s(1/pt+s)
−εYt+spwt+s
}∑∞
s=0 θ
sEt−1 {Λt,s(1/pt+s)−εYt+s} , (3.38)
where pwt+s =
Pwt+s
Pt
and pt+s = Pt+s/Pt.
3.3.3 Wholesalers
Wholesale goods are produced by perfectly competitive firms and then sold to monopolis-
tically competitive retailers who costlessly differentiate them. Wholesalers hire labor from
households and entrepreneurs in a competitive labor market at real wage Wt and W
e
t and
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rent capital from entrepreneurs at rental rate Rrt . Note that capital purchased in period
t is used in period t + 1. Following BGG, the production function of the representative
wholesaler is given by
Yt = AtK
α
t−1(Ht)
(1−α)Ω(Het )
(1−α)(1−Ω), (3.39)
where At denotes aggregate technology, Kt is capital, Ht is household labor, H
e
t is en-
trepreneurial labor, and Ω defines the relative importance of household labor and en-
trepreneurial labor in the production process. Entrepreneurs inelastically supply one unit
of labor, so that the production function simplifies to
Yt = AtK
α
t−1H
(1−α)Ω
t . (3.40)
One can express the price of the wholesale good in terms of the price of the final good.
In this case, the price of the wholesale good will be
Pwt
Pt
=
1
Xt , (3.41)
where Xt is the variable markup charged by final goods producers. The objective function
for wholesalers is then given by
max
Ht,Het ,Kt−1
1
XtAtK
α
t−1(Ht)
(1−α)Ω(Het )
(1−α)(1−Ω) −WtHt −W et Het −RrtKt−1. (3.42)
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Here wages and the rental price of capital are in real terms. The first order conditions with
respect to capital, household labor and entrepreneurial labor are
1
Xtα
Yt
Kt−1
= Rrt , (3.43)
Ω
Xt (1− α)
Yt
Ht
= Wt, (3.44)
Ω
Xt (1− α)
Yt
Het
= W et . (3.45)
3.3.4 Capital Producers
The perfectly competitive capital producer transforms final consumption goods into capital.
Capital production is subject to adjustment costs, according to
Kt = It + (1− δ)Kt−1 − φK
2
(
It
Kt−1
− δ
)2
Kt−1, (3.46)
where It is investment in period t, δ is the rate of depreciation and φK is a parameter that
governs the magnitude of the adjustment cost. The capital producer’s objective function is
max
It
KtQt − It, (3.47)
where Qt denotes the price of capital. The first order condition of the capital producer’s
optimization problem is
1
Qt
= 1− φK
(
It
Kt−1
− δ
)
. (3.48)
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3.3.5 Lenders
One can think of the representative lender in the model as a perfectly competitive bank
which costlessly intermediates between households and borrowers. The role of the lender is
to diversify the household’s funds among various entrepreneurs. The bank takes nominal
household deposits Dt and loans out nominal amount Bt to entrepreneurs. In equilibrium,
deposits will equal loanable funds (Dt = Bt). Households, as owners of the bank, receive
a state contingent real rate of return Rt+1 on their “deposits” — which equals the rate of
return on loans to entrepreneurs.5 Households choose the optimal lending rate according
to their first order condition with respect to deposits:
βEt
{
UC,t+1
UC,t
Rt+1
}
= Et
{
Λt,t+1Rt+1
}
= 1.
As we discussed above, the lender prefers a return that co-varies negatively with household
consumption, which amplifies the financial accelerator.
3.3.6 Entrepreneurs
We have already described the entrepeneur’s problem in detail in Section 3.2. Entrepreneurs
choose their cutoff productivity level and leverage according to: (3.14) in BGG; (3.17) in
CFP; and (3.20) and (3.21) in the dynamically optimal contract.
Wholesale firms rent capital at rate Rrt+1 =
αYt
XtKt−1 from entrepreneurs. After production
5Note that lenders are not necessary in the model, but we follow BGG and CFP in positing a perfectly
competitive financial intermediary between households and borrowers.
132
Chapter 3 The Financial Accelerator and the Optimal Lending Contract
takes place entrepreneurs sell undepreciated capital back to capital goods producers for the
unit price Qt+1. Aggregate returns to capital are then given by
Rkt+1 =
1
Xt
αYt+1
Kt
+Qt+1(1− δ)
Qt
. (3.49)
Consistent with the partial equilibrium specification, entrepreneurs die with probability
1− γ, which implies the following dynamics for aggregate net worth:
Nt+1 = γNtκtR
k
t+1g(ω¯t+1, σω,t) +W
e
t+1. (3.50)
3.3.7 Goods market clearing
We have goods market clearing
Yt = Ct + It +Gt + C
e
t + µG(ω¯t, σω,t−1)R
k
tQt−1Kt−1, (3.51)
where µG(ω¯) =
∫ ω¯
0 µf(ω)ωdω is the fraction of capital returns that go to monitoring costs,
paid by lenders.
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3.3.8 Monetary Policy
We assume that there is a central bank which conducts monetary policy by choosing the
nominal interest rate Rnt . In Section 3.4 we employ the nominal interest rate rule in BGG:
log(Rnt )− log(Rn) = ρR
n
(
log(Rnt−1)− log(R)
)
+ ξpit−1 + R
n
t (3.52)
where ρR
n
and ξ determine the relative importance of the past interest rate and past inflation
in the central bank’s interest rate rule. Shocks to the nominal interest rate are given by
R
n
. It should be noted that the interest rule in BGG differs from the conventional Taylor
rule, which targets current inflation rather than past inflation.
In Section 3.5, we consider the conventional Taylor rule with interest rate smoothing
log(Rnt )−log(Rn) = ρR
n
(
log(Rnt−1)−log(R)
)
+ξpit+ρ
Y
(
log(Yt)−log(Yt−1)
)
+R
n
t . (3.53)
nd an inertial Taylor rule with interest rate smoothing
log(Rnt )− log(Rn) = 0.5(log(Rnt−1)− log(R)) + 0.5[1.5pit + 0.5(log(Yt)− log(Yt−1))] + R
n
t .
(3.54)
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3.3.9 Shocks
The shocks in the model follow a standard AR(1) process. The AR(1) processes for tech-
nology, government spending and idiosyncratic volatility are given by
log(At) =ρ
A log(At−1) + At , (3.55)
log(Gt/Yt) =(1− ρG) log(Gss/Yss) + ρG log(Gt−1/Yt−1) + Gt , (3.56)
log(σω,t) =(1− ρσω) log(σω,ss) + ρσω log(σω,t−1) + σωt (3.57)
where A, G and σω denote exogenous shocks to technology, government spending and
idiosyncratic volatility, and Gss and σω,ss denote the steady state values for government
spending and idiosyncratic volatility respectively. Recall that σ2ω is the variance of id-
iosyncratic productivity, so that σω is the standard deviation of idiosyncratic productivity.
Nominal interest rate shocks are defined by the BGG Rule in (3.52) or the Taylor rule in
(3.53).
3.3.10 Equilibrium
The model has 20 endogenous variables and 20 equations. The endogenous variables are: Y ,
H, C, Λ, Ce, W , W e, I, Q, K, Rn, Rk, R, p∗, X , pi, N , ω¯, k and Z. The equations defining
these endogenous variables are: (3.9), (3.27), (3.29), (3.30), (3.11), (3.37), (3.38), (3.41),
(3.40), (3.44), (3.45), (3.46), (3.48), (3.49), (3.50), (3.51), (3.52), (3.28), (B.8) and (B.18).
The exogenous processes for technology, government spending and idiosyncratic volatility
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follow (3.55), (3.56) and (3.57) respectively. Nominal interest rate shocks are defined by
the Taylor rule in (3.52).
3.4 Quantitative Analysis
3.4.1 Calibration
Our baseline calibration largely follows BGG. We set the discount factor β = 0.99, the risk
aversion parameter σ = 1 so that utility is logarithmic in consumption, and the elasticity
of labor is 3 (η = 1/3). The share of capital in the Cobb-Douglas production function is
α = 0.35. Investment adjustment costs are φk = 10 to generate an elasticity of the price
of capital with respect to the investment capital ratio of 0.25. Quarterly depreciation is
δ = .025. Monitoring costs are µ = 0.12. The death rate of entrepreneurs is 1− γ = .0272,
yielding an annualized business failure rate of three percent. The idiosyncratic productivity
term, log(ω(j)), is assumed to be log-normally distributed with variance of 0.28. The weight
of household labor relative to entrepreneurial labor in the production function is Ω = 0.99.
For price-setting, we assume the Calvo parameter θ = 0.75, so that only 25% of firms
can reset their prices in each period, meaning the average length of time between price
adjustments is four quarters. As our baseline, we follow the BGG monetary policy rule
and set the autoregressive parameter on the nominal interest rate to ρR
n
= 0.9 and the
parameter on past inflation to ξ = 0.11. Note that in Section 3.5 we also consider a
conventional Taylor rule where the central bank targets current inflation rather than past
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inflation. For the conventional Taylor rule, we set ρR
n
= 0, ξ = 1.5 and ρY = 0.5 as a
benchmark, and consider an inertial interest rate rule with smoothing parameter ρR
n
= 0.5,
ξ = 0.75 and ρY = 0.25. We follow BGG and set the persistence of the shocks to technology
and government spending at ρA = 0.999 and ρG = 0.95. We follow Christiano, Motto and
Rostagno (2013) and set the persistence of idiosyncratic volatility at ρσω = 0.9706 and the
distribution of the shocks equal to σωt ∼ N(0, 0.0283).
Following BGG, we consider a one percent technology shock and a 25 basis point shock
(in annualized terms) to the nominal interest rate. For the risk shock, we allow the standard
deviation of idiosyncratic productivity to increase by one percentage point, from 0.28 to
0.29.
3.4.2 Quantitative Comparison: BGG, CFP and the Optimal Contract
In our quantitative analysis we compare three allocations: the competitive equilibrium under
the BGG contract; the competitive equilibrium under the CFP contract; and the compet-
itive equilibrium under the optimal contract. Impulse responses for shocks to technology,
the nominal interest rate and idiosyncratic volatility are found in this section.
Figure 3.3 shows impulse responses for a extremely persistent one percent technology
shock when prices are sticky. Notice the impact of consumption insurance. Lenders in
the CFP contract allocations will settle for a lower rate of return in a boom in order to
ensure a higher rate of return in a recession, which amplifies the response of the economy.
However, this does not occur under the optimal contract because entrepreneurs are forward
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looking: they act as a stabilizing influence on the economy. Forward looking entrepreneurs
are reluctant to invest in new capital when a positive technology shock hits because fi-
nancial premiums will be low. Asset prices will decline back to their steady state value,
so entrepreneurs offer higher deposit rates to lender’s in order utilize financial resources
in states that promise higher capital returns. The stabilizing influence of forward looking
entrepreneurs cancels out the consumption insurance channel under this calibration, such
that the optimal contract and BGG output responses coincide almost exactly. In general,
this coincidence does not hold outside of the particular calibration employed here.
The difference between the three allocations is very noticeable in Figure 3.4, which plots
impulse responses for a one percent shock to the nominal interest rate when prices are
sticky. Because the monetary shock is less persistent than the technology shock, the price
of capital depreciates back to its steady state value very quickly after an initial rise. As
a result, capital returns are positive in the first period, but negative thereafter. This
leads to an even sharper difference between the response of entrepreneurs in the three
models. Under the BGG contract the deposit rate does not respond to the shock at all
because it is predetermined; under the CFP contract the deposit rate falls because household
consumption increases in response to the shock; and under the optimal contract the deposit
rate increases, because the financial premium goes down after the shock. Forward looking
entrepreneurs thus stabilize consumption and output, leading to small amplification. In
contrast, the CFP contract with consumption insurance leads to a decline in the lending
rate following the rise in consumption, which amplifies the response of output, consumption
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and other macroeconomic aggregates to the interest rate shock.
In Figure 3.5 we plot impulse responses for a one standard deviation increase in unob-
served idiosyncratic volatility σω. This is what we defined earlier as a risk shock. In all
three models, the household consumption response on impact is close to zero, but slightly
positive for CFP and BGG and slightly negative for the optimal contract. The consumption
insurance channel in CFP and the optimal contract leads to a decline in the lending rate
following a risk shock. An additional factor is at work under the optimal contract: the
financial premium rises because, other things equal, higher idiosyncratic variance makes de-
fault more likely. Therefore, borrowing is more expensive and returns to capital are higher.
Net worth thus increases on impact under the optimal contract. Overall, risk shocks have a
very small impact on the real economy in the optimal contract equilibrium, and may even
boost output over a longer time horizon. Also note the negative correlation between output
and consumption under the optimal contract, unlike the BGG contract where output and
consumption both fall.
3.5 How Robust is the Financial Accelerator? Comparison
with the Frictionless Model
To truly measure the strength of the financial accelerator, we need to compare the CSV
model with financial frictions against a frictionless benchmark. As our frictionless bench-
mark, we take the model described in Section 3.3 and set monitoring costs and idiosyncratic
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productivity to zero.6
Our frictionless model is similar to Carlstrom and Fuerst’s (1997), which also sets moni-
toring costs equal to zero, but different from the BGG frictionless model. BGG’s frictionless
model assumes a constant positive financial premium. We choose our definition because a
constant positive financial premium in different aggregate states implies different profits for
entrepreneurs, which distorts their decisions. We focus here only on the frictionless model
with zero monitoring costs, but all of our main results hold relative to both frictionless
cases.
One might ask at this point, why not use the basic New Keynesian model as a frictionless
benchmark? Our reasoning is as follows. The basic New Keynesian sticky price model
deviates from the CSV framework in two dimensions: (1) it abstracts from heterogeneity
between lenders and borrowers because there are no entrepreneurs, and (2) it has no CSV
frictions. As a result, if we use the basic New Keynesian model as a frictionless benchmark,
it is impossible to isolate the impact of the CSV friction on volatility from the impact
of heterogeneity. In order to isolate these two effects, we need a model that incorporates
heterogeneity between lenders and borrowers but which eliminates the CSV friction. Our
frictionless benchmark does exactly that, providing an exact characterization of the role of
the CSV friction in generating volatility.
Before we proceed to the frictionless benchmark, let us compare the amplification response
6The model without monitoring costs generates a different steady state relative to the model with moni-
toring costs, but the difference between the steady states is small for all variables except leverage. We
correct steady state leverage in the frictionless model by increasing the share of entrepreneurs in the pro-
duction function from 0.01 to 0.1. These modifications have a very small effect on equilibrium dynamics
and do not alter our conclusions in any way.
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of the model with frictions to the basic New Keynesian model. Figure 3.6 shows that all
three models with frictions generate more amplification than the basic New Keynesian model
for very persistent technology shocks. In this case, forward looking entrepreneurs forecast
higher capital returns in the future, which makes one unit of net worth more valuable today,
leading to a large increase in net worth following the shock. For less persistent technology
shocks (ρA = 0.99 for example) amplification under the optimal contract is actually lower
than in the basic New Keynesian model.
Figure 3.6 also shows that the optimal contract delivers slightly smaller volatility than
the New Keynesian model for monetary shocks. The intuition is very simple. In the wake
of a positive monetary shock net worth increases and cash is abundant, so one additional
unit of net worth generates a smaller consumption flow. Therefore, entrepreneurs want to
increase their payments to lenders and pay out back their increase in net worth. As a result
net worth does not react to the shock, which stabilizes expenditures relative to the basic
New Keynesian model. Overall then, we see that amplification under the optimal contract
is slightly smaller for technology shocks with persistence equal to or lower than ρA = 0.99
as well as for monetary shocks.
Now, let us consider the amplification response of the model with frictions relative to the
frictionless benchmark with no monitoring costs. As we discussed earlier, the amplifying ef-
fect of the CSV framework depends on three characteristics: a suboptimal lending contract,
extremely persistent technology shocks and loose monetary policy. The removal of any one
of these characteristics eliminates the financial accelerator or even reverses the accelerator,
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such that financial frictions stabilize the economy in the presence of shocks.
Figure 3.7 plots the output response to a variety of technology shocks in a CSV model
with and without monitoring costs and demonstrates the fragility of the financial accelerator
to these three characteristics. The first row of plots in Figure 3.7 shows the response of
output to an extremely persistent technology shock when prices are sticky. The model with
frictions provides slightly more amplification in the suboptimal BGG lending contract, while
the frictionless model generates more amplification for the CFP contract and the optimal
contract.
Why do financial frictions stabilize business cycles in the latter two cases? First, en-
trepreneurs sell insurance to the household in order to smooth household consumption.
The resulting decline in household consumption volatility leads to a rise in the volatility
of entrepreneurial consumption and net worth, and entrepreneurs become a driver of the
business cycle. Second, when entrepreneurs are forward looking they behave in a risk averse
manner by trying to tighten the financial constraint during booms, when the financial pre-
mium is low, in order to relax it during recessions, when the financial premium is high.
States with positive technology shocks promise falling asset prices in the short run after
the initial reaction of asset prices on impact, and higher dividends in the long run from
non-stationarity. This leads entrepreneurs to lever up and increase their net worth by a
large amount, generating massive amplification in the frictionless model under the optimal
contract. We also find that under the CFP contract, financial frictions stabilize business
cycle, although the stabilizing effect is much smaller than under the optimal contract.
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The sensitivity of the financial accelerator to stationary technology shocks is illustrated
clearly in the second row of Figure 3.7, where we consider technology shocks with lower
persistence (ρA = 0.95). In this calibration, financial frictions stabilize business cycles not
only for the optimal contract and CFP but also for BGG. Why is it the case? We know,
that for flexible prices model with and without financial friction deliver very similar results
under BGG. Therefore, amplification should exacerbate fluctuation of markups. However,
we know that for stationary technology shocks even in standard New Keynesian models,
markups move procyclically and stabilize business cycles. If financial frictions exacerbate
fluctuation for markups, they stabilize the model response to stationary technology shocks,
since markups become even more procyclical.
Rows three and four of Figure 3.7 demonstrate the output response for extremely persis-
tent technology shocks with a conventional Taylor rule and under flexible prices, respectively.
The impulse responses show that the financial accelerator is not robust to more conservative
monetary policy or flexible prices. As in the previous cases, the frictionless model for the
CFP and optimal contracts generates higher amplification than the model with CSV fric-
tions. Under the BGG contract, the accelerator disappears when the central bank follows
a conventional Taylor rule. It is still present under flexible prices, but is extremely small
quantitatively. In other words, the magnitude of the financial accelerator in the BGG case
is negligible when monetary policy is more aggressive or when prices are flexible.
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3.5.1 Sensitivity of the Financial Accelerator to Different Monetary
Policy Rules
How sensitive is the financial accelerator to different monetary policy rules?7 Figure 3.9
plots output responses to a 25 basis point shock to the nominal interest rate for the BGG
monetary policy rule (Row 1), the inertial Taylor rule (Row 2) and the conventional Taylor
rule (Row 3). Here we see the sensitivity of the financial accelerator to different monetary
policy specifications. Under the BGG policy rule, the coefficient on past inflation is ξ = 0.11,
while the interest rate smoothing parameter is ρR
n
= 0.9. Following the initial 25 basis
point decrease in the nominal interest rate, there is little subsequent change in the interest
rate under the BGG policy rule because the central bank is targeting past inflation, and
also smoothing the interest rate. Any increase in inflation on impact is not taken into
account until the next quarter. Under the BGG policy rule, monetary shocks are thus quite
persistent, and entrepreneur’s increase their net worth in the first period, which amplifies
the shock. On the other hand, under conservative monetary policy asset prices and net
worth are more stable, and there is no amplification.
We also calculate the quarterly inflation response to a monetary shock for the BGG
policy rule and the conventional Taylor rule. For the conventional Taylor rule with a weight
ρR
n
= 0.5 on the previous interest rate, a two percent surprise to the Fed funds rate in
annual terms leads to a one percent inflation response, while for the BGG monetary policy
7Gilchrist and Leahy (2002) investigate the role of monetary policy for non-contingent contracts in the
BGG framework.
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rule a one percent surprise to the Fed funds rate will lead to four percent inflation response,
which significantly deviates from the flexible price equilibrium.
Overall, our simulations show that under the CFP contract and the optimal contract,
financial frictions do not amplify business cycles for any calibration, while under the BGG
contract they amplify business cycles only when technology shocks are extremely persistent
and monetary policy is loose.
3.5.2 Sensitivity of the Financial Accelerator to Household Risk Aversion
One might expect that an increase in household risk aversion would shift aggregate risk onto
the balance sheet of entrepreneurs, causing the financial accelerator to reappear. However,
we find that households sell insurance to entrepreneurs and use labor supply to smooth
their consumption regardless of the degree of risk aversion.8 Although this may seem
counterintuitive, it is natural for entrepreneurs to increase their returns by shifting aggregate
risk to households, as households can smooth their consumption through variation in labor
while enjoying higher returns from insuring aggregate risk. The only way to motivate
households to buy insurance from entrepreneurs is to make labor supply elasticity very small,
which counterfactually reduces business cycle fluctuations to a minimum. Thus, we find
that financial frictions with state-contingent contracts and forward looking entrepreneurs
stabilize business cycles even when households are extremely risk averse.
8Although not reported here, we conduct experiments for coefficients of risk-aversion, σ, from 1 to 500 and
find that the financial accelerator is not present for all values.
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3.6 Related Literature
There is a large literature on the role of financial frictions in macreoconomics, particularly
on how such frictions amplify and propagate shocks, which is the idea of the financial
accelerator. We focus here on the CSV framework, but there are other ways of modeling
financial frictions in general equilibrium models. In much of the literature, returns to lenders
are predetermined by assumption and lenders are unable to use state-contingent contracts,
despite the fact that they desire to do so.
One early example is Kiyotaki and Moore (1997), who show that feedback between col-
lateral prices and loans leads to amplification. However, Krishnamurthy (2003) later proved
that the amplification in Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) disappears when agents are able to
use collaterilized state-contingent contracts.9
There is also a rich literature on pecuniary externalities which applies Kiyotaki and
Moore (1997) type constraints in different environments. Topics in this vein include sudden
stops for emerging economies, such as Caballero and Krishnamurthy (2001, 2003, 2004),
Jeanne and Korinek (2013) and Bianchi (2011), as well as research on macroprudential
policies, including Stein (2012), Jeanne and Korinek (2010) and Bianchi and Mendoza
(2011). Krishnamurthy’s (2003) critique of Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) also applies to this
literature.
9Krishnamurthy (2003) restores financial amplification in a three period version of the model by introducing
large aggregate shocks that reverses the role of lenders and borrowers, so that lenders have to post
collateral. He also introduces constraints on aggregate collateral in the spirit of Holmstrom and Tirole
(1998). This is a very different channel however, which has not been investigated in quantitative general
equilibrium.
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Similar concerns about the financial accelerator arise in the costly state enforcement
literature. In Kiyotaki and Gertler (2010) and all other examples we are aware of, lender’s
returns are predetermined. Jermann and Quadrini (2012) allow both debt and equity,
however they introduce adjustment costs between these instruments and rule out other
instruments.
Adverse selection is another way to model financial frictions. House (2006) extends the
Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) framework and shows that financial frictions amplify business
cycles only when returns for lenders are predetermined. When contracts allow both debt
and equity, financial frictions actually stabilize business cycles. Our results in the CSV
framework are consistent with House (2006).
Our paper is also related to the growing body of medium sized DSGE models with
financial frictions. To the best of our knowledge, the literature follows the BGG framework
and employs myopic entrepreneurs with suboptimal contracts. Examples include Villaverde
(2009, 2010) and Christiano, Motto and Rostagno (2013). Again, our results differ from the
conclusions of this literature, as risk shocks under the optimal contract with non-myopic
entrepreneurs have very little impact on the real economy.
3.7 Conclusion
This paper contributes to the literature on financial frictions in macroeconomics by intro-
ducing forward looking entrepreneurs into the costly state verification framework. In the
literature, lending contracts are suboptimal and entrepreneurs are myopic. We solve for
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the optimal contract with forward looking entrepreneurs and show that financial frictions
neither amplify nor propagate business cycles when lending contracts are optimal. In addi-
tion, we show that shocks to the variance of the unobserved productivity of entrepreneurs
— so-called “risk shocks” — have little effect on the economy and generate the wrong
comovement between macroeconomic aggregates when contracts are optimal.
We also investigate the robustness of the financial accelerator under the standard BGG
contract, which assumes that lenders receive a constant safe rate of return and borrow-
ers are myopic. In this setup, we find that the accelerator depends on a combination of
three things: a suboptimal lending contract, extremely persistent technology shocks, and
loose monetary policy. Stationary technology shocks or a standard Taylor rule eliminate
the financial accelerator or even reverse the accelerator such that financial frictions stabi-
lize macroeconomic fluctuations. We thus conclude that the amplifying effect of financial
frictions is present only under very restrictive conditions in costly state verification models.
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Figure 3.3: Technology Shock
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Note: All impulse responses are plotted as percent deviations from steady state.
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Figure 3.4: Monetary Policy Shock
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Note: All impulse responses are plotted as percent deviations from steady state.
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Figure 3.5: Idiosyncratic Volatility Shock
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Figure 3.6: Output Response Relative to the Basic New Keynesian Model
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Figure 3.7: Output Response Relative to the Frictionless Model, Technology Shocks
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Figure 3.8: Output Response Relative to the Frictionless Model, Technology Shocks
Extremely Persistent Technology Shock, Conventional Taylor rule
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Figure 3.9: Output Response Relative to the Frictionless Model, Monetary Shocks
BGG Monetary Policy Rule
log(Rnt )− log(Rn) = 0.9
(
log(Rnt−1)− log(R)
)
+ 0.11pit−1 + R
n
t
0 5 10
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
BGG
0 5 10
0.5
1
1.5
CFP
0 5 10
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
Optimal Contract
Inertial Taylor rule
log(Rnt )− log(Rn) = 0.5
(
log(Rnt−1)− log(R)
)
+ 0.5
[
1.5pit+ 0.5
(
log(Yt)− log(Yt−1)
)]
+ R
n
t
0 5 10
0
5 · 10−2
0.1
BGG
0 5 10
5 · 10−2
0.1
CFP
0 5 10
0
5 · 10−2
0.1
Optimal Contract
Conventional Taylor rule
log(Rnt )− log(Rn) = 1.5pit + 0.5
(
log(Yt)− log(Yt−1)
)
+ R
n
t
0 5 10
0
2 · 10−2
4 · 10−2
6 · 10−2
8 · 10−2
0.1
BGG
0 5 10
0
2 · 10−2
4 · 10−2
6 · 10−2
8 · 10−2
0.1
CFP
0 5 10
0
2 · 10−2
4 · 10−2
6 · 10−2
8 · 10−2
0.1
Optimal Contract
Model With Frictions Frictionless Model
Note: All impulse responses are plotted as percent deviations from steady state.
156
Appendix A
Price Stability in Small Open Economies
A.1 Risk-Sharing
The household in country i will maximize lifetime utility (2.4), subject to the following
budget constraint and transversality condition:
Ci(st)Pi(st) = Wi(st)Ni(st) +
∫ 1
0
Eij(st)Bij(st)dj, (A.1)
∞∑
t=1
∑
st
∫ 1
0
qj(st)Bij(st)dj = 0. (A.2)
Bij(st) denotes the state-contingent bond that pays in currency j in state st; qj(st) is the
price of that bond in period 0 (when all trading occurs), qj(st) is arbitrary up to a constant.
Household in period 0 cares about relative price of claims across states and currencies. The
transverality condition stipulates that all period 0 transactions must be balanced: payment
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for claims issued must equal payment for claims received. The household Lagrangian is:
Li =
∞∑
t=1
βtPr(st)
{
Ui(C(st))− Vi(N(st)) + λi(st)
Pi(st)
[
Wi(st)Ni(st) +
∫ 1
0
EijBij(st)(st)dj − Ci(st)Pi(st)
]}
− λi0
∞∑
t=1
∑
st
∫ 1
0
qj(st)Bij(st)dj, (A.3)
Now take the FOC with respect to state contingent bonds Bij(st):
∂Li
∂Bij(st)
= λi0qj(st) +
βtλi(st)Pr(st)Eij(st)
Pi(st)
= 0, (A.4)
which gives price of the state-contingent bond,
qj(st) = β
tλi(st)Pr(st)Eij(st)
λi0Pi(st)
. (A.5)
The analogous FOC for country j,
∂Lj
∂Bjj(st)
= 0 will yield:
qj(st) = β
tλj(st)Pr(st)Ejj(st)
λj0Pj(st)
. (A.6)
Using Ejj(st) = 1 and setting (A.5) equal to (A.6), we get the risk-sharing condition
λi(st)
λj(st)
=
λi0
λj0
Pi(st)
Pj(st)Eij(st) . (A.7)
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When PPP holds, Pi(st)Pj(st)Eij(st) = 1, and the risk-sharing condition simplifies to
λi(st)
λj(st)
=(
Ci(st)
Cj(st)
)−σ
= λi0λj0 . When the consumption ratio is constant across countries, Cit = AiCwt.
In order to solve for Ai, we substitute (A.5) into the transversality condition.
∞∑
t=1
∑
st
∫ 1
0
qj(st)Bij(st)dj =
∞∑
t=1
∑
st
∫ 1
0
βt
λi(st)Pr(st)Eij(st)
λi0Pi(st)
Bij(st)dj
=
∞∑
t=1
∑
st
βt
λi(st)Pr(st)
λi0Pi(st)
∫ 1
0
Eij(st)Bij(st)dj
(A.1)
=
∞∑
t=1
∑
st
βt
λi(st)Pr(st)
λi0Pi(st)
(
Pi(st)Ci(st)−Wi(st)Ni(st)
)
= 0
We substitute Ci(st) = AiCw(st) into the above equation, and solve for Ai.
Ai =
∑∞
t=1
∑
st
βt W (st)N(st)P (st) λi(st)Pr(st)∑∞
t=1
∑
st
βtCw(st)λi(st)Pr(st)
=
∑∞
t=1 β
tEt−1
{
WtNt
Pt
λi(st)
}
∑∞
t=1 β
tEt−1 {Cwtλi(st)}
=
∑∞
t=1 β
tEt−1
{
Y
γ−1
γ
it C
1
γ
wtλi(st)
}
∑∞
t=1 β
tEt−1 {Cwtλi(st)}
=
∑∞
t=1 β
tEt−1
{
Y
γ−1
γ
it C
1
γ
wtC
−σ
wt
}
∑∞
t=1 β
tEt−1
{
CwtC
−σ
wt
}
where we used λi(st) = A
−σ
i C
−σ
w (st). This gives us the definition of complete markets from
the text, equation (2.20).
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A.2 Closed Economy: Propositions and Proofs
Proposition 1 In the closed economy under ex ante commitment, the central bank will
maximize (1.24) subject to (1.25) and (1.26). The solution to this problem is: Ct =(
1−τ
χµ
) 1
σ+ϕ
Z
1+ϕ
σ+ϕ
t . The central bank replicates the flexible price allocation via a policy of
price stability.
Proof: The flexible price allocation is obtained from solving this two equation system in
two unknowns (C,N):
1 =
µχ
1− τ
N1+ϕt
C1−σt
,
Ct = ZtNt.
The solution is Ct =
(
1−τ
µχ
) 1
σ+ϕ
Z
1+ϕ
σ+ϕ
t . Now, let’s reformulate the central bank’s problem
by substituting the labor market clearing condition (1.25) and the goods market clearing
condition (1.26) into the objective function.
max
Ct
Et−1
{
C1−σt
1− σ − χ
C1+ϕt Z
−1−ϕ
t
(1 + ϕ)
}
s.t.
1 =
µχ
1− τ
Et−1
{
C1+ϕt Z
−(1+ϕ)
t
}
Et−1C1−σt
.
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The Lagrangian for this constrained optimization problem is
L = Et−1
{
C1−σt
1− σ − χ
C1+ϕt Z
−1−ϕ
t
(1 + ϕ)
}
+ λ
(
Et−1C1−σt −
µχ
1− τ Et−1
{
C1+ϕt Z
−(1+ϕ)
t
})
.
(A.8)
The first order condition with respect to consumption is1
∂L
∂Ct
= (1 + λ(1− σ))C−σt − χ
(
1 +
λµ
1− τ
)
Cϕt Z
−1−ϕ
t = 0. (A.9)
which is equivalent to
C1−σt = χ
(
1 + λµ1−τ
1 + λ(1− σ)
)
N1+ϕt . (A.10)
Given that λ is a constant and not a variable, the first order condition and the budget
constraint are satisfied only under the flexible price equilibrium. Thus, the central bank’s
optimal policy is to mimic the flexible price equilibrium in the closed economy. ♦
Proposition 2 In the closed economy, the social planner will maximize (1.24) subject
to (1.26), ignoring the labor condition (1.25). The solution to this problem is: Ct =(
1
χ
) 1
σ+ϕ
Z
1+ϕ
σ+ϕ
t .
Proof: Insert the aggregate goods market clearing constraint (1.26) directly into the
1One can easily carry out the same exercise by optimizing with respect to labor.
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objective function, replacing Nt+1, and maximize this objective function.
max
Ct+1
[
C1−σt+1
1− σ −
χ
1 + ϕ
(
Ct+1
Zt+1
)1+ϕ]
The solution to this optimization problem is Ct =
(
1
χ
) 1
σ+ϕ
Z
1+ϕ
σ+ϕ
t . ♦
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A.3 Global Social Planner: Proposition and Proof
Proposition 8 The global social planner will maximize (2.24), subject to (2.25) and (2.26).
The solution to the global social planner problem is:
Ci =
(
1
χ
) 1
σ+ϕ
Z
1+ϕ
σ+ϕ
w , (A.11a)
Ni =
(
1
χ
) 1
σ+ϕ
Z
(1−γσ)(1+ϕ)
(1+γϕ)(σ+ϕ)
w Z
γ−1
1+γϕ
i , (A.11b)
Zw =
(∫ 1
0
Z
(γ−1)(1+ϕ)
1+γϕ
i di
) 1+γϕ
(γ−1)(1+ϕ)
. (A.11c)
Proof: If we substitute (2.25) and (2.26) directly into the objective function (2.24), then
we can reformulate the problem as follows:
max
∀cij
∫ 1
0

(∫ 1
0 c
γ−1
γ
ij dj
) γ(1−σ)
γ−1
1− σ −
χ
1 + ϕ
(∫ 1
0 cjidj
Zi
)1+ϕ di. (A.12)
Rearranging, we have
max
cij
1
1− σ
∫ 1
0
(∫ 1
0
c
γ−1
γ
ij dj
) γ(1−σ)
γ−1
di− χ
1 + ϕ
∫ 1
0
(∫ 1
0 cjidj
)1+ϕ
Z1+ϕi
di. (A.13)
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The FOC with respect to cij is
0 =
(∫ 1
0
c
γ−1
γ
ij dj
) γ(1−σ)
γ−1 −1
c
−1
γ
ij − χ
(∫ 1
0 cjidj
)ϕ
Z1+ϕj
. (A.14)
This is equivalent to
0 =
(∫ 1
0
c
γ−1
γ
ij dj
) 1−σγ
γ−1

︸ ︷︷ ︸
=C
1−σγ
γ
i
c
−1
γ
ij − χ
(∫ 1
0 cjidj
Zj
)ϕ
︸ ︷︷ ︸
=Nϕj
1
Zj
,
⇒0 = C
1−σγ
γ
i c
− 1
γ
ij − χ
Nϕj
Zj
,
and solving for cij we have:
cij =
Zγj C
1−γσ
i
χγNγϕj
. (A.15)
The consumption basket in country i (Ci) can then be expressed as:
Ci =
(∫ 1
0
c
γ−1
γ
ij dj
) γ
γ−1
,
=
∫ 1
0
(
Zγj C
1−γσ
i
χγNγϕj
) γ−1
γ
dj

γ
γ−1
,
=
(
1
χ
) 1
σ
∫ 1
0
(
Zj
Nϕj
)(γ−1)
dj
 1σ(γ−1) . (A.16)
So Ci does not depend on its own technology Zi. Now, let’s solve for labor (Ni) and output
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(Yi).
Ni =
Yi
Zi
from goods market clearing
=
∫ 1
0 cjidj
Zi
from (2.26)
=
∫ 1
0
(
Zγi C
1−γσ
j
χγNγϕi
)
dj
Zi
from (A.15)
=
Zγ−1i
χγNγϕi
∫ 1
0
C1−γσj dj (A.17)
From (A.16), we know that Ci = Cj = C for all i, j. So we can take Cj outside of the
integral in (A.17) and solve for Ni:
Ni =
Zγ−1i C
1−γσ
j
χγNγϕi
⇒ Ni =
(
Zγ−1i C
1−γσ
χγ
) 1
1+γϕ
. (A.18)
Similarly, output will be:
Yi =
(
Z
γ(1+ϕ)
i C
1−γσ
χγ
) 1
1+γϕ
. (A.19)
Substitute (A.18) and (A.19) back into the definition of the consumption basket (A.16),
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and solve for the consumption basket C in each country, which will be identical:
C =
(
1
χ
) 1
σ

∫ 1
0
(Zγ−1j C1−γσ
χγ
) 1
1+γϕ
−(γ−1)ϕ Zγ−1j dj

1
σ(γ−1)
,
C
σ+ϕ
(1+γϕ)σ =
(
1
χ
) 1
σ
∫ 1
0
(
Zγ−1j
χγ
)− (γ−1)ϕ
1+γϕ
Zγ−1j dj

1
σ(γ−1)
,
⇒ C = Ci =
(
1
χ
) 1
σ+ϕ
(∫ 1
0
Z
(γ−1)(1+ϕ)
1+γϕ
j dj
) 1+γϕ
(σ+ϕ)(γ−1)
. (A.20)
Solve for labor and output by substituting (A.20) into (A.18) and (A.19) respectively:
Ni =
(
1
χ
) 1
σ+ϕ
(∫ 1
0
Z
(γ−1)(1+ϕ)
1+γϕ
j dj
) 1−γσ
(σ+ϕ)(γ−1)
Z
γ−1
1+γϕ
i , (A.21)
Yi =
(
1
χ
) 1
σ+ϕ
(∫ 1
0
Z
(γ−1)(1+ϕ)
1+γϕ
j dj
) 1−γσ
(σ+ϕ)(γ−1)
Z
γ(1+ϕ)
1+γϕ
i . (A.22)
This is the Pareto efficient allocation. When γ → ∞, the flexible price allocation and the
global social planner allocation become identical. Consumption is identical to the first order
between social planner and flexible price allocation. However, it is not true for labor. ♦
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A.4 Producer Currency Pricing: Propositions and Proofs
Proposition 4 In complete markets, non-cooperative central banks will maximize (1.30a)
and cooperative central banks will maximize (1.30b), subject to (2.29a), (2.29b), (2.29c) and
(2.29d). The solution under commitment for both cooperative and non-cooperative central
banks in complete markets is:
E{Ui} = C1−σi
(
1
1− σ −
1− τi
µ(1 + ϕ)
)
Ci =
(
1− τi
χµ
) 1
σ+ϕ
Z
1+ϕ
σ+ϕ
w
Ni =
(
1− τi
χµ
) 1
σ+ϕ
Z
(1−γσ)(1+ϕ)
(1+γϕ)(σ+ϕ)
w Z
γ−1
1+γϕ
i
Yi =
(
1− τi
χµ
) 1
σ+ϕ
Z
(1−γσ)(1+ϕ)
(1+γϕ)(σ+ϕ)
w Z
γ(1+ϕ)
1+γϕ
i
Zw =
(∫ 1
0
Z
(γ−1)(1+ϕ)
1+γϕ
i di
) 1+γϕ
(γ−1)(1+ϕ)
The resulting equilibrium allocation exactly coincides with the flexible price allocation. Mim-
icking the flexible price allocation is thus the dominant strategy for non-cooperative central
banks in complete markets, and is the optimal policy under cooperation. If the government
corrects the distortions due to market power with a non-contingent tax τi = 1− µ, then the
flexible price allocation in complete markets is identical to the global social planner solution.
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Proposition 5 In financial autarky, non-cooperative central banks will maximize (1.30a)
and cooperative central banks will maximize (1.30b), subject to (1.35), (2.31), (1.37) and
(1.38). The solution under commitment for both cooperative and non-cooperative central
banks in financial autarky is:
E{Ui} = Ci
(
1
1− σ −
1− τi
µ(1 + ϕ)
)
,
Ci =
(
1− τi
χµ
) 1
σ+ϕ
(
Zγ−1i Z
1+ϕ
σ+ϕ
w
) 1+ϕ
1−σ+γ(ϕ+σ)
,
Ni =
(
1− τi
χµ
) 1
σ+ϕ
(
Zγ−1i Z
1+ϕ
σ+ϕ
w
) 1−σ
1−σ+γ(ϕ+σ)
,
Yi =
(
1− τi
χµ
) 1
σ+ϕ
(
Zγ−1i Z
1+ϕ
σ+ϕ
w
) 1−σ
1−σ+γ(ϕ+σ)
Zi,
Zw =
(∫ 1
0
Z
(γ−1)(1+ϕ)
1−σ+γ(σ+ϕ)
i di
) 1−σ+γ(σ+ϕ)
(γ−1)(1+ϕ)
.
The resulting equilibrium allocation exactly coincides with the flexible price allocation. Mim-
icking the flexible price allocation is thus the dominant strategy for non-cooperative central
banks in financial autarky, and is the optimal policy under cooperation.
Proof: The objective function for non-cooperative and cooperative central banks will
be, respectively:
max
Nit
Et−1
{
C1−σit
1− σ − χ
N1+ϕit
1 + ϕ
}
, (A.23a)
max
∀Nit
∫ 1
0
Et−1
{
C1−σit
1− σ − χ
N1+ϕit
1 + ϕ
}
di. (A.23b)
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Policymakers in each scenario will maximize their objective function subject to the following
constraints:
1 =
(
χµ
1− τi
) Et−1 {N1+ϕit }
Et−1
{
C−σit Y
γ−1
γ
it C
1
γ
wt
} , (A.24)
Yit = ZitNit, (A.25)
Cwt =
(∫ 1
0
Y
γ−1
γ
it
) γ
γ−1
. (A.26)
Cit = C
1
γ
wtEt−1
{
Y
γ−1
γ
it
}
(A.27a)
Cit = C
1
γ
wtY
γ−1
γ
it (A.27b)
where (A.26) is a constant, (A.27a) refers to goods market clearing and risk-sharing under
complete markets, while (A.27b) refers to goods market clearing and risk-sharing under
financial autarky.
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Notice that under complete markets we can substitute (A.27a) into (A.24) so that:
1 =
(
χµ
1− τi
) Et−1 {N1+ϕit }
Et−1
{
C−σit Y
γ−1
γ
it C
1
γ
wt
}
Plug in Cit
=
(
χµ
1− τi
) Et−1 {N1+ϕit }
Et−1
{[
C
1
γ
wtEt−1
{
Y
γ−1
γ
it
}]−σ
Y
γ−1
γ
it C
1
γ
wt
} ,
Cwt is constant=
(
χµ
1− τi
) Et−1 {N1+ϕit }
C
1−σ
γ
wt Et−1
{[
Et−1
{
Y
γ−1
γ
it
}]−σ
Y
γ−1
γ
it
} ,
LIE
=
(
χµ
1− τi
) Et−1 {N1+ϕit }
C
1−σ
γ
wt
[
Et−1
{
Y
γ−1
γ
it
}]−σ
Et−1
{
Y
γ−1
γ
it
} ,
=
(
χµ
1− τi
) Et−1 {N1+ϕit }
C
1−σ
γ
wt
[
Et−1
{
Y
γ−1
γ
it
}]1−σ (A.28)
where LIE denotes the law of iterated expectations. The denominator of (A.28) is constant,
so its expectation will also be constant. We now take the expectation of the entire denom-
inator so that this expression will be identical in complete markets and financial autarky.
Continuing on, we can rewrite (A.28) as
(
χµ
1− τi
) Et−1{N1+ϕit }
C
1−σ
γ
wt
[
Et−1
{
Y
γ−1
γ
it
}]1−σ = ( χµ1− τi
) Et−1{N1+ϕit }
Et−1
{[
C
1
γ
wtEt−1
{
Y
γ−1
γ
it
}]1−σ}
⇒ 1 =
(
χµ
1− τi
) Et−1 {N1+ϕit }
Et−1
{
C1−σit
} , (A.29)
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Again, note that in complete markets it is not necessary to include the expectation in the
denominator of (A.29) because the denominator is constant, but we do so in order that
our expression for price-setting is identical in complete markets and financial autarky. It is
trivial to verify that under financial autarky the price-setting condition equal to (A.29) by
substituting (A.27b) into (A.24).
Using (A.29) as our constraint in complete markets and in financial autarky, we can
formulate a Lagrangian for the non-cooperative and cooperative cases:
L = Et−1
{
C1−σit
}
1− σ − χ
Et−1
{
N1+ϕit
}
1 + ϕ
+ λi
(
Et−1
{
C1−σit
}− χµ
1− τiEt−1
{
N1+ϕit
})
(A.30a)
L =
∫ 1
0
Et−1
Et−1 {C1−σit }
1− σ − χ
Et−1
{
N1+ϕit
}
1 + ϕ
+ λi
(
Et−1
{
C1−σit
}− χµ
1− τiEt−1
{
N1+ϕit
}) di
(A.30b)
Using Cit = C
1
γ
wtEt−1
{
N
γ−1
γ
it Z
γ−1
γ
it
}
for complete markets, or Cit = C
1
γ
wtN
γ−1
γ
it Z
γ−1
γ
it for
financial autarky, we can take the first order condition with respect to Nit.
2 The FOC will
be identical in both cases.
∂L
∂Nit
= C−σit
[
1+λi(1−σ)
](
γ − 1
γ
)Y γ−1γit C 1γwt
Nit
−χ [1 + λ µ
1− τi (1 + ϕ)
](
1
Nit
)
N1+ϕit = 0
(A.31)
2Remember that we are optimizing given the fact that state st is realized. Expectations in our context
thus refer to a summation over all possible states multiplied by the probability of each state occuring.
For example, Et−1{C1−σit } =
∑
st
C1−σi (st)Pr(st).
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In equilibrium, this equals:
1 = χ
 1 + λiµ(1+ϕ)1−τi
1 + λi(1−σ)(γ−1)γ

︸ ︷︷ ︸
Constant
 N1+ϕit
C−σit Y
γ−1
γ
it C
1
γ
wt
 . (A.32)
This equation holds in both complete markets and financial autarky, and differs from the
flexible price equilibrium only by the constant term. However, subject to labor market
clearing, this constant will coincide with the flexible price equilibrium. The flexible price
equilibrium in complete markets and financial autarky is found by taking expectations out
of the labor market clearing condition (A.24) and substituting in goods market clearing
(A.25):
1 =
(
χµ
1− τi
)
Y
1+ϕγ
γ
it
C−σit C
1
γ
wtZ
1+ϕ
it
. (A.33)
For complete markets, we can express output as a function of technology and a constant
term by substituting (A.27a) into (B.2): Yit = AiZ
γ(1+ϕ)
1+γϕ
it . (We can do the same for exercise
for autarky by substituting (A.27b) into (B.2), but leave that to the reader). Using this
expression for output, consumption in complete markets in country i can be expressed as
Cit = A
γ−1
γ
i C
1
γ
wtEt−1
{
Z
(γ−1)(1+ϕ)
1+γϕ
it
}
. (A.34)
Now substitute (B.3) back into the flexible price equilibrium (B.2)
1 =
(
χµ
1− τi
)
C
σ
γ
wtA
(γ−1)σ
γ
i Et−1
{
Z
(γ−1)(1+ϕ)
1+γϕ
it
}σ
A
1+ϕγ
γ
i C
− 1
γ
wt , (A.35)
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and rearrange and solve for Ai:
Ai =
[(
1− τi
χµ
)γ
C1−σwt Et−1
{
Z
(γ−1)(1+ϕ)
1+γϕ
it
}−σγ] 11−σ+γ(ϕ+σ)
. (A.36)
Now, substitute the solution for Ai, (B.5), into (B.3):
Cit =
[(
χµ
1− τi
)1−γ
Cϕ+1wt Et−1
{
Z
(γ−1)(1+ϕ)
1+γϕ
it
}1+γϕ] 11−σ+γ(ϕ+σ)
. (A.37)
Using the fact that Cwt =
∫ 1
0 Citdi and setting Zw =
(∫ 1
0 Z
(γ−1)(1+ϕ)
1+γϕ
i di
) 1+γϕ
(γ−1)(1+ϕ)
, consump-
tion for country i in complete markets is:
Cit =
(
1− τi
χµ
) 1
σ+ϕ
Z
1+ϕ
σ+ϕ
w . (A.38)
Solving for labor and output using (B.7) is a straightforward exercise. The solution to
the central bank’s problem in complete markets and financial autarky for cooperative and
non-cooperative equilibria, coincides exactly with the flexible price allocation. Here we’ve
explicitly outlined the proof for complete markets. The proof for financial autarky is iden-
tical up to (B.2). We simply substitute (A.27b) into (B.2) to get the optimal allocation
under financial autarky. ♦
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A.5 Local Currency Pricing: Propositions and Proofs
Proposition 6 Under LCP, non-cooperative central banks will maximize (1.30a) subject
to (1.39) and (1.40). A fixed exchange rate will be the Nash equilibrium policy for a non-
cooperative central bank in both complete markets and financial autarky under LCP.
Proof:
In this section we explain the case of LCP in the continuum framework. First, let another
country j import goods from firm h in country i.
Price Setting
Profits from the exports of firm h in country i to country j in domestic currency will be:
Pjit(h)EijtCjit(h)−WitNjit(h) (B.1)
where Pjit(h) denotes the price charged by firm h in country j which is located in country
i. This price will be denominated in currency j. Njit(h) is the amount of labor used by
firm h (which is manufacturing in country i) in the production of its exports to country j.
Given this, firm h will choose the price that maximizes its expected profit:
Et−1
{
C−σit
(
Pjit(h)EijtCjit(h)−WitNjit(h)
CPIit
)}
. (B.2)
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We also have demand for firm h’s good:
Cjit(h) =
(
Pjit(h)
Pjit
)−ε
Cjit. (B.3)
In order to solve the maximization problem, we substitute the demand for firm h’s good
(B.3) into the expected profit function (B.2) and take the FOC with respect to Pjit(h). The
FOC will be:
Et−1
{
C−σit
(
Pjit(h)EijtCjit(h)
Pjit(h)CPIit
)}
=
ε
ε− 1Et−1
{
WitNjit(h)
Pjit(h)CPIit
}
(B.4)
Pjit(h) on the LHS will cancel out, and we will be left with:
Et−1
{
C−σit
EijtCjit(h)
CPIit
}
= µEt−1
{
C−σit
WitNjit(h)
Pjit(h)CPIit
}
(B.5)
Labor Market Clearing
We can take out the h index for firms because they are all identical. Now, substituting
labor supply χ1−τi
Wit
CPIit
= NϕitC
σ
it into the above equation, we get
Et−1
{
C−σit
EijtCjit
CPIit
}
=
χµ
1− τiEt−1
{
NϕitNjit
Pjit
}
. (B.6)
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Substituting the identities Njit = CjitZ
−1
it and Cjit =
(
Pjit
CPIjt
)−γ
Cjt into the above equation
gives:
Et−1
{
C−σit
EijtP−γjit CPIγjtCjit
CPIit
}
=
χµ
1− τiEt−1
{
NϕitP
−γ
jit CPI
γ
jtCjit
ZitPjit
}
. (B.7)
Now we use the fact that CPIit, Pjit and Nit are predetermined:
Et−1
{
C−σit
EijtYitPjitCjt
CPIit
}
=
χµ
1− τiEt−1
{
N1+ϕit Cjt
}
. (B.8)
The next step in our derivation requires that we assume there is a common numeraire
country, call it 0, and all countries fix their currency with respect to this numeraire currency.
This means that Eijt = Ei0tE0jt. When combined with predetermined prices and output,
the following condition emerges:
Et−1
{
C−σit
YitPjit
CPIit
Ei0t
}
=
χµ
1− τi
Et−1 {Cjt}Et−1
{
N1+ϕit
}
Et−1 {E0jtCjt} (B.9)
A.5.1 Non-Cooperative Equilibrium
Below we describe the non-cooperative Nash equilibrium under LCP. Here we assume that
all countries, with the expection of country i, have a fixed exchange rate with the numeraire
currency, such that E0jt = 1. Given this assumption, the labor clearing condition becomes
Et−1
{
C−σit
YitPjit
CPIit
Ei0t
}
=
χµ
1− τiEt−1
{
N1+ϕit
}
. (B.10)
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Let us now write out the same equation for the numeraire country exporting to i and j
respectively:
Et−1
{
C−σ0t
Y0tPi0t
CPI0t
E00t
}
=
χµ
1− τ0Et−1
{
N1+ϕ0t
} Et−1Cit
Et−1[E0itCit] , (B.11)
Et−1
{
C−σ0t
Y0tPj0t
CPI0t
E00t
}
=
χµ
1− τ0Et−1
{
N1+ϕ0t
} Et−1Cjt
Et−1[E0jtCjt] . (B.12)
If we divide (B.11) by (B.12), and use the fact that prices are predetermined and E0jt = 1,
we get
Pi0t
Pj0t
=
CPIit
CPIjt
=
CPIit
CPI0t
=
Et−1Cit
Et−1[E0itCit] . (B.13)
Financial Autarky
In autarky, we assume all economies in the rest of the world (−i) are ex-ante identical and
that the actions of country i will not influence their policy decisions. Therefore, prices and
price indices will be equalized across all −i countries, so that P0it = Pjit and CPI0t = CPIjt
respectively. This will lead to the following set of identities:
Cit =
∫ 1
0 CjitP0itEijtdj
CPIit
=
P0it
CPIit
∫ 1
0
CjitEijtdj = P0it
CPIit
Ei0t
∫ 1
0
CjitE0jtdj = P0it
CPIit
Ei0tYit.
(B.14)
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Output is standard:
Yit =
∫ 1
0
Cjitdj =
∫ 1
0
(
Pjit
CPIjt
)−γ
Cjtdj =
(
P0it
CPI0t
)−γ
Cwt, (B.15)
P0it
CPI0t
= Y
−1
γ
it C
1
γ
wt. (B.16)
Now we can plug these equations into the labor market clearing equation (1.39).
Et−1C1−σit =
χµ
1− τiEt−1N
1+ϕ
it (B.17)
Goods market clearing will be the following
Cit =
P0it
CPIit
Ei0tYit = P0it
CPI0t
CPI0t
CPIit
Ei0tYit = Ei0tCPI0t
CPIit
Y
γ−1
γ
it C
1
γ
wt. (B.18)
Using (B.13), this can be rewritten as:
Cit =
Et−1 {E0itCit}
E0itEt−1 {Cit}Y
γ−1
γ
it C
1
γ
wt. (B.19)
The optimization problem of the non-cooperative central bank in country i will then be:
L =Et−1
{
C1−σit
}− χY 1+ϕit Et−1 {Z−1−ϕit }+ λ1 [Et−1C1−σit − χµ1− τiEt−1N1+ϕit
]
+ λ2
[
Cit − Et−1[E0itCit]E0itEt−1Cit Y
γ−1
γ
it C
1
γ
wt
]
(B.20)
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Maximization with respect to E0it will yield the following FOC:
∂L
∂E0it =−
1
E0itY
γ−1
γ
it C
1
γ
wt +
Et−1[E0itCit]
E20itEt−1Cit
Y
γ−1
γ
it C
1
γ
wt = 0
⇒ Et−1 {E0itCit} =E0itEt−1 {Cit} (B.21)
This proves that the optimal exchange rate chosen by the central bank must not be state-
contingent. In other words, the central bank will choose to fix its exchange rate.
Complete Markets
In this section, we assume that the degree of exchange rate pass-through is governed by
parameter η ∈ [0, 1], where η = 1 is perfect pass-through (PCP) and η = 0 is zero pass-
through (LCP). Maximization of (A.3) with respect to state contingent bonds yields the
following FOC:
λi(st)
λj(st)
=
λi0
λj0
Pi(st)
Pj(st)Eij(st) =
λi0
λj0
Eηi0t(st)
Eηj0t(st)Eij(st)
=
λi0
λj0
Eη−1ijt (B.22)
Using marginal utility, this will become:
C−σit
C−σjt
= Eη−1ijt . (B.23)
So we can express consumption in the following way: Cit = AiE
1−η
σ
ijt Cjt. Using the fact that
Cjt = Cwt, this will become Cit = AiE
1−η
σ
i0t Cwt. To find Ai we plug this expression into the
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transversality condition.
∞∑
t=1
∑
st
∫ 1
0
qj(st)Bij(st)dj =
∞∑
t=1
∑
st
∫ 1
0
βt
λi(st)Pr(st)Eij(st)
λi0Pi(st)
Bij(st)dj
=
∞∑
t=1
∑
st
βt
λi(st)Pr(st)
λi0Pi(st)
∫ 1
0
Eij(st)Bij(st)dj
(A.1)
=
∞∑
t=1
∑
st
βt
λi(st)Pr(st)
λi0Pi(st)
(
Pi(st)Ci(st)−Wi(st)Ni(st)−Πi(st)
)
= 0
Ai =
∑∞
t=0
∑
st
βt W (st)N(st)P (st) λi(st)Pr(st)∑∞
t=0
∑
st
βtE
1−η
σ
i0t Cw(st)λi(st)Pr(st)
=
∑∞
t=0 β
tEt
{
WtNt
Pt
λi(st)
}
∑∞
t=0 β
tEt−1
{
E
1−η
σ
i0t Cwtλi(st)
}
=
∑∞
t=0 β
tEt {YitTOTitλi(st)}∑∞
t=0 β
tEt
{
E
1−η
σ
i0t Cwtλi(st)
}
=
∑∞
t=0 β
tEt
{
YitTOTitC
−σ
wt
}
∑∞
t=0 β
tEt
{
E
1−η
σ
i0t CwtC
−σ
wt
}
Given the solution for Ai, it follows that:
Cit =
∑∞
t=0 β
tE0
{
YitTOTitC
−σ
wt
}
∑∞
t=0 β
tE0
{
E
1−η
σ
i0t C
1−σ
wt
} E 1−ησi0t Cwt. (B.24)
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If technology shocks are independent across time, then Cit =
Et−1{YitTOTitC−σwt }
Et−1
{
E
1−η
σ
i0t C
1−σ
wt
} E 1−ησi0t Cwt.
Assuming independence of shocks across countries as well, we obtain Cit =
Et−1{YitTOTit}
Et−1
{
E
1−η
σ
i0t
} E 1−ησi0t .
Under LCP, if all countries except i have a fixed exchange rate, we have
Cit =Et−1
{∫ 1
0 CjitP0itEijtdj
CPIit
}
E
1
σ
i0t
Et−1
{
E
1
σ
i0t
}
=Et−1
{
P0it
CPIit
Ei0t
∫ 1
0
CjitE0jtdj
} E 1σi0t
Et−1
{
E
1
σ
i0t
}
=Et−1
{
P0it
CPIit
Ei0tYit
} E 1σi0t
Et−1[E
1
σ
i0t]
Now we assume σ = 1, so that we have log utility. The goods market clearing constraint in
complete markets will then be:
Cit =
P0it
CPIit
Ei0tYit (B.25)
Notice that this expression is identical to (1.40), the goods market clearing constraint in
financial autarky. Since the labor equilibrium condition is also identical to the labor equi-
librium condition in autarky, and the objective function does not change, the solution to
the central bank’s optimization problem in complete markets will be identical to that in
autarky.
♦
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A.5.2 Cooperative Equilibrium
Below we describe the cooperative equilibrium under LCP.
Proposition 7 Under LCP, cooperative central banks will maximize (1.30b) subject to
(1.41) and (1.42). The optimal policy for cooperative central banks in both complete markets
and financial autarky will be a fixed exchange rate.
Proof:
Financial Autarky
Cit =
∫ 1
0 CjitPjitEijtdj
CPIit
(B.26)
Now we assume σ = 1, and Pjit = P0it = CPI0t = CPIit because of ex-ante symmetry, so
the above equation becomes:
Cit = Ei0t
∫ 1
0
CjitE0jtdj. (B.27)
Complete Markets
Cit = Et−1
{∫ 1
0 CjitP0itEijtdj
CPIit
}
E
1
σ
i0t
Et−1
{
E
1
σ
i0t
} = Et−1{ P0it
CPIit
Ei0t
∫ 1
0
CjitE0jtdj
} E 1σi0t
Et−1
{
E
1
σ
i0t
}
(B.28)
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Again, we assume σ = 1, and Pjit = P0it = CPI0t = CPIit because of ex-ante symmetry,
so the above equation becomes:
Cit = Ei0t
∫ 1
0
CjitE0jtdj. (B.29)
Notice that this expression is identical to autarky. Since the labor equilibrium condition
is also identical to autarky, the optimization problem for cooperative central banks under
LCP will be identical in complete markets and autarky.
We know that output will be predetermined because prices are predetermined. As a
result, exchange rate policy can affect only consumption, but not labor. Therefore the
maximization problem faced by cooperative central banks will be as follows:
L =
∫ 1
0
C1−σit di =
∫ 1
0
C1−σit di+
∫ 1
0
λit
(
Cit − Ei0t
∫ 1
0
CjtE−1j0tdj
)
di. (B.30)
The FOC with respect to Ei0t is
∂L
∂Ei0t = −λit
Cit
Ei0t +
∫ 1
0
λjtEj0tCitE−2i0t dj = 0, (B.31)
which yields the following condition:
λitEi0t =
∫ 1
0
λjtEj0tdj. (B.32)
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The above equation holds for all i, j pairs, so that λitEi0t = λjtEj0t. This equation holds
when exchange rates are fixed. ♦
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A.6 Cashless Economy
In this section we demonstrate the equivalence of the central bank optimizing over labor
or the money supply. We begin with the closed economy and then proceed to the open
economy. We will follow the notation employed in the rest of the paper.
A.6.1 Closed Economy
When we have money in the model, the household will maximize the following utility
function:
Et
∞∑
k=0
{
C1−σt+k
1− σ +
ρ
1− b
(
Mt+k
Pt+k
)1−b
− χN
1+η
t+k
1 + η
}
where M/P denotes the household’s real money balances. The household budget constraint
is:
Ct +
Mt
Pt
+
Bt
Pt
= (1− τ)Wt
Pt
Nt +
Mt−1
Pt
+ (1 + it−1)
(
Bt−1
Pt
)
+ Πt. (B.33)
The FOC with respect to Mt is:
C−σt = ρ
(
Mt
Pt
)−b
+
Pt
Pt+1
Et
{
C−σt+1
}
. (B.34)
Labor market clearing implies
1 =
(
χµ
1− τ
)
Et−1{N1+ϕt }
Et−1{C1−σt }
, (B.35)
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while goods market clearing gives
Ct = NtZt. (B.36)
We can now formulate the full optimization problem by the central bank, which maximizes
the utility of the household by choosing a state contingent plan for the money supply.
max
Mt...
lim
ρ→0
Et
∞∑
k=0
{
C1−σt+k
1− σ +
ρ
1− b
(
Mt+k
Pt+k
)1−b
− χN
1+η
t+k
1 + η
}
(B.37)
subject to
Ct = NtZt, (B.38)
1 =
(
χµ
1− τ
)
Et−1{N1+ϕt }
Et−1{C1−σt }
, (B.39)
C−σt = ρ
(
Mt
Pt
)−b
+
Pt
Pt+1
Et
{
C−σt+1
}
. (B.40)
Notice that the price level P is undefined in these equations because prices are set one-
period-in-advance.
The solution to (B.37)-(B.40) will be inferior to that of the following optimization prob-
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lem, where the central bank chooses labor.
max
Nt...
lim
ρ→0
Et
∞∑
k=0
{
C1−σt+i
1− σ +
ρ
1− b
(
Mt+k
Pt+k
)1−b
− χN
1+η
t+k
1 + η
}
(B.41)
subject to
Ct = NtZt (B.42)
1 =
(
χµ
1− τ
)
Et−1{N1+ϕt }
Et−1{C1−σt }
. (B.43)
Why is the solution to the problem characterized by (B.37)-(B.40) inferior to the problem
characterized by (B.41)-(B.43)? In the first problem money supply and inflation define
the dynamics of consumption, and labor and goods market clearing constraints have to be
satisfied. On the other hand, in the second problem the consumption path is arbitrary as
long as it does not violate labor and goods market clearing.
As we demonstrated in Appendix B, the solution to (B.41)-(B.43) is
Ct =
(
1− τ
χµ
) 1
σ+ϕ
Z
1+ϕ
σ+ϕ
t . (B.44)
We can construct a money supply rule that replicates this allocation by substituting (B.44)
into (B.40) and solving for M .
The following money supply rule will implement the consumption allocation given by
(B.44): [(
1− τ
χµ
) 1
σ+ϕ
Z
1+ϕ
σ+ϕ
t
]−σ
− Pt
Pt+1
Et
{
C−σt+1
}
= ρ
(
Mt
Pt
)−b
. (B.45)
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Thus, in equilibrium money supply would follow
[(
1− τ
χµ
) 1
σ+ϕ
Z
1+ϕ
σ+ϕ
t
]−σ
− Pt
Pt+1
Et
{[(
1− τ
χµ
) 1
σ+ϕ
Z
1+ϕ
σ+ϕ
t+1
]−σ}
= ρ
(
Mt
Pt
)−b
(B.46)
Notice, that the money supply rule (B.45) is different from (B.46) in the sense that it
ensures only one equilibrium consumption path.
A.6.2 Open Economy
In the open economy, the central bank’s money supply path is again subject to goods and
labor market clearing constraints. For simplicity we will concentrate on the case of financial
autarky, but the derivation for complete markets is quite similar. Also we ignore i subindices
denoting individual countries to eliminate unnecessary notation. A central bank optimizing
over money supply M in the open economy will face the following problem:
max
Mt...
lim
ρ→0
Et
∞∑
k=0
{
C1−σt+k
1− σ +
ρ
1− b
(
Mt+k
Pt+k
)1−b
− χN
1+η
t+k
1 + η
}
, (B.47)
subject to (B.48)
Ct = C
1
γ
wtN
γ−1
γ
t Z
γ−1
γ
t (B.49)
1 =
(
χµ
1− τ
)
Et−1{N1+ϕt }
Et−1{C1−σt }
, (B.50)
Ct =
[
ρ
(
Mt
CPIt
)−b
+ Et
{
CPIt
CPIt+1
C−σt+1
}]σ
. (B.51)
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The optimization problem faced by a central bank in the open economy choosing labor N
is given by:
max
Ct...
lim
ρ→0
Et
∞∑
k=0
[
C1−σt+k
1− σ +
γ
1− b
(
Mt+k
CPIt+k
)1−b
− χN
1+η
t+K
1 + η
]
, (B.52)
subject to (B.53)
Ct = C
1
γ
wtN
γ−1
γ
t Z
γ−1
γ
t , (B.54)
1 =
(
χµ
1− τ
)
Et−1{N1+ϕt }
Et−1{C1−σt }
. (B.55)
As in the closed economy, when central banks optimize over money (B.47)-(B.51), the
solution will be inferior to that when central banks optimize over labor (B.52)-(B.55). As
we showed in Appendix D, the solution to (B.52)-(B.55) is:
Ct =
(
1− τ
χµ
) 1
σ+ϕ
(
Zγ−1t Z
1+ϕ
σ+ϕ
wt
) 1+ϕ
1−σ+γ(ϕ+σ)
. (B.56)
The money supply rule that implements the same allocation is given by:
[(
1− τ
χµ
) 1
σ+ϕ
(
Zγ−1t Z
1+ϕ
σ+ϕ
wt
) 1+ϕ
1−σ+γ(ϕ+σ)
]−σ
= ρ
(
Mt
CPIt
)−b
+ Et
{
CPIt
CPIt+1
C−σt+1
}
(B.57)
In financial autarky, we know that CPItCt = PtYt. Assuming that the producer price path
P is equal to 1, we can plug in the expression CPIt =
Yt
Ct
and (B.56) to determine the
dynamics of real money supply and formulate a money supply rule that exactly replicates
189
Appendix A Price Stability in Small Open Economies
the allocation given by B.56).
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The Optimal Design of a Fiscal Union
B.1 Proof of Proposition 9 and 10: Flexible Exchange Rate
Allocations
Non-cooperative central banks will maximize their objective function (2.28) subject to
(2.29a), (2.29b), (2.29c) and (2.29d) in complete markets and (2.29a), (2.29c), (2.29d) and
(2.31) in financial autarky. The Lagrangian for the non-cooperative and cooperative cases
is:
L = Et−1
{
C1−σit
}
1− σ − χ
Et−1
{
N1+ϕit
}
1 + ϕ
+ λi
(
Et−1
{
C1−σit
}− χµε
1− τiEt−1
{
N1+ϕit
})
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Using Cit = C
1
γ
wtEt−1
{
N
γ−1
γ
it Z
γ−1
γ
it
}
for complete markets, or Cit = C
1
γ
wtN
γ−1
γ
it Z
γ−1
γ
it for
financial autarky, we can take the first order condition with respect to Nit.
1 The FOC will
be identical in both cases.
∂L
∂Nit
= C−σit (1 + λi(1− σ))
(
γ − 1
γ
)Y γ−1γit C 1γwt
Nit
−χ(1 + λ µε
1− τi (1 + ϕ)
)
1
Nit
N1+ϕit = 0
In equilibrium, this equals:
1 = χ
 1 + λiµε(1+ϕ)1−τi
1 + λi(1−σ)(γ−1)γ

︸ ︷︷ ︸
Constant
 N1+ϕit
C−σit Y
γ−1
γ
it C
1
γ
wt
 . (B.1)
This equation holds in both complete markets and financial autarky, and differs from the
flexible price equilibrium only by the constant term. However, subject to labor market
clearing, this constant will coincide with the flexible price equilibrium. The flexible wage
equilibrium in complete markets and financial autarky is found by taking expectations out
of the labor market clearing condition (2.18) and substituting in goods market clearing
(2.29b):
1 =
(
χµε
1− τi
)
Y
1+ϕγ
γ
it
C−σit C
1
γ
wtZ
1+ϕ
it
. (B.2)
For complete markets, we can express output as a function of technology and a constant
term by substituting (2.29b) into (B.2): Yit = AiZ
γ(1+ϕ)
1+γϕ
it . (We can do the same for exercise
1Remember that we are optimizing given the fact that state st is realized. Expectations in our context
thus refer to a summation over all possible states multiplied by the probability of each state occuring.
For example, Et−1{C1−σit } =
∑
st
C1−σi (st)Pr(st).
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for autarky by substituting (2.31) into (B.2), but leave that to the reader). Using this
expression for output, consumption in complete markets in country i can be expressed as
Cit = A
γ−1
γ
i C
1
γ
wtEt−1
{
Z
(γ−1)(1+ϕ)
1+γϕ
it
}
. (B.3)
Now substitute (B.3) back into the flexible price equilibrium (B.2)
1 =
(
χµε
1− τi
)
C
σ
γ
wtA
(γ−1)σ
γ
i Et−1
{
Z
(γ−1)(1+ϕ)
1+γϕ
it
}σ
A
1+ϕγ
γ
i C
− 1
γ
wt , (B.4)
and rearrange and solve for Ai:
Ai =
[(
1− τi
χµε
)γ
C1−σwt Et−1
{
Z
(γ−1)(1+ϕ)
1+γϕ
it
}−σγ] 11−σ+γ(ϕ+σ)
. (B.5)
Now, substitute the solution (B.5) into (B.3):
Cit =
[(
χµε
1− τi
)1−γ
Cϕ+1wt Et−1
{
Z
(γ−1)(1+ϕ)
1+γϕ
it
}1+γϕ] 11−σ+γ(ϕ+σ)
. (B.6)
Using the fact that Cwt =
∫ 1
0 Citdi = Cit in equilibrium, and setting Zw =
(∫ 1
0 Z
(γ−1)(1+ϕ)
1+γϕ
it di
) 1+γϕ
(γ−1)(1+ϕ)
,
integrate (B.6) over all i and solve for consumption for country i in complete markets:
Cit =
(
1− τi
χµε
) 1
σ+ϕ
Z
1+ϕ
σ+ϕ
w . (B.7)
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Solving for labor and output using (B.7) is a straightforward exercise. The solution to
the central bank’s problem in complete markets and financial autarky for cooperative and
non-cooperative equilibria coincides exactly with the flexible wage allocation.
Non-cooperative fiscal authorities will set a labor tax rate of τi = 1 − µεµγ , introducing a
terms of trade markup to exploit their country-level monopoly power. 
B.2 Proof of Proposition 11 and 12: Currency Union
Allocations
Non-cooperative policymakers in a currency union in complete markets will maximize (2.33)
by choosing a non state contingent income tax rate, subject to (2.29a), (2.29b), (2.29c),
(2.29d) and (2.34). From (2.34) we can compute labor using Yit = ZitNit:
Nit = AZ
γ−1
it . (B.8)
Given the above, consumption will be
Cit = Cwt = A
(∫
Zγ−1it di
) γ
γ−1
. (B.9)
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Using labor market clearing (2.18), and substituting in Yit, Cit, Nit expressed as functions
of A and Zit from above, we find:
1 =
(
χµε
1− τi
)
A1+ϕ
∫ 1
0 Z
(γ−1)(1+ϕ)
it di
A1−σ
(∫ 1
0 Z
(γ−1)
it di
) γ(1−σ)
γ−1
(B.10)
Now we can solve for A:
A =
(
χµε
1− τi
) −1
σ+ϕ
(∫ 1
0
Z
(γ−1)(1+ϕ)
it di
) −1
σ+ϕ
(∫ 1
0
Zγ−1it di
) γ
γ−1
(1−σ)
σ+ϕ
. (B.11)
Given this solution for the constant A, one can solve for Cit and Nit by substituting A into
the expressions above, resulting in (2.35a) for Cit and (2.35b) for Nit. The same exercise in
financial autarky will yield (2.36a) for Cit and (2.36b) for Nit. 
B.3 Proof of Proposition 13: Contingent Fiscal Policy
Within A Currency Union
We now assume that fiscal policymakers can choose their income tax rate in each period. In
both complete markets and financial autarky, the fiscal authority in country i will maximize
utility in each period, choosing the optimal contingent labor tax τit, given the realization
of Zit in that period. To solve for the optimal allocation, follow the exact same steps as in
Appendix B.2, but use τit as the policy instrument rather than Nit. The optimal allocations
will remove the wage rigidity distortion and mimic the flexible exchange rate allocations,
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given by (2.30a) in complete markets and (2.32a) in financial autarky. 
B.4 Proof of Proposition 14: Tax Union
Under flexible exchange rates, policymakers in a tax union will maximize (2.39a) if they
are not in a transfer union or (2.39e) if they are in a transfer union. In a currency union,
policymakers in a tax union will maximize (2.39b) if they are not in a transfer union
or (2.39f) if they are in a transfer union. Policymakers face the constraints outlined in
Propositions 9 (flexible exchange rates and complete markets), 10 (flexible exchange rates
and financial autarky), 11 (currency union and complete markets) or 12 (currency union
and financial autarky), respectively.
In the non-cooperative case, policymakers do not internalize the impact of their tax
rate on other countries. As a result, non-cooperative policymakers set τi to eliminate the
markup on domestic intermediates, µε, but also introduce a terms of trade markup, µγ , to
take advantage of the monopoly power they exercise over their unique export good. The
solution to the non-cooperative problem is τi = 1− µεµγ .
In a tax union policymakers do internalize the impact of their tax rate on other countries.
The solution to the cooperative problem defines the optimal tax rate within a tax union:
τi = 1 − µε. The optimal tax rate in a tax union eliminates the markup on domestic
intermediate goods without imposing a terms of trade markup.

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B.5 Proof of Proposition 15: Transfer Union
In a transfer union, policymakers agree to send contingent cash payments across countries.
Under flexible exchange rates, policymakers in a transfer union will maximize (2.39c) if they
are not in a tax union or (2.39e) if they are in a tax union. In a currency union, policymakers
in a transfer union will maximize (2.39d) if they are not in a tax union or (2.39f) if they
are in a tax union. Policymakers face the constraints outlined in Propositions 9 (flexible
exchange rates and complete markets), 10 (flexible exchange rates and financial autarky),
11 (currency union and complete markets) or 12 (currency union and financial autarky),
respectively. Because the transfers are state contingent, countries jointly agree on a state
contingent plan to insure households against idiosyncratic consumption risk resulting from
asymmetric shocks. Outside of a tax union, the solution to the transfer union optimization
problem under flexible exchange rates will replicate the complete markets allocation detailed
in Proposition 9. Outside of a tax union, the solution to the optimization problem in a
currency union will replicate the complete markets allocation detailed in Proposition 11.
Within a tax union, the solution to the transfer union optimization problem under flexible
exchange rates will replicate the complete markets allocation detailed in Proposition 9
without a terms of trade markup. Outside of a tax union, the solution to the optimization
problem in a currency union will replicate the complete markets allocation detailed in
Proposition 11 without a terms of trade markup.

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B.6 Proof of Proposition 17: Labor Mobility
In the presence of labor mobility, non-cooperative policymakers in a currency union in
financial autarky will face the following problem
max
τi
C1−σ
1− σ − χ
N1+ϕ
1 + ϕ
(B.12)
s.t.
WN(h) = CP (B.13a)
C =
(∫ 1
0
c
γ−1
γ
j dj
) γ
γ−1
(B.13b)
W
pj
= Zj (B.13c)
P =
(∫ 1
0
p1−γj dj
) 1
1−γ
(B.13d)
cj = ZjNj (B.13e)
N(h) =
∫ 1
0
Nj(h)dj (B.13f)
Nj =
[∫ 1
0
Nj(h)
ε−1
ε dj
] ε
ε−1
(B.13g)
where W is equalized across countries because of labor mobility. As each economy in the
currency union is hit with idiosyncratic shocks, labor will shift from low demand bust
countries to high demand boom countries.
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FOCs:
cj =
(pj
P
)−γ
C (B.14)
W
P
=
(
χµε
1− τi
)
CσNϕ (B.15)
To solve for the optimal allocation, begin with (B.13d)
P =
(∫ 1
0
p1−γj dj
) 1
1−γ
=
(∫ 1
0
(
W
Zj
)1−γ
dj
) 1
1−γ
= W
(∫ 1
0
Zγ−1j dj
) 1
1−γ
and solve for the real wage
W
P
=
(∫ 1
0
Zγ−1j dj
) 1
γ−1
. (B.16)
Now substitute this expression for the real wage into (B.13a):
C = N(h)
W
P
= N(h)
(∫ 1
0
Zγ−1j dj
) 1
γ−1
=
∫ 1
0
Nj(h)dj
(∫ 1
0
Zγ−1j dj
) 1
γ−1
.
Take (B.14) and substitute in the expression for the real wage from (B.13c):
cj =
(pj
P
)−γ
C =
(
Zj
W
P
)γ
C, (B.17)
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and then substitute cj = ZjNj in B.17
Nj =
(
W
P
)−γ
Zγ−1j C. (B.18)
Integrating Nj over j will yield
∫ 1
0
Njdj = N = C
(
W
P
)−γ ∫ 1
0
Zγ−1j dj = C
(∫ 1
0
Zγ−1j dj
)− 1
γ−1
. (B.19)
Using (B.15), we can substitute in our expression for N from (B.19) and our expression for
W/P from (B.16):
W
P
=
(∫ 1
0
Zγ−1j dj
) 1
γ−1
=
(
χµε
1− τi
)
CσNϕ.
Solving for C, we find:
C =
(
1− τi
χµε
) 1
σ+ϕ
(∫ 1
0
Zγ−1j dj
) 1+ϕ
(σ+ϕ)(γ−1)
. (B.20)
To solve for Nj simply substitute (B.20) into (B.18):
Nj =
(
1− τi
χµε
) 1
σ+ϕ
(∫ 1
0
Zγ−1j dj
) 1+ϕ−γ(σ+ϕ)
(γ−1)(σ+ϕ)
Zγ−1j . (B.21)
As we’ve mentioned a number of times, the optimal tax rate outside of a tax union in the
decentralized Nash equilibrium will be τi = 1− µεµγ .
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When labor can move freely across borders, the equilibrium allocation outside of a tax
union will be:
Ci =
(
1
χµγ
) 1
σ+ϕ
(∫ 1
0
Zγ−1i di
) 1+ϕ
(σ+ϕ)(γ−1)
Ni =
(
1
χµγ
) 1
σ+ϕ
(∫ 1
0
Zγ−1j dj
) 1+ϕ−γ(σ+ϕ)
(γ−1)(σ+ϕ)
Zγ−1j .
This allocation holds under flexible exchange rates and within a currency union, in both
complete markets and financial autarky. 
B.7 Welfare Derivations
Below, we outline the steps necessary to derive the expected utility functions contained in
Section 2.7 of the paper. Here we only conduct the exercise for flexible exchange rates in
complete markets, but following the steps presented here will also yield the expected utility
functions for the other allocations.
Cflex,complete =
(
1− τi
χµε
) 1
σ+ϕ
(∫ 1
0
Z
(γ−1)(1+ϕ)
1+γϕ
i di
) 1+γϕ
(γ−1)(σ+ϕ)
E {Uflex,complete} =
[
1
1− σ −
1− τi
µε(1 + ϕ)
]
E
{
C1−σflex,complete
}
=
[
1
1− σ −
1− τi
µε(1 + ϕ)
](
1− τi
χµε
) 1−σ
σ+ϕ
E

(∫ 1
0
Z
(γ−1)(1+ϕ)
1+γϕ
i di
) (1+γϕ)(1−σ)
(γ−1)(σ+ϕ)

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For normative analysis, we assume that technology is log-normally distributed and is inde-
pendent across time and across countries: logZit ∼ N(0, σ2Z). The expectation above can
then be rewritten as:
E

(∫ 1
0
Z
(γ−1)(1+ϕ)
1+γϕ
i di
) (1+γϕ)(1−σ)
(γ−1)(σ+ϕ)
 = e
[
(γ−1)(1+ϕ)
1+γϕ
]2 (1+γϕ)(1−σ)
(γ−1)(σ+ϕ) σ
2
Z
= e
(γ−1)(1+ϕ)2(1−σ)
(1+γϕ)(σ+ϕ)
σ2Z .
Now, we insert this expression back into the original equation and get:
E {Uflex,complete} =
[
1
1− σ −
1− τi
µε(1 + ϕ)
](
1− τi
χµε
) 1−σ
σ+ϕ
e
(γ−1)(1+ϕ)2(1−σ)
(1+γϕ)(σ+ϕ)
σ2Z .
Taking logarithms, we can rewrite the log of expected utility as:
logE {Uflex,complete} = log
[
1
1− σ −
1− τi
µε(1 + ϕ)
]
+
1− σ
σ + ϕ
log
(
1− τi
χµε
)
+
(γ − 1)(1 + ϕ)2(1− σ)
(1 + γϕ)(σ + ϕ)
σ2Z .
(B.22)
Calculating the expected utility for the other coalitions simply requires that one follow the
steps outlined here. Notice that when we calculate welfare differences between allocations,
the first and second terms on the right hand side of equation (B.22) will cancel out, leaving
only the difference between the remaining term on the right hand side.
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B.8 Are countries better off in a currency union?
A country with a flexible exchange rate and no risk-sharing is better off than a country in
a currency union with perfect risk-sharing whenever
(1 + ϕ) [1 + ϕ+ (γ − 1)(1− σ)(σ + ϕ)]− (1 + ϕ− γϕ) [1− σ + γ(σ + ϕ)]2 ≥ 0, (B.23)
which can be rewritten in cubic form as
(
γ − 1
){
ϕ(σ + ϕ)2(γ − 1)2 + (γ − 1)
[
2ϕ(σ + ϕ)(1 + ϕ)− (σ + ϕ)2
]
+ ϕ(1 + ϕ)2 + (1− σ)(1 + ϕ)(σ + ϕ)− 2(σ + ϕ)(1 + ϕ)
}
≥ 0. (B.24)
The roots to this cubic equation are:
γ =

σ2+2σ2ϕ−ϕ2+2σϕ2−(σ+ϕ) 32
√
σ+ϕ+4σϕ+4σϕ2
2(σ2ϕ+2σϕ2+ϕ2)
1
σ2+2σ2ϕ−ϕ2+2σϕ2+(σ+ϕ) 32
√
σ+ϕ+4σϕ+4σϕ2
2(σ2ϕ+2σϕ2+ϕ2)
(B.25)
where the first root is less than one, and the third root is greater than one. When γ is less
than one or greater than the third root expressed in (B.25), a country will be better off
outside of a currency union in financial autarky than as a member of a currency union in
complete markets.
In the limiting case as households become completely risk neutral (σ → 0), the roots of
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(B.24) will be
γ =

−1
0
1
(B.26)
while in the opposite limiting case, as households become extremely risk averse (σ → ∞),
the roots of (B.24) will be
γ =

0
1
1+2ϕ
ϕ
(B.27)
Internationally traded goods are perfect complements as γ approaches zero and perfect
substitutes as γ approaches infinity, so γ must be non-negative. We can safely ignore any
negative roots and focus only on positive roots. There is a very small window for which
countries are better off as members of a currency union than as non-members. In a standard
calibration with σ = 2 and ϕ = 3, countries are better off as members of a currency union
only when 1 ≤ γ ≤ 1.12. For all other values of γ outside this narrow range, households
prefer to be outside of a currency union in financial autarky.
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B.9 Extended Model with Home Bias and Calvo Wage
Rigidity
The consumption basket in the home country is given by (2.48), and consists of both home
goods CH and an import basket defined by CF . Similarly the price index will consist of
goods prices of both home and foreign products:
Pit =
[
(1− α)(PHit )1−η + α(PFit )1−η
] 1
1−η
. (B.28)
Relative demand for home and foreign products is given by
CHit = (1− α)
(
PHit
Pit
)−η
Cit, (B.29)
CFit = α
(
PFit
Pit
)−η
Cit, (B.30)
where CFit and C
H
it are defined as
CFit =
(∫
(CFijt)
γ−1
γ dj
) γ
γ−1
, (B.31)
CHit =
(∫
(CHit (h))
−1
 dh
) 
−1
. (B.32)
CFijt denotes consumption by households in country i of the variety produced by country j.
CHit (h) denotes consumption by households in country i of the domestic variety produced
by intermediate firm h.
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Production in each country i and the demand for country i′s goods are given by:
Yit = ZitNit (B.33)
Yit = C
H
it +
(
PHit /P
F
it
)−γ
CH∗t (B.34)
where CH∗t represents foreign consumption of the home good.
Ct =
E0
{∑
βtYit
PH,it
PFit
}
E0
{∑
βt
(
Pit
PFit
)σ−1
σ
} (PFt
Pt
) 1
σ
(B.35)
The equations describing Calvo wage setting are:
VW,t = N
1+ϕ
t + βθWEtVW,t+1 (B.36)
V˜W,t = C
−σ
t
Nt
Pt
+ βθW V˜W,t+1 (B.37)
W˜ = χ
(
ε
ε− 1
)
VW,t
V˜W,t
(B.38)
W 1−εt = (1− θW )W˜ 1−εt + θWW 1−εt−1 (B.39)
where W˜ is the flexible wage and θW is the fraction of households who are able to reset
wages in each period.
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B.10 Non-cooperative Tax Policy in the Extended Model
In this section we solve for the optimal steady state income tax rate for non-cooperative
fiscal authorities in the extended model with home bias. Because the optimal income tax
rate is a steady state object, we will drop all time subscripts in this section. Using the
demand equation from (B.29) and the fact that C = Y PH/P , we can write
CH = (1− α)C1−ηY η. (B.40)
We can also rearrange the price index (B.28) to get
(
PH
P
)η−1
+ α− 1 = α
(
PH
PF
)η−1
. (B.41)
Substitute C/Y = PH/P into (B.41) and rearrange so that
PH
PF
=
[
(C/Y )η−1 + α− 1
α
] 1
η−1
. (B.42)
Now we plug this expression into the demand equation for home products (B.34):
Y = (1− α)C1−ηY η +
[
(C/Y )η−1 + α− 1
α
] −γ
η−1
CH∗ (B.43)
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Using the implicit function theorem, we define C = f(Y )=(B.43), so that the non-cooperative
policymaker’s objective function becomes
max
Y
f(Y )1−σ
1− σ − χ
Y 1+ϕ
1 + ϕ
. (B.44)
The policymaker’s first order conditions with respect to Y are
f ′(Y )f(Y )−σ − χY ϕ = 0 (B.45)
where we’ve used Y = N because we are in steady state, and C = f(Y ). From the implicit
function theorem, we know that f ′(Y ) = −gY /gC , where
g(C, Y ) = −Y + (1− α)C1−ηY η +
[
Cη−1Y 1−η + α− 1
α
] −γ
η−1
CH∗. (B.46)
Solving for gC gives
gC = (1− η)(1− α)C−ηY η − γ
α
[
Cη−1Y 1−η + α− 1
α
] −γ
η−1−1
CH∗Cη−2Y 1−η. (B.47)
In steady state, we know that αC = αY = CH∗, so that gC = (1− η)(1−α)− γ. Similarly,
we solve for gY :
gY = −1 + (1− α)ηC1−ηY η−1 + γ
α
[
Cη−1Y 1−η + α− 1
α
] −γ
η−1−1
CH∗Cη−1Y −η, (B.48)
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which becomes gY = −1+(1−α)η+γ in steady state. Using these two simplified expressions
for gC and gY , we can rewrite the FOC from (B.45):
f ′(Y )f(Y )−σ − χY ϕ = −gY
gC
C−σ − χY ϕ = 1− (1− α)η − γ
(1− η)(1− α)− γ Y
−σ − χY ϕ = 0. (B.49)
Using the implicit function theorem and solving for steady state Y yields:
Y =
(
1− τi
χµε
) 1
σ+ϕ
=
[
1
χ
(
γ − 1 + (1− α)η
γ − (1− α)(1− η)
)]− 1
σ+ϕ
(B.50)
where the optimal tax rate for non-cooperative fiscal authorities is τi = 1−µε
(
γ−1+(1−α)η
γ−(1−α)(1−η)
)
.
As in the closed-form model, the optimal tax rate in a tax union will be τi = 1− µε.
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The Financial Accelerator and the
Optimal Lending Contract
C.1 Value Function Transformation
We can also formulate the optimal contract using normalized variables. For example, one
can substitute leverage into the right hand side of equation (3.5) to obtain
Nt+s(j) = Nt+s−1(j)κt+s−1(j)Rkt+s max {ωt+s(j)− ω¯t+s, 0}+W et+s = Nt+s−1(j)Ret+s(j)+W et+s,
(B.1)
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where Ret (j) = κt−1(j)Rkt max {ωt(j)− ω¯t, 0} is the entrepreneur’s ex post realized return.
Iterating this equation backward generates
Nt+s(j) = Nt+s−1(j)Ret+s(j) +W
e
t+s
= Nt(j)R˜
e
t,t+s +W
e
t+1R˜
e
t+1,t+s...+W
e
t+s
= Nt(j)R˜
e
t,t+s +
s∑
i=1
W et+iR˜
e
t+i,t+s, (B.2)
where R˜et,t+s = R
e
t+1R
e
t+2...R
e
t+s and R˜t+s,t+s = 1. Intuitively, R˜
e
t,t+s is the entrepreneur’s
ex post accumulated rate of return on projects from period t through period t + s. For
example, suppose the entrepreneur invests one dollar in period t and continues to reinvest
his profits in new projects in each subsequent period. In period t+ s, the entrepreneur will
have accumulated R˜et,t+s from his initial one dollar investment. We can substitute (B.2)
into the value function (3.2) and obtain
V et (j) = (1− γ)Et
{
Nt(j)R
e
t+1 +
∞∑
s=2
γs−1
(
Nt(j)R˜
e
t,t+s +
s−1∑
i=1
W et+iR˜
e
t+i,t+s
)}
. (B.3)
Because the entrepreneur will optimize with respect to leverage and the productivity cutoff
we want to express (B.3) as a function of the leverage and the productivity cutoff. In the
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first step, we separate terms to get
V et (j) = (1− γ)Nt(j)Et
{
R˜et,t+1
∞∑
s=1
γs−1R˜et+1,t+s
}
+ (1− γ)Et
{ ∞∑
s=1
γs−1
( s−1∑
i=1
W et+iR˜
e
t+i,t+s
)}
,
(B.4)
where we used R˜et,t+s = R˜
e
t,t+1R˜
e
t+1,t+s. Net worth enters the value function as a con-
stant multiplicative term and has no effect on the entrepreneur’s choice of leverage κt(j)
or cutoff ω¯t+1; both enter only through R˜
e
t,t+1. Using the law of iterated expectations
Et(xt+1) = Et[E(xt+1|Ωagg,t+1)] and the independence of idiosyncratic productivity from
aggregate productivity, we can replace the realizations of idiosyncratic productivity with
their expectation and get
V et (j) = (1− γ)Nt(j)Et
[
R˜e,aggt,t+1
∞∑
s=1
γs−1R˜e,aggt+1,t+s
]
+ (1− γ)Et
[ ∞∑
s=2
γs−1
( s−1∑
i=1
W et+iR˜
e,agg
t+i,t+s
)]
,
(B.5)
where R˜e,aggt,t+s = R
e,agg
t+1 R
e,agg
t+2 ...R
e,agg
t+s with R˜
e,agg
t+s,t+s = 1, and R
e,agg
t+1 = κtR
k
t+1g(ω¯t+1) is
the enterpreneur’s ex post realized rate of return expressed as a function of aggregate
productivity and leverage, with g(ω¯t+1) =
∫∞
ω¯t+1
[ω − ω¯t+1]f(ω)dω.
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Now we can reexpress value function as
V et (j) = (1− γ)Nt(j)(Ψt − 1) + (1− γ)Et
[ ∞∑
s=1
γsW et+s(Ψt+s − 1)
]
, (B.6)
where Ψt = 1 + γEt
[
κtR
k
t+1g(ω¯t+1, σω,t)Ψt+1
]
. If we divide the lender’s ex post returns in
equation (3.7) by Nt(j) we get
[
κt(j)− 1
]
Rt+1(j) = κt(j)R
k
t+1h(ω¯t+1, σω,t). (B.7)
Now, if we substitute (B.7) into the Euler equation for the representative household (3.12),
we have
βEt
{
UC,t+1κt(j)R
k
t+1h(ω¯t+1, σω,t)
}
=
[
κt(j)− 1
]
UC,t. (B.8)
Before looking at the first order conditions to the optimization problem, it is important
to notice that all entrepreneurs will choose the same leverage and state-contingent interest
rate regardless of their net worth, due to the homotheticity of the problem. Thus, the
entrepreneur index (j) is omitted below. We use the following notation: BGG refers to the
contract of Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (1999), CFP refers to the contract of Carlstrom,
Fuerst and Paustian (2012), and Optimal refers to the optimal contract with non-myopic
entrepreneurs
213
Appendix C The Financial Accelerator and the Optimal Lending Contract
C.2 BGG Contract
In the BGG contract, the lender is guaranteed a fixed rate of return. In this case, the
entrepreneur’s Lagrangian will be:
LBGG = (1− γ)Et
{
NtκtR
k
t+1g(ω¯t+1, σω,t) + λt+1
[
βEt
{
UC,t+1
}
ktR
k
t+1h(ω¯t+1, σω,t)− (kt − 1)UC,t
]}
.
The entrepreneur’s first order conditions with respect to κt and ω¯t+1 are:
∂LBGG
∂κt
= NtEt
{
Rkt+1g(ω¯t+1, σω,t)
}
− Et
{
λt+1
}UC,t
κt
= 0 (B.9)
∂LBGG
∂ωt+1
= NtκtR
k
t+1gω(ω¯t+1, σω,t) + λt+1βEt
{
UC,t+1
}
κtR
k
t+1hω(ω¯t+1, σω,t) = 0
= Ntgω(ω¯t+1, σω,t) + λt+1βEt
{
UC,t+1
}
hω(ω¯t+1, σω,t) = 0 (B.10)
If we substitute ∂L
BGG
∂ωt+1
into ∂L
BGG
∂κt
, we find
NtEt
{
Rkt+1g(ω¯t+1)
}
= Et −
{
Ntgω(ω¯t+1, σω,t)
hω(ω¯t+1)βEtUc,t+1
}
UC,t
κt
. (B.11)
Rearranging, simplifying and substituting in the stochastic discount factor yields:
κtEt
{
Rkt+1g(ω¯t+1, σω,t)
}
= −Et
{
gω(ω¯t+1, σω,t)
hω(ω¯t+1, σω,t)
}
1
EtΛt,t+1
. (B.12)
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C.3 CFP Contract
In the CFP contract, the entrepreneur’s Lagrangian is:
LCFP = (1− γ)
{
NtκtEt
[
Rkt+1g(ω¯t+1, σω,t)
]
+ λt
[
Et
(
βUC,t+1ktR
k
t+1h(ω¯t+1, σω,t)
)
− (kt − 1)UC,t
]}
.
The entrepreneur’s first order conditions with respect to κt and ω¯t+1 are:
∂LCFP
∂κt
= (1− γ)
[
NtEt
{
Rkt+1g(ω¯t+1, σω,t)
}
+ λt
(
Et
{
βUC,t+1R
k
t+1h(ω¯t+1, σω,t)− UC,t
})]
= 0,
∂LCFP
∂ω¯t+1
= (1− γ)
[
NtκtR
k
t+1gω(ω¯t+1, σω,t) + λtβUC,t+1κtR
k
t+1hω(ω¯t+1, σω,t)
]
= 0.
Rearranging these first order conditions, solving in terms of λt and setting them equal to
each other yields:
κtEt
{
Rkt+1g(ω¯t+1, σω,t)
}
= − gω(ω¯t+1, σω,t)
hω(ω¯t+1, σω,t)
1
Λt,t+1
. (B.13)
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C.4 Optimal Contract With Forward Looking Entrepreneurs
Under the optimal contract, the forward looking entrepreneur’s Lagrangian has the following
form (if we divide the value function by (1− γ)Nt(j) as a scaling factor):
LOptimal =(1− γ)Et
{
Nt(j)(Ψt − 1) +
∞∑
s=1
γsW et+s(Ψt+s − 1)
+
∞∑
i=0
λt+i
[
βUc,t+i+1κt+iRk,t+i+1h(ω¯t+i+1, σω,t+i)− (κt+i − 1)Uc,t+i
]}
,
where Ψt = 1 + κtEt
{
g(ω¯t+1, σω,t)Rk,t+1Ψt+1
}
. The entrepreneur’s first order condition
with respect to leverage κt is:
∂LOptimalt
∂κt
= (1− γ)Et
{
Nt(j)g(ω¯t+1, σω,t)Rk,t+1Ψt+1 + λt
(
βUC,t+1R
k
t+1h(ω¯t+1, σω,t)− UC,t
)}
= 0,
where we have used the fact that ∂Ψt∂κt = Et
{
g(ω¯t+1, σω,t)Rk,t+1Ψt+1
}
and ∂Ψt+i∂κt = 0 for
i = 1, 2, ... The entrepreneur’s first order condition with respect to the productivity cutoff
ω¯t+1 is:
∂LOptimalt
∂ω¯t+1
=(1− γ)
{
Nt(j)κtgω(ω¯t+1, σω,t)Rk,t+1Ψt+1 + λt
[
βUC,t+1κtRk,t+1hω(ω¯t+1, σω,t)
]}
= 0.
(B.14)
where we have used the fact that ∂Ψt∂ω¯t+1 = κtg
′(ω¯t+1, σω,t)Rk,t+1Ψt+1 and
∂Ψt+i
∂ωt+1
= 0 for
i = 1, 2... We then move λt to the right hand side of both first order conditions and divide
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the equations by each other to obtain:
gω(ω¯t+1, σω,t)Et+1Ψt+1
Et
{
Rkt+1g(ω¯t+1, σω,t)Ψt+1
} = βκtUC,t+1hω(ω¯t+1, σω,t)
βEt
{
UC,t+1κtRkt+1h(ω¯t+1)
}
− κtUC,t
=
βκtUC,t+1hω(ω¯t+1, σω,t)
(κt − 1)UC,t − κtUC,t
where we utilized the participation constraint for lenders in the final step. After rearranging
and simplifying, we get
κtEt
{
Ψt+1R
k
t+1g(ω¯t+1, σω,t)
}
= − gω(ω¯t+1, σω,t)
hω(ω¯t+1, σω,t)
Ψt+1
Λt,t+1
. (B.15)
C.5 BGG Contract With Forward Looking Entrepreneurs
For a predetermined lending rate, the non-myopic entrepreneur’s Lagrangian has the fol-
lowing form if we divide the value function by (1− γ)Nt(j) as a scaling factor:
L =(1− γ)Et
{
Nt(j)(Ψt − 1) +
∞∑
s=1
γsW et+s(Ψt+s − 1)
+
∞∑
i=0
λt+i+1
[
βEt
{
Uc,t+i+1
}
κt+iRk,t+i+1h(ω¯t+i+1, σω,t+i)− (κt+i − 1)Uc,t+i
]}
,
where Ψt = 1 + κtEt
{
g(ω¯t+1, σω,t)Rk,t+1Ψt+1
}
. The entrepreneur’s first order condition
with respect to leverage κt is:
∂Lt
∂κt
= (1− γ)Et
{
Nt(j)g(ω¯t+1, σω,t)Rk,t+1Ψt+1 + λt+1
(
βEt
{
UC,t+1
}
Rkt+1h(ω¯t+1, σω,t)− UC,t
)}
= 0,
(B.16)
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where we have used the fact that ∂Ψt∂κt = Et
{
g(ω¯t+1, σω,t)Rk,t+1Ψt+1
}
and ∂Ψt+i∂κt = 0 for
i = 1, 2, ... The entrepreneur’s first order condition with respect to the productivity cutoff
ω¯t+1 is:
∂Lt
∂ω¯t+1
=(1− γ)
{
Nt(j)κtgω(ω¯t+1, σω,t)Rk,t+1Ψt+1 + λt+1
[
βEt
{
UC,t+1
}
κtRk,t+1hω(ω¯t+1, σω,t)
]}
= 0.
(B.17)
where we have used the fact that ∂Ψt∂ω¯t+1 = κtgω(ω¯t+1, σω,t)Rk,t+1Ψt+1 and
∂Ψt+i
∂ωt+1
= 0 for
i = 1, 2... One can express λt+1 in the equation
∂L
∂ωt+1
= 0 as a function of other variables,
and substitute the result into ∂L∂κt = 0. Then, using the participation constraint to simplify
and after some rearranging, we obtain:
κtEt
{
Ψt+1R
k
t+1g(ω¯t+1, σω,t)
}
= −Et
{
gω(ω¯t+1, σω,t)
hω(ω¯t+1, σω,t)
Ψt+1
EtΛt,t+1
}
. (B.18)
It is trivial to show that log-linearization of the BGG contract with myopic or non-myopic
agents gives an identical optimality condition. However, this identity does not hold for
higher order approximations.
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C.6 Complete Log-Linearized Model
In this section we review the whole model in its log-linearized form.
New Keynesian Components
We begin with the set of equations characterizing the standard New Keynesian components
of the model. Equation (B.19) gives the Euler equation for state-contingent assets from the
FOC for deposits, while (B.20) is the Euler equation for nominal bonds. The labor market
clearing condition is given by (B.21), (B.22) is the New Keynesian Phillips curve, (B.23) is
the production function, (B.24) gives the evolution of capital, (B.25) refers to the dynamics
of the price of capital, (B.26) gives returns to capital, and (B.27) refers to goods market
clearing. Shocks to technology, monetary policy, government spending and idiosyncratic
risk are defined by (B.28), (B.29), (B.30) and (B.31).
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− σ
(
EtCˆt+1 − Cˆt
)
+ EtRˆt+1 = 0, (B.19)
Rˆnt = EtRˆt+1 + Etpˆit+1 (B.20)
Yˆt − Hˆt − Xˆt − σCˆt = ηHˆt, (B.21)
pˆit = −(1− θ)(1− θβ)
θ
Xˆt + βEtpˆit+1. (B.22)
Yˆt = Aˆt + αKˆt−1 + (1− α)(1− Ω)Hˆt. (B.23)
Kˆt = δIˆt + (1− δ)Kˆt−1, (B.24)
Qˆt = δφK(Iˆt − Kˆt−1), (B.25)
Rˆkt+1 = (1− )(Yˆt+1 − Kˆt − Xˆt+1) + Qˆt+1 − Qˆt (B.26)
Y Yˆt = CCˆt + IIˆt +GGˆt + C
eCˆet + φµφˆµ,t, (B.27)
Aˆ = ρAAˆt−1 + At (B.28)
Rˆnt = ρ
RnRˆnt−1 + ξpˆit + ρ
Y Yˆt + 
Rn
t (B.29)
Gˆt = ρ
GGˆt−1 + Gt (B.30)
σˆω,t = ρ
σω σˆω,t−1 + σωt (B.31)
Entrepreneurial Consumption and Net Worth
The evolution of entrepreneurial net worth is given by (B.32), where (B.33) defines leverage.
Entrepreneurial consumption is defined by (B.34) and the financial premium is given by
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(B.35).
Nˆt+1 = N (Nˆt + Rˆt+1 + κ(Rˆ
k
t+1 − Rˆt+1) + νΨσˆω,t) + (1− N )(Yˆt − Xˆt), (B.32)
κˆt = Kˆt + Qˆt − Nˆt (B.33)
Cˆet+1 = Nˆt + Rˆt+1 + κ(Rˆ
k
t+1 − Rˆt+1) + νΨσˆω,t (B.34)
EtRˆkt+1 − EtRˆt+1 = νκκˆt + νσσˆω,t (B.35)
Dynamics of the Lending Rate
The BGG lending rate is defined as (B.36a), the CFP lending rate is defined as (B.36b) and
the optimal lending rate is defined as (B.36c). These log-linear expressions are derived in
Appendix C.7.
Rˆt+1 − EtRˆt+1 =

0 (B.36a)
Rˆkt+1 − EtRkt+1 − α˜σ(Cˆt+1 − EtCˆt+1) (B.36b)
Rˆkt+1 − EtRkt+1 − α˜
[
σ(Cˆt+1 − EtCˆt+1) + Ψˆt+1 − EtΨˆt+1
]
(B.36c)
Ψˆt+1 = NEt+1
{
(κ− 1)(Rˆkt+2 − Rˆt+2) + Rˆkt+2 + νΨσˆω,t+1 + Ψˆt+2
}
(B.37)
Monitoring Costs
φˆµt = Cˆ
e
t+1 + νµ
(
1
κ− 1 κˆt − (Rˆk,t+1 − Rˆt+1)
)
+ νσ,µσˆω,t (B.38)
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C.7 Log-linearization of the Lending Contracts
Log-linearization of the Common Optimality Condition
We begin by log-linearizing the common optimality condition for each contract. The non-
linear participation constraint and FOC are, respectively:
βEt
{
UC,t+1
}
ktR
k
t+1h(ω¯t+1, σω,t)− (kt − 1)UC,t = 0, (B.39)
κtEt
{
Rkt+1g(ω¯t+1, σω,t)
}
= −Et
{
g′(ω¯t+1, σω,t)
h′(ω¯t+1, σω,t)
}
1
EtΛt,t+1
. (B.40)
In their linearized form, these become:
− σ
(
EtCˆt+1 − Cˆt
)
+ Rˆkt+1 +
hω
h
ω¯ωˆt+1 +
hσω
h
σωσˆω,t =
1
κ− 1 κˆt, (B.41)
κˆt + EtRkt+1 +
gω
g
ω¯Etωˆt+1 +
gσω
g
σωσˆω,t = −EtΛˆt,t+1 +
(
gωω
gω
− hωω
hω
)
ω¯Etωˆt+1 +
(
gωσ
gω
− hωσ
hω
)
σωσˆω,t.
(B.42)
Now we take the expected value of the participation constraint (B.41) and obtain:
EtΛˆt,t+1 + EtRˆkt+1 +
hω
h
ω¯Etωˆt+1 +
hσω
h
σωσˆω,t =
1
κ− 1 κˆt. (B.43)
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Define 4ˆt = Rˆkt − Rˆt, and rewrite the system as:
1
κ− 1 κˆt −
hσω
h
σωσˆω,t − Et4ˆt+1 = hω
h
ω¯Etωˆt+1,
κˆt + Et4ˆt+1 −
(
gωσ
gω
− hωσ
hω
− gσω
g
)
σωσˆω,t =
(
gωω
gω
− hωω
hω
− gω
g
)
ω¯Etωˆt+1. (B.44)
Now we can set these two equations equal to each other and eliminate ω:
κˆt + Et4ˆt+1 −
(
gωσ
gω
− hωσ
hω
− gσω
g
)
σωσˆω,t =
(
gωω
gω
− hωωhω −
gω
g
)
hω
h
(
1
κ− 1 κˆt −
hσω
h
σωσˆω,t − Et4ˆt+1
)
.
(B.45)
We can rearrange this to obtain:
Et4ˆt+1 =
(
gωω
gω
− hωωhω
)
(
gωω
gω
− hωωhω −
gω
g +
hω
h
) 1
κ− 1 κˆt +
[
− hσωh
(
gωω
gω
− hωωhω −
gω
g
)
+ hωh
(
gωσ
gω
− hωσhω −
gσω
g
)]
(
gωω
gω
− hωωhω −
gω
g +
hω
h
) σωσˆω,t.
(B.46)
This can be simplified to give the log-linear optimality condition, which is identical for all
three lending contracts:
Et4ˆt+1 = νκκˆt + νσσωσˆω,t (B.47)
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where
νκ =
(
gωω
gω
− hωωhω
)
(
gωω
gω
− hωωhω −
gω
g +
hω
h
) 1
κ− 1 , (B.48)
νσ =
[
− hσωh
(
gωω
gω
− hωωhω −
gω
g
)
+ hωh
(
gωσ
gω
− hωσhω −
gσω
g
)]
(
gωω
gω
− hωωhω −
gω
g +
hω
h
) . (B.49)
Log-linearization of the BGG Lending Rate
The log-linear lending rate in BGG is given by:
Rˆt+1 − EtRˆt+1 = 0 (B.50)
Log-linearization of the CFP Contract
The non-linear participation constraint and FOC are, respectively:
βEt
{
UC,t+1ktR
k
t+1h(ω¯t+1, σω,t)
}
− (kt − 1)UC,t = 0, (B.51)
κtEt
{
Rkt+1g(ω¯t+1, σω,t)
}
= −g
′(ω¯t+1, σω,t)
h′(ω¯t+1, σω,t)
1
Λt,t+1
. (B.52)
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In their linearized form, these become:
EtRˆkt+1 − EtRˆt+1 +
hω
h
ω¯Etωˆt+1 +
hσω
h
σωσˆω,t =
1
κ− 1 κˆt, (B.53)
κˆt + EtRkt+1 +
gω
g
ω¯Etω¯t+1 +
gσω
g
σωσˆω,t = −Λˆt,t+1 +
(
gωω
gω
− hωω
hω
)
ω¯ωˆt+1 +
(
gωσ
gω
− hωσ
hω
)
σωσˆω,t.
(B.54)
Now we plug the participation constraint (B.53) into the FOC (B.54) and obtain
κˆt + EtRkt+1 +
gω
g
hω
h
(
1
κ− 1 κˆt − EtR
k
t+1 + EtRt+1 −
hσω
h
σωσˆω,t
)
+
gσω
g
σωσˆω,t =
−Λˆt,t+1 +
(
gωω
gω
− hωω
hω
)
ω¯ωˆt+1 +
(
gωσ
gω
− hωσ
hω
)
σωσˆω,t. (B.55)
Using −
gω
g
hω
h
= (k − 1), we can simplify the last expression to:
k(EtRˆkt+1 − EtRˆt+1) + Λˆt,t+1 − EtΛˆt,t+1 +
(
− gωhσω
ghω
+
gσω
g
− gωσ
gω
+
hωσ
hω
)
σωσˆω,t =
(
gωω
gω
− hωω
hω
)
ω¯ωˆt+1.
(B.56)
Define lender’s returns by log-linearizing Rt+1 =
κt
κt−1h(ω¯t+1, σω,t)R
k
t+1:
Rˆt+1 = − 1
k − 1 kˆt +
hω
h
ω¯ωˆt+1 +
hσω
h
σωσˆω,t + Rˆ
k
t+1. (B.57)
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Now substitute in the expression for the cutoff and obtain
Rˆt+1 =
hω
h
gωω
gω
− hωωhω
[
k(EtRˆkt+1 − EtRˆt+1) + Λˆt,t+1 − EtΛˆt,t+1 +
(
− gωhσω
ghω
+
gσω
g
− gωσ
gω
+
hωσ
hω
)
σωσˆω,t
]
− 1
k − 1 kˆt +
hσω
h
σωσˆω,t + Rˆ
k
t+1. (B.58)
Finally, substitute in the expression for leverage:
Rˆt+1 =
hω
h
gωω
gω
− hωωhω
[
Λˆt,t+1 − EtΛˆt,t+1 +
(
− gωhσω
ghω
+
gσω
g
− gωσ
gω
+
hωσ
hω
)
σωσˆω,t
]
+
[
− hσωh
(
gωω
gω
− hωωhω −
gω
g
)
+ hωh
(
gωσ
gω
− hωσhω −
gσω
g
)]
(
gωω
gω
− hωωhω
) σωσˆω,t
+
hσω
h
σωσˆω,t + (EtRˆkt+1 − EtRˆt+1) + Rˆkt+1. (B.59)
After some rearranging and canceling out like terms, we obtain the log-linear CFP lending
rate:
Rˆt+1 =
hω
h
gωω
gω
− hωωhω
[
Λˆt,t+1 − EtΛˆt,t+1
]
− (EtRˆkt+1 − EtRˆt+1) + Rˆkt+1. (B.60)
This can be rewritten in the same form as Corollary 2 in the text:
Rˆt+1 − EtRˆt+1 = Rˆkt+1 − Et+1Rˆkt+1 − α˜σ
(
Cˆt+1 − EtCˆt+1
)
(B.61)
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where α˜ =
hω
h
hωω
hω
− gωω
gω
.
Log-linearization of the Optimal Contract
The non-linear participation constraint and FOC are, respectively:
βEt
{
UC,t+1ktR
k
t+1h(ω¯t+1, σω,t)
}
− (kt − 1)UC,t = 0 (B.62)
κtEt
{
Ψt+1R
k
t+1g(ω¯t+1, σω,t)
}
= −g
′(ω¯t+1, σω,t)
h′(ω¯t+1, σω,t)
Ψt+1
Λt,t+1
, (B.63)
where Ψt is defined as:
Ψt = 1 + κtEt{g(ω¯t+1, σω,t)Rk,t+1Ψt+1}. (B.64)
In their linearized form, the participation constraint and FOC become:
−σ
(
EtCˆt+1 − Cˆt
)
+ EtRˆkt+1 +
hω
h
ω¯Etωˆt+1 +
hσ
h
σωσˆω,t =
1
κ− 1 κˆt, (B.65)
EtΨt+1 + κˆt + EtRkt+1 +
gω
g
ω¯Etω¯t+1 +
gσω
g
σωσˆω,t =Ψˆt+1 − Λˆt,t+1 +
(
gωω
gω
− hωω
hω
)
ω¯ωˆt+1
+
(
gωσ
gω
− hωσ
hω
)
σωσˆω,t. (B.66)
where
Ψˆt = N
(
κˆt +
gω
g
ω¯Etωˆt+1 +
gσ
g
σωσˆω,t + EtRˆkt+1 + EtΨˆt+1
)
. (B.67)
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Now we substitute the participation constraint into the optimality condition and obtain:
κˆt + EtRkt+1 +
gω
g
hω
h
(
1
κ− 1 κˆt − EtR
k
t+1 + EtRt+1 −
hσω
h
σωσˆω,t
)
+
gσω
g
σωσˆω,t
= −Λˆt,t+1 +
(
gωω
gω
− hωω
hω
)
ω¯ωˆt+1 +
(
gωσ
gω
− hωσ
hω
)
σωσˆω,t + Ψˆt+1 − EtΨˆt+1. (B.68)
Using −
gω
g
hω
h
= (k − 1), we can simplify the previous expression to
(
gωω
gω
− hωω
hω
)
ω¯ωˆt+1 =k(EtRˆkt+1 − EtRˆt+1) + Λˆt,t+1 − EtΛˆt,t+1
+
(
− gωhσω
ghω
+
gσω
g
− gωσ
gω
+
hωσ
hω
)
σωσˆω,t − (Ψˆt+1 − EtΨˆt+1).
(B.69)
Define the lender’s returns by log-linearizing Rt+1 =
κt
κt−1h(ω¯t+1, σω,t)R
k
t+1:
Rˆt+1 = − 1
k − 1 kˆt +
hω
h
ω¯ωˆt+1 +
hσω
h
σωσˆω,t + Rˆ
k
t+1. (B.70)
Now substitute in the expression for the cutoff and obtain:
Rˆt+1 =
hω
h
gωω
gω
− hωωhω
[
k(EtRˆkt+1 − EtRˆt+1) + Λˆt,t+1 − EtΛˆt,t+1 +
(
− gωhσω
ghω
+
gσω
g
− gωσ
gω
+
hωσ
hω
)
σωσˆω,t
− (Ψˆt+1 − EtΨˆt+1)
]
− 1
k − 1 kˆt +
hσω
h
σωσˆω,t + Rˆ
k
t+1. (B.71)
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Rearranging and canceling out like terms yields:
Rˆt+1 =
hω
h
gωω
gω
− hωωhω
[
Λˆt,t+1 − EtΛˆt,t+1 − (Ψˆt+1 − Et Ψˆt+1)
]
+ Rˆkt+1 − (EtRˆkt+1 − EtRˆt+1).
(B.72)
This can be rewritten in the same form as Corollary 3 in the text:
Rˆt+1 − EtRˆt+1 = Rˆkt+1 − Et+1Rˆkt+1 − α˜
[
σ
(
Cˆt+1 − EtCˆt+1
)
+ Ψˆt+1 − EtΨˆt+1
]
(B.73)
where α˜ =
hω
h
hωω
hω
− gωω
gω
. Finally, we eliminate ω in the expression for Ψˆt:
Ψˆt = N
[
κˆt+
gω
g
hω
h
(
1
κ− 1 κˆt−EtRˆ
k
t+1 +EtRˆt+1−
hσω
h
σωσˆω,t
)
+
gσ
g
σωσˆω,t+EtRˆkt+1 +EtΨˆt+1
]
(B.74)
and we can rearrange this expression to match Corollary 3 in the text:
Ψˆt+1 = NEt+1
{
(κ− 1)(Rˆkt+2 − Rˆt+2) + Rˆkt+2 + νΨσˆω,t+1 + Ψˆt+2
}
(B.75)
where νΨ =
gσ−hσ gωhω
g σω.
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